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VIROTECH PATENTS
INTRODUCTION
Access to medicines goes hand in hand with the protection of intellectual
property rights. At a time when the United States is undertaking large-scale
reforms in both the intellectual property and healthcare arenas, it is worth
thinking more deeply and broadly about the connections between the two.
In March 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act' and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.
The passage of these highly controversial statutes led to a constitutional
challenge to the first statute before the United States Supreme Court. In the
5-4 decision of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
Chief Justice John Roberts upheld the statute's individual mandate while
striking down its Medicaid expansion provisions.'
In the intellectual property arena, Congress enacted the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act4 in September 2011, providing a complete overhaul of
the U.S. patent system. The next year, high-stakes patent trials resulted in
three eye-popping verdicts, each exceeding $1 billion.' By the end of the
2012 Term, the United States Supreme Court has reviewed an unusually
large number of patent cases.' As Timothy Holbrook reminded us:
Starting in around 2000, the Supreme Court became active, if not
even hyperactive, in patent law. . . . Additionally, the Supreme
Court's intervention is no longer on the periphery of patent law.
The cases they have decided go right to the substance of patent
law: the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel,
subject matter eligibility, induced infringement, the statutory
experimental use defense, to name but a few.
Of great interest in the 2012 Term was Association for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.8 Lying at the intersection of intellectual
1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
2. Pub. L. No. 111-152,124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
3. Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
4. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
5. See Amanda Bronstad, IP Awards Dominate, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 2013,
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202590587509&slreturn=20131006195123
(reporting the verdicts from the lawsuit Carnegie Mellon University filed against Marvell
Technology, the lawsuit Apple filed against Samsung Electronics, and the lawsuit Monsanto
filed against DuPont).
6. For a discussion of the Court's growing interest, see generally Timothy R. Holbrook,
Explaining the Supreme Court's Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62 (2013).
7. Id. at 63-64 (footnotes omitted).
8. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
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property and public health, this case concerned the patentability of
composition and method claims covering two isolated human genes
associated with breast and ovarian cancers as well as their alterations and
mutations. In a surprisingly short decision, Justice Clarence Thomas held
that "a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not
patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that [synthetically
created DNA segment known as complementary DNA] is patent eligible
because it is not naturally occurring."' He further noted that the case did not
involve patent claims in "an innovative method of manipulating genes while
searching for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes," "patents on new applications
of knowledge about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes," and "the patentability
of DNA in which the order of the naturally occurring nucleotides has been
altered."o Although it is too early to assess the full implications of this
narrowly written decision, it is not hard to appreciate the decision's
potential impact on U.S. biotechnology and life science industries. Myriad
Genetics will also raise important questions about the appropriate level of
patent protection in relation to the development of biologics" and
diagnostic kits. 12
At the international level, there has been a decade-long, but still vibrant,
debate about the major impediments the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 3 ("TRIPS Agreement") has
generated to access to essential medicines in less developed countries-a
term used collectively to cover both developed and least developed
9. Id. at 2111.
10. Id. at 2119-20.
11. For discussions of intellectual property issues in relation to biologics, see generally
Donna M. Gitter, Innovators and Imitators: An Analysis of Proposed Legislation Implementing
an Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-on Biologics in the United States, 35 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 555 (2008); Christopher M. Holman, Maintaining Incentives for Healthcare Innovation:
A Response to the FTC's Report on Follow-on Biologics, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 755
(2010); Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry's Unintended Admission
that Biotech Patents Fail Enablement, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8 (2006); Symposium, Follow-on
Biologics: Implementation Challenges and Opportunities, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 501 (2011).
12. See, e.g., EDSON BEAS RODRIGUES JR., THE GENERAL EXCEPTION CLAUSES OF THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT: PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 168-69 (2012) (discussing the
impact of gene patents on the development of diagnostic kits); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P.
Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption, Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic
Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1361-70 (2011) (providing a case study of patent-related
issues arising in genetic diagnostics).
13. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I C, 108 Stat. 4809,
869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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countries as identified within the World Trade Organization ("WTO").14
Since the TRIPS Agreement entered into force in January 1995, it not only
has taken away the wide policy space less developed countries once enjoyed
at the international level," but it has also resulted in needless deaths and
suffering to patients that have acquired either the human immunodeficiency
virus ("HIV") or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS")."6
The pandemic caused by HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis has also
greatly reduced the productivity of many countries in sub-Saharan Africa."
14. See Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 858-62
(2007) (discussing these deleterious impacts). For book-length discussions of access-to-
medicines problems in relation to the TRIPS Agreement, see generally SUDIP CHAUDHURI, THE
WTO AND INDIA'S PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRY: PATENT PROTECTION, TRIPS, AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2005); HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE
CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2008); CYNTHIA M. Ho, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS
(2011); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PHARMACEUTICALS, AND PUBLIC HEALTH: ACCESS TO DRUGS
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Kenneth C. Shadlen et al. eds., 2012); VALBONA MUZAKA, THE
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2011); NEGOTIATING
HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006)
[hereinafter NEGOTIATING HEALTH].
15. See generally Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 14, at 855-72
(discussing the growing enclosure of the policy space of less developed countries at the
international level).
16. For discussions of access-to-medicines problems in relation to HIV/AIDS, see
generally THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (Obijiofor Aginam, John Harrington & Peter K. Yu eds., 2013)
[hereinafter GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS]; THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HIV/AIDS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: TRIPS, PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS AND FREE ACCESS (Benjamin Coriat
ed., 2008) [hereinafter POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HIV/AIDS].
17. See FRANKLYN LISK, GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC:
RESPONDING TO AN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS 82-92 (2009) (discussing the impact of HIV/AIDS
on human resource capacity); Wolfgang Hein et al., Introduction: Globalization, HIVIAIDS and
the Rise of Global Health Governance, in GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE AND THE FIGHT
AGAINST HIV/AIDS 1, 7 (Wolfgang Hein et al., eds., 2007) [hereinafter FIGHT AGAINST
HIV/AIDS] ("HIV/AIDS and infectious diseases strike hardest at the productive parts of the
population, at the pool of experienced individuals that would qualify for leading positions in
society, leading to economic decline."); Colin McInnes, National Security and Global Health
Governance, in GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: CRISIS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL
ECONOMY 42, 48 (Adrian Kay & Owain David Williams eds., 2009) [hereinafter GLOBAL
HEALTH GOVERNANCE] (noting the "disproportionate impact [of HIV/AIDS] upon workers in
what should be the most productive period of their lives"); Geoff Tansey, Introduction: Legal
Fictions and Public Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 14, at 1, 2 (noting that, in
rural Africa, "HIV/AIDS is devastating farming families and undermining their ability to
farm"); Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme
Court in PhRMA v. Walsh and the TRIPS Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 777, 821 (2004)
[hereinafter Ragavan, Jekyll and Hyde] ("An epidemic increase of AIDS reduced life
expectancy and affected labor and economic output, as the younger casualties increase.
Consequently, national productivity declined in several developing nations since the loss of
labor from the loss of each life affected a proportionate value of output." (footnotes omitted));
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In December 2013, WTO member states met in the Ninth Ministerial
Conference in Bali, with the hope of reviving the Doha Development
Round of Trade Negotiations ("Doha Round")." This ministerial
conference was held a few months after WTO members agreed at the
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS
Council") to extend the transition period for least developed countries."
Article 66 of the TRIPS Agreement initially set the period at ten years.20 in
November 2005, shortly before the Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong
Kong, WTO members agreed to extend the period for seven-and-a-half
years until July 1, 2013, as long as the extension-seeking country has not
yet met the TRIPS requirements or has not already offered protection in
excess of those requirements. 21 Building on Haiti's formal request for
another extension on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group,22 the
June 2013 TRIPS Council decision further extended the transition period
for eight years until July 1, 2021 without the earlier "non-rollback"
commitment.23
Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 14, at 855 ("At the macro level, health
problems could also lower the productivity of a country-to the point that it will fall behind its
trading partners in terms of economic development, technological innovation, industrial
progress, and national competitiveness.").
18. Press Release, World Trade Org. [WTO], Bali Ministerial to Be Held 3-6 December
2013 (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/newsl2_e/gcl 1decl2_e.htm.
19. Press Release, WTO, The Least Developed Get Eight Years More Leeway on
Protecting Intellectual Property (June 11, 2013), http://www.wto.org/english/newse/
newsl3_e/trip_ 11junl3_e.htm.
20. TRIPS Agreement art. 66.
21. Press Release, WTO, Poorest Countries Given More Time to Apply Intellectual
Property Rules (Nov. 29, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/news e/pres05_e/pr424_e.htm.
22. Communication from Haiti on Behalf of the LDC Group, Request for an Extension of
the Transitional Period Under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/W/583 (Nov. 5,
2012). Haiti initially proposed to extend the transition period "for as long as the WTO Member
remains a least developed country." That proposal, though eventually failed, earned the support
of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), and more than 300 civil society organizations. See UNAIDS
& UNDP, TRIPS Transition Period Extensions for Least-developed Countries 6 (UNAIDS,
Issue Brief, 2013), http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/
unaidspublication/2013/JC2474_TRIPS-transition-period-extensionsen.pdf [hereinafter
UNAIDS/UNDP Issue Brief] (calling on the WTO members to give "close and immediate
attention" to the extension request from least developed countries); Catherine Saez, WTO: LDCs
to Press for Extension for TRIPS, Plain Packaging Back, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 26, 2013,
2:15 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/02/26/wto-ldcs-to-press-for-extension-for-trips-plain-
packaging-back (reporting the support least developed countries received from UNAIDS,
UNDP, and civil society organizations).
23. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property [TRIPS Council],
Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 for Least Developed Country Members:
Decision of the Council for TRIPS of II June 2013, IP/C/64 (June 11, 2013). For discussions of
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Notwithstanding this recent extension for least developed countries,
there remains another deadline that is highly important to the global access
to medicines debate. This deadline concerns the ratification of the protocol
to amend the TRIPS Agreement, which WTO member states adopted also
shortly before the Hong Kong Ministerial.2 4 If ratified by two-thirds of the
WTO membership, the new Article 31bis would allow countries with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity to import generic versions of
patented pharmaceuticals. Although the initial deadline for ratification was
December 1, 2007, that deadline has since been extended four times to
December 31, 2015. As of this writing, slightly less than a third of the 159
WTO member states have ratified the proposed amendment." If the
amendment fails to attain the requisite ratifications by the new deadline, this
deadline will have to be extended again.26
Sadly, with all the interrelated developments in the intellectual property
and public health arenas both within and outside the United States, the
domestic debate remains surprisingly disconnected from the international
debate. Because of this disconnect, the laws and policies Congress and the
administration adopt often do not synchronize with developments abroad.
To help bridge this disconnect, this Article discusses the interrelationship
between intellectual property and public health in the context of
communicable diseases. This type of disease is intentionally picked to
highlight how developments abroad could easily affect what happens at
home, and vice versa.
this extension, see generally Frederick M. Abbott, Technical Note: The LDC TRIPS Transition
Extension and the Question of Rollback (ICTSD Programme on Innovation, Technology and
Intellectual Property, Policy Brief No. 15, 2013), available at http://ictsd.org/
downloads/2013/05/the-ldc-trips-transition-extension-and-the-question-of-rollback.pdf; Arno
Hold & Bryan Christopher Mercurio, After the Second Extension of the Transition Period for
LDCs: How Can the WTO Gradually Integrate the Poorest Countries into TRIPS? (NCCR
Trade Regulation, World Trade Institute, University of Bern, Working Paper No. 2013/42,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2302335.
24. General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005)
[hereinafter TRIPS Amendment], available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/tripse/wtl641 e.htm; see also Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note
14, at 872-86 (tracing the development of Article 3 1bis of the TRIPS Agreement).
25. Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips_e/amendment-e.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2013)
[hereinafter Members Accepting Amendment].
26. See General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 11, WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 509 (2004)
[hereinafter August 30 Decision] (stating that the waivers granted in this decision "shall
terminate for each Member on the date on which an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement
replacing its provisions takes effect for that Member").
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Parts I to III of this Article recount three distinct "virostories"-stories
about viruses responsible for AIDS, the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome ("SARS"),2 7 and the avian influenza.2 8 Part I discusses the
ongoing developments within the WTO concerning efforts to address the
access-to-medicines problems in relation to HIV/AIDS and other
pandemics. Part II documents the unusual race among research and health
institutions in Canada, Hong Kong, and the United States to patent
technologies involving the isolated gene sequences of the SARS
coronavirus. This Part also explores the use of patenting as a defensive
measure and the development of patent pools as a solution to prevent the
creation of a patent thicket. Part III examines the recent efforts by
Indonesia, India, and other members of the Non-Aligned Movement to
claim sovereignty over viruses found within their jurisdictions. This Part
focuses on the H5N1 strain of the avian influenza virus in Indonesia.
To help illustrate the need to take a global, holistic, multidisciplinary
socio-legal approach, which will be the focus of the second half of this
Article, Parts I to III embrace the narrative technique. Such a technique
enables the stories to be told in a way that would be meaningful to those
participating in both the intellectual property and public health debates. The
thick descriptions the article provides also highlight related issues on cross-
border trade, global governance, human development, North-South
relations, international sovereignty, human rights protection, and medical
and biological ethics. With a wide range of characters, openings, plot twists,
and endings, these virostories provide insight into the different facets of the
international patent debate. By bringing together HIV/AIDS, SARS, and
H5N1, this Article will further remind policymakers that the discussion on
the TRIPS Agreement should not focus so much on the HIV/AIDS crisis in
the less developed world to the point that they ignore other similar problems
created by an out-of-balance intellectual property system.2 9
27. For discussions of SARS, see generally THOMAS ABRAHAM, TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY
PLAGUE: THE STORY OF SARS (2007); TIM BROOKES, BEHIND THE MASK: How THE WORLD
SURVIVED SARS, THE FIRST EPIDEMIC OF THE 21ST CENTURY (2004); DAVID P. FIDLER, SARS,
GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE (2004); KARL TARO GREENFELD, CHINA
SYNDROME: THE TRUE STORY OF THE 21ST CENTURY's FIRST GREAT EPIDEMIC (2006); WORLD
HEALTH ORG. [WHO], SARS: HOW A GLOBAL EPIDEMIC WAS STOPPED (2006) [hereinafter
HoW A GLOBAL EPIDEMIC WAS STOPPED].
28. See generally AVIAN INFLUENZA: SCIENCE, POLICY AND POLITICS (Ian Scoones ed.,
2010) [hereinafter AVIAN INFLUENZA] (discussing avian influenza).
29. As the U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights reminded us:
It is particularly important not to allow the debate in [the intellectual
property] area to be influenced unduly by the HIV/AIDS experience,
dramatic though it is. Apart from HIV/AIDS, which is the biggest single
cause of mortality in developing countries, TB and malaria claim almost as
1570  Ariz. St. L.J.
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Part IV draws seven important lessons from the three earlier narratives to
advance a new, integrated approach to setting international intellectual
property norms. This new approach takes account of both the existing
problems concerning the TRIPS Agreement and the new problems
precipitated by the negotiation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
("ACTA"), 30 the Trans-Pacific Partnership ("TPP") Agreement,3 1 and other
nonmultilateral trade and investment agreements. 32 Tying domestic laws
and policies to the international debate, this Part focuses on three sets of
issues that often come up in the international intellectual property norm-
setting process: negotiation gains, the negotiation process, and negotiated
outcomes.
By bringing together both the descriptive and the prescriptive, this
Article seeks to drive home the message that the international intellectual
property and public health debates could easily spill over into the domestic
debates, and vice versa. Just as viruses do not recognize national
boundaries 3 -as health professionals have repeatedly warned us-
many lives. Together all three diseases claimed nearly six million lives [in
2001], and led to debilitating illness for millions more. In addition, there are
a number of less common diseases which are collectively important. These
include, for instance, measles, sleeping sickness, leishmaniasis and Chagas
disease.
COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 30
(2002) [hereinafter IPR COMMISSION REPORT] (footnote omitted).
30. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M.
243 (2011) [hereinafter ACTA].
31. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP.,
http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited Nov. 7, 2013) (providing up-to-date information about the
TPP).
32. See, e.g., Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement,
May 28, 2004 [hereinafter CAFTA-DR], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text;
United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004 [hereinafter
AUSFTA], available at http://www.ustrgov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/australian-
fta/final-text; United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003
[hereinafter SUSFTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset-upload-file708_4O36.pdf. For discussions of bilateral,
plurilateral, and regional trade agreements, see sources cited in Peter K. Yu, Intellectual
Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1045, 1046 n.1 (2012).
For a discussion of intellectual property provisions in international investment agreements, see
generally Bryan Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Property Rights in
International Investment Agreements, 15 J. INT'L ECON. L. 871 (2012).
33. As Colin McInnes observed:
Health threats, the provision of health care services and the market for
pharmaceuticals are increasingly transborder in nature. In terms of health
security, this makes defence 'at the border' a near impossibility despite
45: 1563] 1571
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policymakers and commentators should also think more holistically and
globally about the connections between the domestic and international
debates and between developments in the intellectual property and public
health arenas. After all, there are non-altruistic reasons for developed
countries to promote access to essential medicines in the less developed
world.
I. VIRAL PANDEMIC
The first virostory concerns one of the most dreadful viruses of all time:
HIV, a virus that results in the development of the yet-to-be curable AIDS.34
Since its discovery more than three decades ago, AIDS has grown from a
disease afflicting only a small portion of the world's population to one
having major deleterious effects on an ever-growing number of people. To
date, over thirty million adults and about 2.5 million children have been
infected with the disease.3 5 Another twenty-five million have died owing to
the infection."6 If we count family members, loved ones, and the numerous
professionals and volunteers who have cared for the infected, HIV/AIDS
has disturbed the lives of an incalculable number of individuals and
communities from around the world.
Yet, despite the gravity of this public health crisis and the many
dedicated responses, we are still nowhere close to finding a solution to
containing, if not curing, the disease. As the Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV/AIDS ("UNAIDS") lamented in its 2010 report, about
two-thirds of the estimated fifteen million people living with HIV in less
efforts by states to do just that. The state can no longer function as a self-
contained vessel for health provision (and indeed health security), rather it
has become permeable. This is most obliviously the case with infectious
disease where the processes of globalization have enabled disease to spread
more quickly.
McInnes, supra note 17, at 44 (citation omitted); accord FIDLER, supra note 27, at 13-16
(discussing the "germs do not recognize borders" mantra of public health); MARK W. ZACHER &
TANIA J. KEEFE, THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: UNITED BY CONTAGION 1
(2008) ("[T]he world is becoming an ever smaller place, and microbes that cause devastating
diseases do not stop for border guards.").
34. But cf David Brown, Baby Born with HIVIs Apparently Cured with Aggressive Drug
Treatment, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2013, at Al (reporting that "[a] baby born with the AIDS virus
two years ago in Mississippi who was put on antiretroviral therapy within hours of birth appears
to have been cured of the infection").
35. UNAIDS, GLOBAL REPORT: UNAIDS REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 2010,
at 180 (2010).
36. Thirty Years of a Disease: The End of AIDS?, ECONOMIST, June 4, 2011, at 11,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/l8774722.
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developed countries have no access to affordable life-saving medications."
Such limited access has renewed fears that the disease will continue to
plague the globe for decades to come.
Of great importance in the intellectual property arena are issues
concerning access to essential medicines-and in this case, access to
HIV/AIDS antiretrovirals. The arrival of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994 has
greatly curtailed the ability of less developed countries to manufacture
affordable generic medicines. Article 27.1, for example, requires WTO
member states to offer strong protection of patent rights to "any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that
they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application."" By prohibiting the distinction between patents for
pharmaceutical products and patents for processes used to manufacture
those products, this provision takes away a key flexibility that some argued
has contributed to the successful development of the Indian generic
pharmaceutical industry."
Although Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement allows countries to adopt
compulsory licenses under several narrow-and some would say
cumbersome-conditions,4 0 it has greatly curtailed the ability of these
countries to export medicines to less developed countries in need. Article
31(f) specifically limits compulsory licenses to uses "authorized
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market."4 1 While countries
could still export "a 'non-predominant' part of the production,"42 such
export is unlikely to sustain a local generic pharmaceutical industry.
37. UNAIDS, supra note 35, at 7.
38. TRIPS Agreement art. 27.1.
39. See Peter Drahos, Securing the Future of Intellectual Property: Intellectual Property
Owners and Their Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 53,
76 (2004) ("India's success in building a strong pharmaceutical industry was based in large
measure upon its recognition of patents for pharmaceutical processes, but not for
pharmaceutical products.").
40. See TRIPS Agreement art. 31 (providing a set of complex procedural rules governing
the conditions under which compulsory licenses are to be issued); see also K.M. Gopakumar,
The WTO Deal on Cheap Drugs: A Critique, 7 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 99, 102 (2004) (stating
that the procedural formalities required by Article 31 "will result in inordinate delays in the
supply of drugs to the importing country").
41. TRIPS Agreement art. 31(f).
42. Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade
and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 317, 319 (2005) [hereinafter Abbott,
WTO Medicines Decision]; accord Communication from the European Communities and Their
Member States, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration of the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, 3, IP/C/W/352 (June 20, 2002) (conceding that Article 31(f) "does ... allow a non-
predominant part of the products concerned to be destined to supply foreign markets (except
under the circumstances addressed by Article 31(k))"); F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-
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As if these restrictions were not significant enough, Article 39.3 of the
TRIPS Agreement mandates protection against the unfair commercial use of
clinical trial data that have been submitted to regulatory agencies for the
approval of pharmaceutical products that utilize new chemical entities.4 3
Such protection could make it difficult for pharmaceutical companies to
reduce the costs of producing generic drugs by skipping costly clinical trials
and conducting bioequivalence studies instead." In recent years, the brand
name pharmaceutical industry has relied on Article 39.3 to push for data
exclusivity regimes through the negotiation of bilateral, plurilateral, and
regional trade agreements.45 If adopted, these regimes would provide even
stronger protection than what is required under the provision.
Given the TRIPS Agreement's significant intrusions on a less developed
country's policy space, it is no surprise that intergovernmental
organizations and commentators have widely criticized the Agreement for
its pernicious effects on the protection of public health. In her highly critical
review of the TRIPS Agreement, Mary Robinson, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, observed:
[T]he overall thrust of the TRIPS Agreement is the promotion of
innovation through the provision of commercial incentives. The
various links with the subject matter of human rights-the
promotion of public health, nutrition, environment and
development-are generally expressed in terms of exceptions to
TRIPS Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing Nations, 5 J. INT'L EcoN. L.
913, 925 (2002) ("The 'predominantly' term in Article 31(f) clearly implies that some
exportation under compulsory license in the exporting nation will be allowed."). Interestingly,
the African Group proposed to interpret Article 31(f) "to mean that up to 49.9 percent of the
production can be exported." Joint Communication from the African Group in the WTO,
Proposal on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
6(d), IP/C/W/351 (June 24, 2002) [hereinafter African Group Proposal].
43. TRIPS Agreement art. 39.3.
44. As the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act stated:
A drug shall be considered to be bioequivalent to a listed drug if... the rate
and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant difference
from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered at
the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental
conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses ....
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B) (2012). Even bioequivalence studies can be quite expensive. For
example, "[a] study in Colombia estimated that the requirement of bioequivalence studies for
anti-hypertensive and anti-inflammatory drugs would increase the price of domestically
manufactured products by a percentage of between 46 and 61 per cent." Joan Rovira, Creating
and Promoting Domestic Drug Manufacturing Capacities: A Solution for Developing
Countries, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 14, at 227, 234.
45. For discussions of the protection of undisclosed clinical trial data and data exclusivity
regimes, see sources cited in Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 14, at 895
n.363.
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the rule rather than the guiding principles themselves and are made
subject to the provisions of the Agreement.46
Her report also expressed concern that the Agreement's high international
minimum standards and the autonomy it took away could undermine
"States' abilities to promote and protect human rights," such as the right to
life, the right health, and the right to development.47 She considered it rather
problematic that "the protection contained in the TRIPS Agreement focuses
on forms of protection that have developed in industrialized countries."48
To be certain, brand name pharmaceutical companies have both the
financial and manufacturing capacities to provide affordable medicines to
less developed countries. Nevertheless, they rarely do so voluntarily, even if
differential pricing-the practice of charging drugs at different prices in
different regions, countries, or market segments--could enable them to
target both the high- and low-end markets.4 9
There are at least three reasons. First, pharmaceutical companies are
concerned that drugs made available at discounted prices would flow back
as parallel imports to their developed country markets, such as the United
States or members of the European Union.so In recent years, these
companies have worked closely with governments to close down online
pharmacies, which they claimed were selling unsafe and sub-standard
drugs.5 1
46. High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on the
Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, T 22, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001)
[hereinafter High Commissioner's Report].
47. Id. 124.
48. Id. 25.
49. See generally Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, Theory and Implementation of
Diferential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 425 (Keith E. Maskus &
Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS] (discussing
differential pricing).
50. See Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic
Considerations, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 563, 566-67 (2002) [hereinafter Maskus, Ensuring Access to
Essential Medicines] ("There are concerns that if medicines were offered to poorer patients at
lower prices the drugs could be resold in the higher-priced segment of the market."). "While
arbitrage is often cited as a factor preventing differential pricing, the real magnitude of the
concern must be kept in perspective. Large pharmaceutical companies understand the problems
of arbitrage and know how to take appropriate safeguards." Peter J. Hammer, Diferential
Pricing of Essential AIDS Drugs: Markets, Politics and Public Health, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 883,
889 n.10 (2002). The August 30 Decision, for example, requires products produced under a
Paragraph 6 license to be "clearly identified as being produced under the system set out in this
Decision through specific labelling or marking." August 30 Decision, supra note 26, 1 2(b)(ii).
51. See, e.g., Press Release, Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am., PhRMA Commends the
Administration for Increased Attention to Worldwide Counterfeit Medicine Threat (Mar. 11,
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Second, pharmaceutical companies fear that the price concessions they
make in less developed countries would reveal the marginal costs of drug
production. Such revelation, in turn, could result in public or governmental
pressure in developed country markets, calling for lower drug prices for at
least low-income households.5 2 In addition, the use of "reference pricing"-
that is, price controls based on an index of prices in comparison countries-
by health authorities in some developed countries has made pharmaceutical
companies reluctant to set lower prices in the less developed world."
Third, because wealth is usually distributed very unevenly in many less
developed countries-South Africa being a notorious example-some
pharmaceutical companies choose to sell their products at high prices that
are affordable by the "more affluent minority," even if those prices would
make the products unaffordable to the larger and poorer majority.54 Given
2011), available at http://www.phrma.org/media/releases/phrma-commends-administration-
increased-attention-worldwide-counterfeit-medicine-thre ("[T]he U.S. government's renewed
emphasis on collaboration, information sharing, education and enforcement-as it relates to
counterfeit pharmaceuticals-is warmly welcomed. The role of the Intellectual Property
Enforcement Coordinator in shaping this strategic, comprehensive, organized and coordinated
U.S. government response to combating counterfeit medicines internationally cannot be
understated."). Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between counterfeit and sub-standard
drugs. While counterfeit drugs are sold in violation of intellectual property laws, sub-standard
drugs fail to meet the stated quality, safety, or efficacy standards. Because of the very different
focus, counterfeit drugs can be sub-standard, but not all counterfeit drugs are sub-standard. See
Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 12 (2010) ("Policymakers
and industry representatives have a high tendency to equate pirated or counterfeit products with
sub-standard goods. However, this tendency is somewhat misguided." (footnote omitted)); see
also Li Xuan, Ten General Misconceptions About the Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 14, 20-21
(Li Xuan & Carlos M. Correa eds., 2009) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT]
(discussing the misconception that counterfeit and piracy always pose a consumer threat).
52. See Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and
Trends in Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 14, at 27, 29
[hereinafter Abbott, Cycle of Action]; see also Hammer, supra note 50, at 893-94 ("[E]ven
without the threat of physical arbitrage, implicitly revealing information in the very act of
setting lower prices in developing countries could lead to an unravelling of high prices in
developed countries.").
53. See Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines, supra note 50, at 567 ("In a
reference pricing system, price controls in one country are based on an index of prices in
comparison countries. To the extent that the comparison group includes developing economies,
firms may prefer not to offer price discounts there.").
54. See Danzon & Towse, supra note 49, at 455 ("[P]ricing in some [developed countries]
is dominated by the demands of small, affluent populations, resulting in prices that are
unaffordable to the majority of poorer people."); Sean Flynn et al., An Economic Justification
for Open Access to Essential Medicine Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L., MED. &
ETHICs 184, 185 (2009) ("[I]n countries with very high income inequality, which characterizes
many developing countries, market forces may produce incentives for patent holders to
maximize profits by pricing their products to serve only the wealthiest sliver of the
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the certainty in the affluent market and the efficiency generated by
strategies targeting comparable customers, it is understandable why many
pharmaceutical companies would find the affluent market more attractive.
Based on these three reasons, brand name pharmaceutical companies have
limited interest in providing affordable drugs to less developed countries,
despite their considerable demand for these drugs.
To meet this demand, less developed countries have sought solutions
elsewhere. Although the TRIPS Agreement has greatly strengthened patent
protection, it includes transition periods for developing and least developed
countries," technology transfer provisions, 7  explicit health-related
population."); F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented
Medicines in Developing Countries 45 (Comm'n on Macroeconomics & Health, Working Paper
No. WG4:1, 2001), cited in Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 14, at 844
n.75 (advancing the concept of the "more affluent minority"). As Sean Flynn, Aidan Hollis, and
Mike Palmedo explained:
Income inequality exists to a greater or lesser extent in every developing country,
where a small minority often earns salaries that compare to those of advanced
industrialized countries and the majority live in poverty. This inequality creates
incentives for an unrestrained monopoly supplier ineluctably to set drugs prices high.
The problem is that relatively rich people, though few, are able to pay so much more
for their drugs that it is more profitable for a company to serve them only. The greater
the inequality of the income or wealth distribution, the more severe this problem
becomes, with greater individual ability to pay on the part of the very rich pushing the
price up.
Flynn et al., supra, at 190 (footnote omitted).
55. See Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines, supra note 50, at 566
("[P]harmaceutical firms and their distributors in poor countries may find it more profitable to
sell drugs in low volumes and high prices to wealthier patients with price-inelastic demand
rather than in high volumes at low prices to poorer patients.").
56. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 65-66.1 (providing transition periods for developing,
transition, and least developed countries).
57. See id. art. 7 ("The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.");
id. art. 66.2 (requiring developed countries to "provide incentives to enterprises and institutions
in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-
developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological
base"); id. art. 67 (requiring developed countries to "provide, on request and on mutually agreed
terms and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of developing and least-
developed country Members"); see also WTO, Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns:
Decision of 14 November 2001, 1 11.2, WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov. 20, 2001) (stating that "the
provisions of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement are mandatory"). Sadly, despite the explicit
language in these provisions and the WTO's recent affirmation of the mandatory nature of the
technology transfer obligations under Article 66.2, "developed countries thus far have only paid
lip service to these obligations, with some undoubtedly subscribing to the view that these
obligations are merely aspirational." Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, 18 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 479, 526 (2011).
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safeguards," and a number of other flexibilities." A key flexibility is
Article 31, which allows countries to provide compulsory licenses under
very restrictive conditions.6 0 Although developed countries often criticize
less developed countries for using compulsory licenses, those licenses are
available in many developed countries," including both the United States62
and members of the European Union.
Thus far, few less developed countries dared to ignore external pressure
to issue compulsory licenses in the pharmaceutical area.13 Brazil is
58. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement art. 8.1 ("Members may, in formulating or amending their
laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition ... ,
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement."); id. art. 27.2
("Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of
the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including
to protect human, animal or plant life or health . . . , provided that such exclusion is not made
merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.").
59. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 14, at 863-66 (discussing
the various flexibilities available in the TRIPS Agreement).
60. TRIPS Agreement art. 31.
61. See IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 42 ("Canada used compulsory
licensing extensively in the pharmaceutical field from 1969 until the late 1980s. This resulted in
prices of licensed drugs being 47% lower than in the US in 1982. The UK also used compulsory
licensing until the 1970's, including for important drugs such as Librium and Valium."
(footnote omitted)); James Love, Access to Medicine and Compliance with the WTO TRIPS
Accord: Models for State Practice in Developing Countries, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 74, 81-83 (Peter Drahos & Ruth
Mayne eds., 2002) (discussing the government use provisions in the United States, Italy,
Australia, Germany, Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, the Philippines, Ireland, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom); Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 14, at 845
("[C]ompulsory licensing has been widely used throughout the world, including by such
developed countries as Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.").
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012) (allowing the government and its contractors to use
patented items in return for compensation through a proceeding before the United States Court
of Federal Claims); see also Frederick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The Herculean Task of
Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 49, at
393, 412 ("No country facilitates government use of patents better than the United States.");
Ragavan, Jekyll and Hyde, supra note 17, at 796-812 (discussing the United States' use of
compulsory licensing and price control mechanisms under circumstances less threatening than
national emergencies).
63. See ELLEN F.M. 'T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY
POWER: DRUG PATENTS, ACCESS, INNOVATION AND THE APPLICATION OF THE WTO DOHA
DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 44-59 (2009) (discussing the use of compulsory
licensing arrangements in Brazil, Thailand, Malaysia, South Africa, Kenya, and India); Jonathan
Burton-MacLeod, Tipping Point: Thai Compulsory Licences Redefine Essential Medicines
Debate, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL
MEDICINES 406 (Thomas Pogge et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC
HEALTH] (discussing Thailand's use of compulsory licenses to promote access to essential
medicines); Elizabeth Siew-Kuan Ng, Global Health and Development: Patents and Public
Interest, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH, supra, at 101, 120 ("Thailand's use of
compulsory licensing in relation to antiretroviral drugs for HIV/AIDS, cancer and heart disease
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generally considered the poster child for using-or, more precisely,
threatening to use-compulsory licenses to obtain concessions from brand
name pharmaceutical companies.' As Pedro Roffe noted, "[w]hile the
[Brazilian] Government never issued a compulsory licence, it managed to
use the mere threat of issuing one to reduce the price of individual
HIV/AIDS retroviral drugs by up to 75 per cent."" Notwithstanding its
success, Brazil does not provide a good model for other less developed
countries. Many conditions in that country cannot be replicated in other
parts of the less developed world.
First, the significant productive capacity in the public sector in Brazil
"allowed the country to make the threat of compulsory licensing credible
and, as a consequence, gave it a strong negotiating capacity for obtaining
low prices from patent holders."66 Having indigenous productive capacity is
important because a country cannot force pharmaceutical companies to
export drugs against their wishes or devote resources to develop treatments
for diseases that primarily affect its population."
Second, Brazil contains a lucrative middle class market that U.S.
pharmaceutical companies cannot afford to lose or alienate. Compared with
other less developed countries, Brazil "is less dependent on the U.S. for ...
a market for its own exported products."" Its large, profitable domestic
market has enabled the development and sustenance of a local generic
. . . has precipitated similar calls from other developing countries, such as India and the
Philippines, for the urgent need to lower the cost of medicines and make them more affordable
to sufferers.").
64. See, e.g., IPR COMMIsSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 43 (providing the Brazilian
National STD/AIDS Program as an illustration); Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents,
and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 32
(2002) [hereinafter 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents] (stating that "[t]he Brazil AIDS
program serves as a model for some developing countries that are able to produce medicines
locally").
65. Pedro Roffe with Christoph Spennemann & Johanna von Braun, From Paris to Doha:
The WTO Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, in NEGOTIATING
HEALTH, supra note 14, at 9, 15; see also Karin Timmermans, Ensuring Access to Medicines in
2005 and Beyond, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 14, at 41, 46 (noting that strategies
seeking voluntary licenses at reasonable royalty rates "are bound to be most successful when
they are backed up by a realistic 'threat' to use TRIPS safeguards or competition laws").
66. Rovira, supra note 44, at 236.
67. Theoretically, countries could nationalize foreign pharmaceutical firms, if those firms
were already present in the country. In reality, however, such action is highly undesirable,
because it could only be used once. In the long run, it would also hurt the country more than it
would help. See Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34
AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 358-59 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Access to Medicines].
68. Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Distributive Politics and International
Institutions: The Case ofDrugs, 36 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 21, 44 (2004).
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pharmaceutical industry, which, in turn, could benefit from the economies
of scale and scope created by that market.69
Third, Brazil has the right conditions and infrastructure to manufacture
drugs. As a World Health Organization ("WHO") document noted:
The complex process of pharmaceutical production . . . requires
special technologies, reliable supplies of high-quality raw
materials, and dependable provision of top-quality water,
electricity, gas and other utilities. It also needs sufficient human
resources with specialist knowledge, such as experts in
pharmaceutical development, quality assurance and regulatory
processes. Even for generic drugs, some research and development
is necessary for the manufacture of high-quality products, and the
expenses and time incurred are often underestimated.
Pharmaceutical plants need a huge initial capital outlay and take
many years to construct; they tend to be located in countries with a
good infrastructure, reliable utilities and access to technical
expertise.70
Thus, unlike Brazil, a lot of less developed countries, including virtually
all of those in the least developed world, have neither the ability nor the
leverage to use Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement to convince brand name
pharmaceutical companies to reduce drug prices.n Even worse, Article
69. See Communication from the Permanent Mission of Brazil, Paragraph 6 of the
Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 12, IP/C/W/355 (June
24, 2002) (noting that "economies of scale that would reduce costs of production and thus
provide more affordable prices for . .. countries in situations . . . where domestic production in
small quantities from a compulsory licence for a particularly high-priced product may be
impractical or too costly"); Rovira, supra note 44, at 229 (pointing out that a limited market size
"might make unprofitable a local industry restricted to the domestic market"); Yu, The
International Enclosure Movement, supra note 14, at 848 ("Because the markets in less
developed countries are very small, it may be virtually unprofitable to develop a local industry
that is primarily restricted to the domestic market.").
70. WHO Executive Board, Manufacture of Antiretrovirals in Developing Countries and
Challenges for the Future, 2, WHO Doc. EB 114/15 (Apr. 29, 2004), available at
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/20177/1/B1 14_15-en.pdf; see Rovira, supra note 44, at
231 ("Few developing and emerging countries have the capacity to produce [active
pharmaceutical ingredients]. Those who can include India, China, Thailand, Egypt, Brazil,
Mexico, Argentina and, to some extent, Yugoslavia and Turkey."); Timmermans, supra note 65,
at 42 (noting that "Indian companies are major suppliers of generic medicines and of the active
pharmaceutical ingredients ... necessary for their production to other developing and developed
countries").
71. See N. Lalitha, Access to Indian Generic Drugs: Emerging Issues, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, PHARMACEUTICALS, AND PUBLIC HEALTH: ACCESS TO DRUGS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 225, 225 (Kenneth C. Shadlen et al. eds., 2012) ("Globally, about 60 developing
countries have no pharmaceutical industry and 87 have capacity to make finished products
only.").
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31(f), which states that compulsory licenses can only be issued
"predominantly for the supply of the domestic market,"7 2 prevented third
countries, such as India, from exporting affordable generic drugs to these
countries.
At the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001, before
the expiration of the transition period concerning pharmaceutical products,
less developed countries successfully negotiated for the adoption of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health ("Doha
Declaration").7 3 The opening paragraph of this Declaration explicitly
"recognize[d] the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many
developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics."7 4 Paragraph 2
underscored "the need for the [TRIPS Agreement] to be part of the wider
national and international action to address these problems."" Paragraph 4
declared that member states "agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and
should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health"
and that "the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in
a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and,
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all."7 6 Paragraph 5
underscored the various "flexibilities" reserved to all WTO member states
under the TRIPS Agreement." Paragraph 6 "recognize[d] that WTO
Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of
72. TRIPS Agreement art. 31(f).
73. WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Nov. 14, 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. While less
developed countries certainly have made a strong case for adjustment needs, their success
should also be attributed to the momentum generated from the brand name pharmaceutical
industry's debacle in South Africa, the United States' eagerness to launch a new round of trade
negotiation following the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the access-to-medicines challenges
created by the anthrax attacks in the Canada and the United States. See Louise Amoore et al.,
Series Preface to AMRITA NARLIKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THE GATT & WTO xiii, xiii (2003) (noting that the launch of the
Doha Round was "assisted to a large degree by the conciliatory international political climate
that followed the September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington"); Yu, The
International Enclosure Movement, supra note 14, at 874 n.247 (providing sources discussing
how the United States' responses to high prices of ciprofloxacin following the anthrax attacks
have undermined its own position against compulsory licensing).
74. Doha Declaration, supra note 73, 1 1.
75. Id. 2.
76. Id. 4.
77. Id. 5; see also Abbott, Cycle of Action, supra note 52, at 27, 30 (highlighting the
various flexibilities less developed countries retain in the public health arena despite the
entering into force of the TRIPS Agreement).
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compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement."18 Finally, Paragraph 7
delayed the introduction of protection for pharmaceutical patents and
undisclosed clinical trial data until January 1, 2016.7
Out of all the seven paragraphs, Paragraph 6 was the most important to
developing and least developed countries. Pursuant to this paragraph, the
TRIPS Council adopted the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6
of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health on
August 30, 2003." Shortly before the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in
Hong Kong in 2005, this decision was formalized as the proposed Article
31bis of the TRIPS Agreement." If ratified by two-thirds of the WTO
membership, this amendment would allow countries with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacity to import generic versions of patented
pharmaceuticals.
Since the adoption of this protocol, the ratification deadline has been
extended four times already-from December 2007 to December 2015.82 As
of this writing, less than a third of the 159 WTO member states, including
mostly high- and middle-income countries, have ratified the proposed
amendment. However, and tellingly, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,
the key targets of this amendment, have yet to ratify the document (see
Table 1).
78. Doha Declaration, supra note 73, 16.
79. Id. 17.
80. August 30 Decision, supra note 26.
81. TRIPS Amendment, supra note 24.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
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2005-2007 2008-2009 2009-2011 2011-2013
United States
Switzerland
El Salvador
Republic of Korea
Norway
India
Philippines
Israel
Japan
Australia
Singapore
Hong Kong, China
China
European Union
Mauritius
Egypt
Mexico
Jordan
Brazil
Morocco
Albania
Macau, China
Canada
Bahrain
Colombia
Zambia
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Former Yugoslav
Republic of
Macedonia
Uganda
Mongolia
Croatia
Senegal
Bangladesh
Argentina
Indonesia
New Zealand
Cambodia
Panama
Costa Rica
Rwanda
Honduras
Togo
Saudi Arabia
Chinese Taipei
Dominican
Republic
Chile
Montenegro
Trinidad and
Tobago
Table 1. WTO Members Accepting the Article 31bis Amendment
(As of October 1, 2013)8
While less developed countries were busy considering and pushing for
the ratification of this amendment, commentators have greatly criticized the
amendment for being "unduly cumbersome and complex."84 They have
83. Members Accepting Amendment, supra note 25.
84. Timmermans, supra note 65, at 45; accord Carlos M. Correa, Recent International
Developments in the Area of Intellectual Property Rights 4,
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/CorreaBellagio2.pdf (last visited Mar. 2,
2013) [hereinafter Correa, Recent International Developments] ("The adopted 'solution' is so
cumbersome for potential suppliers that they will be hardly encouraged to use the Decision,
'because it is so designed that no generic manufacturer would be able or willing to comply with
its provisions."' (footnote omitted) (quoting D.G. Shah, Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance));
Gopakumar, supra note 40, at 106 (stating that "the [August 30] Decision has opted for a
cumbersome route, ignoring a simple solution under Article 30 of TRIPS"); Andrew D. Mitchell
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expressed concern about the amendment's failure to address the transfer of
pharmaceutical technology to less developed countries." In addition, they
were disturbed by the countries' inability to "prevent a private party from
blocking the exportation or importation of drugs, if the national laws do not
specifically permit such exports or imports under compulsory licenses." 6
As Jorge Bermudez, Maria Oliveira, and Gabriela Chaves lamented, "[p]oor
countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America have to go through
unnecessary red tape to prove that they do not have manufacturing
capacity."" Matthew Rimmer went even further to note that "[t]he
codification of such a flawed model would only exacerbate the public health
& Tania Voon, The TRIPS Waiver as a Recognition of Public Health Concerns in the WTO, in
INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 63, at 56, 71 (criticizing the TRIPS
waiver for "not affect[ing] Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, which usually requires the
proposed user to attempt to obtain an ordinary commercial licence from the right holder,
potentially involving lengthy negotiations" and for the difficulty in "determin[ing] in advance
precisely how much of a given product will be needed in a given country"). But see Tenu
Avafia et al., The Ability to Utilize TRIPS Flexibilities in Sub-Saharan African Countries, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS IN A
CHANGING WORLD 175, 200 (Ricardo Meldndez-Ortiz & Pedro Roffe eds., 2010) ("[T]he lack
of use of the 30 August Agreement mechanism does not mean that this Agreement has been
entirely unsuccessful. The express authorization of countries to import generic essential
medicines must have been a factor, together with others, for the increased number of voluntary
licenses that have been granted by patent-holding companies in the past few years."); Wolfgang
Hein, Global Health Governance and WTO/TRIPS: Conflicts Between "Global Market-
Creation" and "Global Social Rights," in FIGHT AGAINST HIV/AIDS, supra note 17, at 38, 56
("Although until today we cannot observe an increased use of compulsory licences by
developing countries, experts do agree that [the] legal and political strengthening [provided by
the August 30 decision and the proposed TRIPS amendment] has given developing countries a
stronger position in conflicts with [transnational pharmaceutical companies] on licences and
price concessions."); Mitchell & Voon, supra, at 72 ("[A]ttempting to operationalize [the
TRIPS waiver] while working around its flaws is preferable to discarding it altogether and
hoping for a better solution to emerge from the WTO in the near future."); Yu, The
International Enclosure Movement, supra note 14, at 877 (stating that "the [TRIPS] waivers, on
balance, represented a promising first step in focusing attention on the public health crises in
less developed countries and in reclaiming some of their lost policy space").
85. See M. Rafiqul Islam, The General Drug Deal of the WTO from Doha to Cancun: A
Peripheral Response to a Perennial Conundrum, 7 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 675, 692 (2004).
86. Correa, Recent International Developments, supra note 84, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
87. Jorge A.Z. Bermudez et al., Intellectual Property in the Context of the WTO TRIPS
Agreement: What Is at Stake?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WTO
TRIPS AGREEMENT: CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 23, 56 (Jorge A.Z. Bermudez & Maria
Auxiliadora Oliveira eds., 2004); see also Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 42, at
353 ("Ambiguous pharmaceutical-related rules raise serious problems when procurement
officials try to do their work.").
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crisis in developing countries caused by infectious diseases, such as
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria."8
Empirically, these critiques have been strongly supported by the fact that
only one country has ever used the proposed arrangement to send drugs
from a developed country to a less developed country. In September 2008,
Apotex, a Canadian generic manufacturer, made its first shipment of the
HIV/AIDS drug TriAvir to Rwanda through the Canada's Access to
Medicine Regime"-one of the very few regimes introduced at the national
level to implement the TRIPS waiver." Although Apotex was eventually
able to deliver the drugs after going through the process for three years, it
expressed strong reluctance to use the arrangement again, citing
bureaucratic barriers and the time-consuming process. As Jack Kay,
Apotex's president, declared:
We invested millions in the research and development of the
product, legal costs in negotiating with the brand companies and
made no profits in this process. We did it because it was the right
thing to do. But in its current form it's not workable for us and, it
appears, it doesn't work easily for developing countries.9'
To some extent, the highly cumbersome arrangement can be compared to
the equally cumbersome arrangement in the Appendix to the Berne
Convention.92 Adopted out of a compromise between developed and less
88. Matthew Rimmer, Race Against Time: The Export of Essential Medicines to Rwanda,
1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 89, 100 (2008).
89. See Mitchell & Voon, supra note 84, at 69. For discussions of Apotex's shipments and
challenges, see Ho, supra note 14, at 214-17; Last Cheaper AIDS Medicines for Rwanda Under
WTO, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 17, 2009, 10:52 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2009/09/17/last-cheaper-aids-medicines-for-rwanda-under-wto/.
90. See UNAIDS, Implementation of TRIPS and Access to Medicines for HIV After
January 2016: Strategies and Options for Least Developed Countries 8 (UNAIDS, Technical
Brief, 2011), http://www.unaids.org/en/medialunaids/contentassets/documents/
unaidspublication/2011 /JC2258 techbrief TRIPS-access-medicines-LDC-en.pdf [hereinafter
UNAIDS Technical Brief] ("So far, only Canada, countries in the European Community, and
India have put in place the system to allow the functioning of the 30 August 2003 decision.");
see also Mitchell & Voon, supra note 84, at 70 ("The US ... was first to accept the Protocol in
2005 but has still not implemented corresponding legislation."). See generally Kristina M.
Lybecker & Elisabeth Fowler, Compulsory Licensing in Canada and Thailand: Comparing
Regimes to Ensure Legitimate Use of the WTO Rules, 37 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 222 (2009)
(discussing Canada's Access to Medicine Regime).
91. Press Release, Apotex, CAMR Federal Law Needs to Be Fixed If Life-Saving Drugs
for Children Are to Be Developed (May 14, 2009), http://www.apotex.com/
global/about/press/20090514.asp.
92. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works app., Sept. 9,
1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971); see also SAM
RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE
BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 960-63 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the incorporation of the
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developed countries, this Appendix permits unauthorized, compensated uses
of copyrighted works, including educational texts, scientific books, and
other nonfictional works. The Berne Appendix has since been incorporated
by reference into the TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO Copyright Treaty."
Although the Appendix was created to facilitate access to copyrighted
content in less developed countries,94 its cumbersome and highly
bureaucratic nature has made the process virtually unusable by target
beneficiaries.9 5 Ruth Okediji declared the Appendix "a dismal failure,"9 6
while Alan Story suggested we "burn" the Berne Convention.97
Even more problematic for many less developed countries, new issues
have arisen just as the international intellectual property system began to
show greater appreciation of the need to promote access to essential
medicines. For example, the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade
agreements have introduced provisions calling for the establishment of a
data exclusivity regime to protect clinical trial data submitted during the
Berne Appendix into the TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO Copyright Treaty); Peter K. Yu, A
Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 465, 481-84 (2009) [hereinafter Yu,
Two Development Agendas] (discussing the Berne Appendix).
93. See TRIPS Agreement art. 9.1; WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 1, adopted Dec. 20, 1996,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, at 1 (1997).
94. See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions and
Public Interest Considerations for Developing Countries 16 (Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable
Dev., Issue Paper No. 15, 2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/
en/docs/iteipc200610_en.pdf [hereinafter Okediji, International Copyright System] (stating that
the Berne Appendix "remains the only bulk access mechanism tool in international copyright
law").
95. See Nddn6 Ndiaye, The Berne Convention and Developing Countries, 11 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 47, 55 (1986) ("The provisions of the Appendix enable the developing
countries neither to 'make the application of the Convention easier' nor to meet their needs with
regard to education. Indeed, it is certainly easier to understand and to apply the substantive
provisions (Articles 1 to 20) than to implement the mechanisms provided for in the
Appendix."); Yu, Two Development Agendas, supra note 92, at 482-83 (discussing the
cumbersome conditions one has to satisfy before a compulsory license can be issued for
"teaching, scholarship, and research" purposes).
96. Ruth L. Okediji, Fostering Access to Education, Research and Dissemination of
Knowledge Through Copyright 9, available at http://www.iprsonline.org/
unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/OkideijiBellagio4.pdf; see also RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note
92, at 957 ("[O]f those countries that have made the necessary declarations, very few actually
seem to have implemented such licensing schemes in their domestic laws."); Okediji,
International Copyright System, supra note 94, at 15-16 ("As of 2004, only thirteen . . .
countries had expressed an interest to WIPO, though Singapore apparently expressed an interest
and then didn't renew its notification." (footnote omitted)).
97. Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright Convention Must
Be Repealed, 40 HouS. L. REv. 763, 763 (2003) (advocating the repeal of the Berne
Convention).
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regulatory approval process,9 the linkage of the registration of
pharmaceutical products to their patent status,99 and the requirement that
patents be granted for "new uses," or second indications, of known
compounds.'o Developed countries also actively negotiated plurilateral
agreements, such as the recently-adopted ACTA and the still-incomplete
TPP. Commentators have generally expressed concerns about the potential
of these agreements for aggravating the access-to-medicines crisis in the
less developed world.'01
As if the proliferation of these agreements were not enough, many less
developed countries fear that the end of the transition period for
pharmaceuticals would induce India to switch over from the generic model
to the proprietary model.'02 Such a switch would therefore greatly reduce
98. See, e.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 32, art. 15.10.1; AUSFTA, supra note 32, art.
17.10.1; SUSFTA, supra note 32, art. 16.8.1.
99. See, e.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 32, art. 15.10.2; AUSFTA, supra note 32, art.
17.10.4; SUSFTA, supra note 32, art. 16.8.4. See generally Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in
Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 79, 88-91 (2004) [hereinafter Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property] (discussing
patent-registration linkage). As Professor Correa noted:
The patent-registration linkage ignores that patents are private rights, as
stated in the Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement, and that, whether a given
product infringes or not, a patent is a legal matter entirely separate from the
technical issues concerning safety and efficacy of drugs. Health authorities
have no knowledge or experience whatsoever to assess the claims of a patent.
Id at 89. Professor Correa also criticized the patent registration linkage for "creat[ing] a
presumption of validity of pharmaceutical product patents which health authorities are neither
empowered nor have the capacity to challenge." Id. at 91.
100. See, e.g., AUSFTA, supra note 32, art. 17.9.1; U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-Bahr., art. 14.8.2, Sept. 14, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/bahrain-fta/final-text. Cf Abbott, Cycle of Action, supra note 52, at 30 ("The
TRIPS Agreement does not specify that new-use patents must be granted."); Correa,
Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, supra note 99, at 82 ("[WTO m]embers have considerable
discretion in defining this concept, which excludes second indications, new formulations, or
dosage forms.").
101. For discussions of ACTA's impact on access to medicines, see generally Brook K.
Baker, ACTA-Risks of Third-Party Enforcement for Access to Medicines, 26 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 579 (2011); Sean Flynn & Bijan Madhani, ACTA and Access to Medicines, THE GREENS:
EUROPEAN FREE ALLIANCE (Oct. 6, 2011), http://rfc.act-on-acta.eu/access-to-medicines.
102. See 'T HOEN, supra note 63, at 37 ("[I]t is to be expected that the Indian generic
medicines sector will shift its business orientation away from supplying new medicines to the
developing world, and towards the export of off-patent generics to more affluent markets.");
Peter K. Yu, The Global Governance of HIV/AIDS and the Rugged Road Ahead: An Epilogue,
in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS, supra note 16, at 223, 227-28 [hereinafter Yu, Rugged
Road Ahead] ("[W]ith the expiry of the transitional periods allowed for developing countries
under the TRIPs Agreement, it is unclear whether India, Brazil, China, Thailand and other
countries with the capacity to manufacture generic antiretrovirals will still be interested in
meeting the demands of countries lacking in such capacity."); UNAIDS/UNDP Issue Brief,
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the supply of much-needed generic pharmaceuticals. As Kenneth Shadlen
observed:
The Doha Declaration (and much of the writing on this topic)
makes a distinction between the challenges facing developing
countries with sufficient local manufacturing capabilities and
those without. Yet as significant as some developing countries'
manufacturing capacity may be, even the largest developing
countries (e.g., Brazil) are heavily dependent on ARVs produced
in India. Thus the more appropriate distinction is between ARV-
exporters and ARV-importers (or to be blunt, India and not
India).' 03
Because India is such an important supplier of generic drugs to the less
developed world, the model its industry embraces is likely to have
significant ramifications for countries in need of affordable medicines.
During the ACTA negotiations, stories about the seizure of
pharmaceuticals in Europe have raised important questions about the
intellectual property enforcement standards set in the TRIPS Agreement and
the handling of in-transit goods under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.104 The issues were so contentious that India and Brazil filed
complaints before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body against the European
Union and the Netherlands over the repeated seizure of in-transit generic
supra note 22, at 5 (noting the "declining certainty that [least developed countries] will be able
to continue importing cheap generic medicines"); see also Biswajit Dhar & K.M. Gopakumar,
The Case of the Generic Industry in India, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 84, at 97, 133 ("[T]he change in the country's patent regime [is
likely to have an impact] on the Indian generic pharmaceutical industry. The limitations
imposed on the extent to which 'me-too' processes can be developed by the Indian industry
imply that the firms would have to adopt radically different strategies under the new regime.");
Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 67, at 388-89 (noting that the picture "may change as
generic manufacturers in the BRICS countries, such as those in India, become more active in
developing on-patent drugs, partly as a result of the TRIPs Agreement"). For discussions of the
change in interests and configuration of the Indian generic pharmaceutical industry, see Dhar &
Gopakumar, supra, at 120-22; Kenneth C. Shadlen, Is AIDS Treatment Sustainable?, in
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS, supra note 16, at 29, 41-45; Dwijen Rangnekar, Context
and Ambiguity in the Making of Law: A Comment on Amending India's Patent Act, 10 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 365, 379-80 (2007).
103. Shadlen, Is AIDS Treatment Sustainable?, supra note 102, at 52 n. 19; see also Lalitha,
supra note 71, at 225 ("Two thirds of the drugs produced in India are exported, with
destinations in North America, the European Union, CIS countries and West Africa in that
order.").
104. For discussions of the seizure of in-transit drugs, see generally HO, supra note 14, at
285-323; Frederick M. Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based on
Allegations of Patent Infringement: A Threat to International Trade, Development and Public
Welfare, I WIPO J. 43 (2009); Bryan Mercurio, "Seizing" Pharmaceuticals in Transit:
Analysing the WTO Dispute that Wasn't, 61 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 389 (2012).
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drugs."o' In July 2011, India and the European Union finally reached an
interim settlement.1 6 As of this writing, both Brazil and India have yet to
withdraw their complaints.
In sum, the story surrounding the lack of affordable access to HIV/AIDS
treatments in less developed countries has highlighted some of the major
challenges in the international patent system as well as the difficulty in
making adjustments to that system. The lack of success in addressing the
access-to-medicines problems through the TRIPS Agreement has also led
reformers to question whether the international patent system can be further
reformed, or whether reform should take place outside the TRIPS
Agreement-such as through the creation of new incentive models. A case
in point is the adoption of the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property at the World Health Assembly
in May 2008,107 which has earned the support and praise of less developed
country governments, nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"), and
academic commentators.o10
II. VIROTECH PATENTS
The second virostory concerns a highly contagious and panic-inducing
virus: the coronavirus responsible for SARS. In spring 2003, countries in
Asia and a small part of Canada were struck by a "mysterious" yet lethal
disease called SARS.'09 Hundreds of people died, thousands more were
infected, and an uncountable number of innocent bystanders were
105. See Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member State-
Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010); Request for Consultations
by Brazil, European Union and a Member State-Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit,
WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010).
106. See India, EU Ink Deal to End Drug Seizure for Now, TIMES OF INDIA (July 29, 2011,
1:21 AM), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-07-29/india-business/
29828750_Igeneric-drugs-consignments-of-generic-medicines-eu-parliament (reporting the
European Union's interim settlement with India).
107. Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual
Property, World Health Assembly Res. WHA61.21 (May 24, 2008) [hereinafter Global Strategy
and Plan of Action].
108. See 'T HOEN, supra note 63, at 92-93 (discussing the Global Strategy and praising it as
"a forceful call for change"); FREDERICK M. ABBOTT & GRAHAM DUKES, GLOBAL
PHARMACEUTICAL POLICY: ENSURING MEDICINES FOR TOMORROW'S WORLD 6 (2011) ("With
the adoption of a Global Strategy and Plan of Action in 2008, the World Health Assembly ...
has taken a significant step toward proactively encouraging new models of innovation.").
109. See Lawrence K. Altman & Keith Bradsher, Rare Health Alert Is Issued by WH.O. for
Mystery Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/16/world/rare-
health-alert-is-issued-by-who-for-mystery-illness.html.
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quarantined."o To prevent further spread of the disease, some governments
closed schools, movie theaters, swimming pools, and other public places."'
Although SARS was serious from a public health standpoint, it was even
more devastating from an economic standpoint. As Georges Benjamin, the
executive director of the American Public Health Association, observed:
Over 8,000 people from 29 countries became ill and about 774
died. This is in stark contrast to the approximately 3.8 million
people who die annually worldwide from pneumonia, the 2.1
million who die from infectious diarrhea, and the 3.1 million who
die from HIV/AIDS.
Put in this perspective, SARS was not "the big one." It
did, however, cost over US$40 billion and served as a global
wake-up call."12
Unlike the first virostory, this story covers a virus that affected both
developed and less developed countries. Not only did the latter have
difficulty locating responses, the former were equally clueless as to the
cause of the disease, the ways to diagnose it, the treatments for it, and the
precautionary measures that could be used to prevent its spread. Shortly
after the outbreak, the WHO quickly put together a network of doctors and
health professionals,"' "collaborat[ing] around the clock to identify the
110. See WHO, Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset ofIllness from 1 November
2002 to 31 July 2003 (Sept. 26, 2003), available at http://www.who.int/
csr/sars/country/table2003_09_23/en/.
111. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Travelers Urged to Avoid Toronto Because of SARS, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2003, at Al; Elisabeth Rosenthal, SARS Outbreak Fading Away, Officials Say,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2003, at Al0.
112. Georges C. Benjamin, Afterword to BROOKES, supra note 27, at 235-36. Similarly,
Andrew Price-Smith and Huang Yanzhong observed:
[T]he damage generated by the epidemic was not so much the result of the
morbidity and mortality that SARS induced, but rather the fear and panic that
the epidemic generated, both within infected areas and in uninfected
populations. This fear resulted in sub-optimal economic outcomes for the
entire Pacific Rim as tourism ground to halt, international trade flows were
slowed, and foreign investors cautiously withdrew from the region during the
cTisis.
Andrew T. Price-Smith & Huang Yanzhong, Epidemic of Fear: SARS and the Political
Economy of Contagion, in INNOVATION IN GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 23, 24 (Andrew F.
Cooper & John J. Kirton eds., 2009) (footnote omitted); see also HOW A GLOBAL EPIDEMIC WAS
STOPPED, supra note 27, at vii ("SARS shook the world. By some standards, the first emerging
and readily transmissible disease of the 21st century was not a big killer, but it caused more fear
and social disruption than any other outbreak of our time.").
113. See Moira Chan-Yeung & Christine Loh, The New Coronavirus: In Search of the
Culprit, in AT THE EPICENTRE: HONG KONG AND THE SARS OUTBREAK 43, 45 (Christine Loh
ed., 2004) [hereinafter AT THE EPICENTRE] ("[The WHO] used its electronically linked global
influenza network as a model to quickly establish a similar 'virtual' connection among 11
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cause of SARS, develop diagnostic tests, define clinical features, and
investigate modes of transmission."ll4 As Klaus Stohr, the coordinator of
the WHO Multi-centre Collaborative Network on SARS Aetiology and
Diagnosis, declared, "We needed people to share data and set aside Nobel
Prize interests or their desire to publish articles."" 5
Notwithstanding the collaboration within this network, the SARS
coronavirus sparked two different races. The first was a race to discover the
genome of the coronavirus."' It involved human resources, medical
technology, and scientific publications. As Moira Chan-Yeung and
Christine Loh recounted, in chronological order and considerable detail:
On 2 April, the Atlanta team began to fish segments of genetic
code out of the virus, posting the information they gathered on the
network website so that others could use it. Meanwhile, the
Michael Smith Genome Sciences Centre in Vancouver, Canada, a
research facility under the British Columbia Cancer Agency [the
"BCCA"], decided to try and sequence the full genome. Under Dr.
Robert Holt, a group of its scientists had already been studying
fast-growing diseases for a year. While their work had originally
started as response to the global bio-terrorism threat, they viewed
the SARS investigation as an opportunity to apply what they had
learned.
The Canadian team received its first sample on 5 April. It
was taken from the lung tissue of the first SARS patient infected in
Toronto, a man who ... was a "super-spreader" who had infected
many people. Once his specimen arrived, nearly half of the 90
staff at the Vancouver laboratory worked on sequencing the virus.
In the early hours of 12 April, Holt's team finished the
sequencing, posting the genome map on the website later that day.
On 14 April, the researchers in Atlanta completed their genome
map. The two genetic blueprints were practically identical. Just
days later, [a University of Hong Kong] team led by Department
of Zoology professor Frederick Leung and a [Chinese University
of Hong Kong] group headed by chemical pathologist Dennis Lo
Yuk-ming completed the sequencing of two SARS virus strains
obtained locally.
leading laboratories around the world through a shared secure website and daily teleconference
calls. The number of labs involved in the investigation was eventually increased to 13.").
114. HOWA GLOBAL EPrDEMIC WAS STOPPED, supra note 27, at 54.
115. Chan-Yeung & Loh, supra note 113, at 46.
116. See BROOKES, supra note 27, at 101-19 (discussing the race to sequence the genome
of the SARS coronavirus).
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On 17 April, exactly a month after Stohr set up the virtual
research network, the collaborators announced conclusive
identification of the SARS causative agent: a new coronavirus." 7
This race to sequence the SARS coronavirus was interesting,
complicated, and at times error-prone. As one close observer described:
[T]he lab that is now widely acknowledged as first having
identified the SARS coronavirus actually reached the finish line
fifth, and even then there was a photo finish and the equivalent of
a steward's inquiry. Two labs that beat it to the post got the wrong
answer. The first lab to publicly identify the pathogen also got the
wrong answer; and in doing so it buried the work of an entirely
different lab that had got the right answer before anyone, but its
researchers never published their results for fear of being
punished. 18
The second race concerned the patenting of isolated gene sequences
associated with the SARS coronavirus."'9 In April 2003, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (the "CDC") in Atlanta, the BCCA in
Vancouver, Canada, and Versitech Ltd., the commercial arm of the
University of Hong Kong, battled to patent technology involving the
isolated gene sequences of the SARS coronavirus. 120 Combimatrix, a
biotechnology subsidiary of Acacia Research Corp., also filed patent
applications claiming ownership of the key isolated sequences of two SARS
genes that were suspected to control reproduction of the virus once it
invades people.12' Although patent applications were still pending at that
time and no institution was therefore able to claim a monopoly on
117. Chan-Yeung & Loh, supra note 113, at 50-51.
118. BROOKES, supra note 27, at 101; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 27, at 121 ("[The
paper by Malik Peiris of the University of Hong Kong and his colleagues] published in the
online edition of Lancet on April 8 was the first scientific paper describing the new coronavirus
as the causal agent for SARS. A paper by the CDC group describing its findings was published
two days later in the New England Journal of Medicine, as was a paper by the group of
European scientists in Germany and the Netherlands.").
119. For discussions of the patenting race, see generally Matthew Rimmer, The Race to
Patent the SARS Virus: The TRIPS Agreement and Access to Essential Medicines, 5 MELB. J.
INT'L L. 335 (2004) [hereinafter Rimmer, Race to Patent the SARS Virus]; Peter K. Yu, SARS
and the Patent Race: What Can We Learn from the HIV/AIDS Crisis?, FINDLAW (May 29,
2003), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/comrnmentary/20030529_yu.html.
120. See Antonio Regalado, Scientists' Hunt for SARS Cure Turns to Race for Patent
Rights, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2003, http://online.wsj.com/article/
0,,SB 105209016979730900,00.html.
121. See Paul Elias, Race to Patent SARS Virus Renews Debate, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May
5, 2003, http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2003/Race-to-Patent-SARS-Virus-Renews-Debate/id-
145b4e8d 1 56cddc93e996ae52dc24ecO [hereinafter Elias, Race to Patent SARS].
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treatments for the disease, this patenting race sparked major concerns in the
public health arena.
Under U.S. law, a patent can be granted to "anything under the sun that
is made by man."l22 One can claim a patent on a device, a mechanical
process, a chemical compound, a computer program, a business model, or
even a genetically engineered microorganism. In the beginning, the United
States Patent and Trademark Office was fairly conservative in granting
patents on bio-engineered organisms. That trend, however, changed in the
wake of the United States Supreme Court's 1980 landmark decision of
Diamond v. Chakrabarty.'23 In this 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the
patentability of a bacterium genetically engineered to "eat" crude oil.124
Since Chakrabarty, patents have been granted on a wide variety of bio-
engineered products.'2 5
Today, naturally-occurring life forms remain ineligible for patent
protection because they are not inventions "made by man." Nevertheless,
one could arguably patent any gene or life form that has been synthetically
created, altered by technology, or reproduced through a novel methodl26
the recent Myriad Genetics decision notwithstanding.'2 7 With increasing
progress in genetic engineering, one might wonder whether such an
expansive protection of gene patents would still be desirable. As the U.K.
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights ("IPR Commission") noted,
gene sequencing "is now a fully automated process, involving little
creativity," even though it once was a labor-intensive manual technique.12 8
122. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5
(1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
123. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
124. See id. at 310.
125. See Ex Parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1425 (B.P.A.I. 1987) , aff'd, 846 F.2d 77
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (extending patent protection to hydrostatically altered polyploid Pacific
oysters); U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed Jun. 22, 1984) (providing patent protection for the
famous "Harvard Onco-mouse"); see also Notice by the Commissioner, 1077 OFF. GAZ. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFFICE 24 (Apr. 21, 1987) (stating that non-naturally occurring, non-human
multicellular living organisms constitute patentable subject matter).
126. See, e.g., Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-93 (Jan. 5, 2001)
(stipulating that human genes are patentable provided they satisfy the statutory requirements
under the Patent Act).
127. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119-20
(2013) (distinguishing between naturally occurring and synthetically created DNA segments).
128. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 112; see GRAHAM DUTFIELD,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE SCIENCE INDUSTRIES: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE 224 (2009) ("[C]onceiving the incidence of a disease (or of resistance to a disease) as
being related to a specific allele and then discovering this allele to the point of localising it to
part of a chromosome ... are substantial intellectual achievements. They require a considerable
amount of painstaking and time-consuming research. Sequencing the already-discovered allele,
on the other hand, is relatively routine."); Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
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In a Congressional hearing, the former director of the National Institute of
Health also testified that "many of the thousands of gene patents that have
been awarded appear to reward unduly the preliminary and frankly obvious
work of determining DNA sequence, and to diminish the value of the
innovative scientific work required ultimately to determine gene function
and medical utility." 29
In the past decade, commentators have widely discussed the potential
chilling effect created by overprotection of patent rights. As Rebecca
Eisenberg and Michael Heller pointed out, such overprotection would create
a "tragedy of the anticommons,"O in which "multiple owners each have a
right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective
privilege of use.""' Because most investors are risk-averse, they will be
reluctant to invest when they are uncertain as to who owns the patent and
whether liability for patent infringement will incur in the future. Thus,
overprotection of patent rights may ultimately deter innovation and stifle
valuable biomedical research. 132
Reflections on the Science and Law of Structural Biology, Genomics, and Drug Development,
53 UCLA L. REV. 871, 881 (2006) ("The labor-intensive methods of development have given
way to technology-driven automated processes that make development a far easier process.
Now, nucleic acid sequencing is routine and automated; protein sequences can be derived from
gene sequences using computationally driven bioinformatics methods."); see also Clarisa Long,
Patents and Cumulative Innovation, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 229, 233-34 (2000) ("Th[e]
explosion of genomics data and the proliferation of new information-based research approaches
call into question many long-held beliefs and assumptions about the role of intellectual property
rights as incentives for research discovery, incentives for technology innovation, and incentives
for the diffusion of both.").
129. Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 129 (2000)
(statement of Dr. Harold Varmus, President, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center)
(emphasis added). Dr. Harold Varmus is a Nobel laureate and the former director of the
National Institute of Health.
130. For discussions of the tragedy of the anti-commons in relation to biomedical research,
see MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 49-78 (2010); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
ScI. 698, 699-700 (1998).
131. Heller & Eisbenberg, supra note 130, at 698.
132. See Press Release, WHO, SARS Research: The Effect of Patents and Patent
Applications (June 30, 2003), available at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_06_30/
en/index.html ("In the longer term, the manner in which SARS patent rights are pursued could
have a profound effect on the willingness of researchers and public health officials to
collaborate during future outbreaks of new infections diseases."); James H.M. Simon et al.,
Managing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Intellectual Property Rights: The
Possible Role of Patent Pooling, 83 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 707, 707 (2005) (pointing out
that "SARS patent applications may adversely affect the development of technologies, such as
vaccines, that will be covered by them").
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Even worse, obtaining patents today has to some extent become an end
in itself, rather than a means to further the U.S. constitutional goal of
"promot[ing] the Progress of . . . useful Arts""' or the dual TRIPS
objectives of "promotion of technological innovation and . .. transfer and
dissemination of technology."1 34 Instead of developing their own products,
some patent holders seek to use patents primarily to preempt others'
research efforts and to profit from such preemption.135 They apply for
patents not because they want to develop products, but because they want to
prevent business rivals from engaging in competitive research. The so-
called "patent trolls," "non-practicing entities," or "patent assertion entities"
also apply for patents so that they can obtain licensing fees or be "bought
out" by companies who need to develop the patented products. 13 6
Given these developments, it is no surprise that both the CDC and the
BCCA were highly concerned about the lack of availability of essential
information needed to protect the public interest in their battle against
SARS. In the end, these publicly-funded agencies filed applications for
patents involving the SARS coronavirus and justified those applications as a
protective tool to ensure that the scientific and medical communities
maintain open access to the virus for research and other purposes. As a
BCCA representative noted, "Patents are in and of themselves not a good or
bad thing. The thing that makes a patent leave a nasty taste . . . is when they
seem to cut people out from access they should have." 37
The CDC went even further to note their skepticism about the intentions
of its Hong Kong rival. When asked about Versitech's patent application,
the director of the CDC's technology transfer office responded, "To the
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
134. TRIPS Agreement art. 7; see also Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the
TRIPS Agreement, 46 Hous. L. REV. 979, 1035-37 (2009) [hereinafter Yu, Objectives and
Principles] (providing an in-depth discussion of the objectives and principles of the TRIPS
Agreement).
135. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The
Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 84-91 (1994) (discussing the bargaining
breakdown involving blocking patents); see also Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket:
Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (describing the patent thicket as "a dense
web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in
order to actually commercialize new technology").
136. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2008-10 (2007) (discussing patent trolls); Nicholas Varchaver, The Patent
King, FORTUNE, May 14, 2001, at 202 (recounting the tactics deployed by Jerome Lemelson,
dubbed the "Patent King").
137. Government, Firms Race to Patent SARS Virus, WASH. TIMES, May 8, 2003,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/may/8/20030508-025509-5928r/.
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extent there might be a competition, I don't think our goals are the same." as
Understandably, the CDC mistrusted the motives behind its competitor's
patent application, especially when that competitor was located in a foreign
country. To many countries, however, it is equally troubling to think of the
scenario when the CDC or the BCCA is awarded the SARS patent.
Consider the CDC for example. With the economic sanctions the United
States has imposed on countries such as Cuba, Iran, and North Korea, one
has to wonder whether research institutions from these sanctioned countries
would receive fair and equal treatment to obtain a license to use the
patented technology."' Even if the agency were willing to donate all the
royalties to SARS research, there remained politically sensitive questions as
to which research institutions would be eligible for the donated funds,
whether conditions would be put on research funded by this donation, and
whether research institutions in other countries would be able to benefit
equally from the royalty pool. After all, it is no news that governments act
in their own interests.
Moreover, when the CDC publicly announced its successful
identification of a new coronavirus as the likely causative agent for SARS,
it mysteriously did not mention any contribution made by the team from the
University of Hong Kong, led by microbiologist Malik Peiris. As David
Quammen recalled:
The CDC announcement [that its scientists had identified a new
coronavirus as the likely cause of SARS] didn't mention that
Malik Peiris and his team had found the same virus and confirmed
its connection with SARS three days before. That act of claiming
priority by the CDC, unnoticeable to the world at large, probably
put the Hong Kong University scientists on edge against their
competitors in Atlanta and elsewhere ....
138. Peg Brickley, Preemptive SARS Patents, SCIENTIST MAG., May 9, 2003,
http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/22173/title/Preemptive-SARS-patents/.
139. But see Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 1 41, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 14] ("States parties should refrain at all times from imposing
embargoes or similar measures restricting the supply of another State with adequate medicines
and medical equipment. Restrictions on such goods should never be used as an instrument of
political and economic pressure.").
140. DAVID QUAMMEN, SPILLOVER: ANIMAL INFECTIONS AND THE NEXT HUMAN PANDEMIC
190 (2012); see also ABRAHAM, supra note 27, at 121 ("'Just so you are clear, the virus was first
found in Hong Kong, first identified in Hong Kong. And then it was identified in the CDC. And
now it has been identified by all the other laboratories."' (quoting David Heymann, the WHO
Executive Director, in a press conference in Geneva)).
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Indeed, Peiris claimed that "[w]hen it became clear others were seeking
patents, the Hong Kong team then sought one," not the other way around.141
In an interview with the National Public Radio, Yu Hailson, Vesitech's
deputy managing director, also explained: "If we didn't patent, for example,
if there is a third party [and] they file a similar patent, and then eventually if
we have to pay a license fee to do the research and development work on
that subject matter, I don't think it is reasonable and logical."' 42 According
to Yu, if the SARS-related patent is eventually granted, Versitech "can
license it for $1 or one penny . . . to grant the right for them to do the
research."' 4 3
Regardless of how the CDC, the BCCA, and Versitech would ultimately
handle their patents if they were granted, their eagerness to patent the virus
to promote the public interest has raised intriguing questions about the need
for "defensive patenting."'" In this case, the agencies were not patenting to
profit from a monopoly over technology involving the claimed isolated
sequences. Instead, by patenting the technology and subsequently
introducing free licenses, these agencies sought to prevent others from
abusing such a monopoly.
The patenting approach is also interesting because the natural response
for those opposing gene patents would be to destroy novelty by publishing
the discovery in scientific journals, such as Lancet, Nature, or Science,4 5 as
141. Elias, Race to Patent SARS, supra note 121.
142. Research Lab Tries to Patent Virus Causing SARS, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 9, 2003),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1258427, cited in Rimmer, Race to
Patent the SARS Virus, supra note 119, at 347-48.
143. Id.
144. As now Judge Kimberly Moore explained:
Defensive patenting often exists in a crowded art to provide the party with
a repertoire of patents to use defensively as counterclaim weapons. These
patents are used to strengthen a firm's negotiating position with
competitors (e.g., as in cross-licensing). These patents may never be
asserted affirmatively, but are maintained for defensive purposes when the
patentee is threatened by competitors in a related field. It may be that
foreign inventors acquire U.S. patents for these defensive and signaling
reasons to gain bargaining power in negotiations with competitors who
threaten litigation.
Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1497, 1533 (2003);
see also Rimmer, Race to Patent the SARS Virus, supra note 119, at 339 ("Michael Stratton and
Cancer Research UK successfully sought a defensive patent in the European Patent Office in
respect of research associated with the breast cancer-related gene, BRCA2. Such a measure was
designed to prevent rival Myriad Genetics from engaging in the exclusive licensing of genetic
tests for BRCA2." (footnote omitted)).
145. See John Sulston, Intellectual Property and the Human Genome, in GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 61, 66 (Peter
Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002) ("Not only was the released [gene] sequence immediately
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opposed to engaging in a patenting race. Nevertheless, as Richard Gold
pointed out:
[T]here are good reasons why the CDC and the BCCA actually
prefer the patent option. First, this option provides them with more
leverage in dealing with the University of Hong Kong's Versitech
Ltd, which has also applied for a patent. Second, and more
importantly, publishing is not enough for the two agencies to
prevent others from patenting the SARS genome given their goal
of preserving the public domain.146
In fact, even though the sequences identified by the Human Genome Project
have become public information, firms remain very eager to apply for
patents involving the identified sequences. Thus, publication alone may not
provide the sufficient defense sought by the CDC and the BCCA.
After more than 8000 reported cases in twenty-nine countries, SARS
finally came under control.147 Although SARS no longer wreaks havoc in
the global public health system, it remains intriguing to explore what has
now happened to the SARS-related patents. As researchers from the
Erasmus Medical Center surmised:
[I]t is likely that patent rights incorporating the SARS genomic
sequence will be fragmented across several groups. Sorting out
these rights will be complex and may require intervention of the
useful for research but also it became prior art and the process of sequencing became more
obvious: both of these attributes would undermine attempts at patenting sequence in the
future."); see also id at 65 (discussing Celera's publication of the draft sequences in Science in
February 2001).
146. E. Richard Gold, SARS Genome Patent: Symptom or Disease?, 361 LANCET 2002,
2002 (2003). In response to Professor Gold's charge against Versitech, Tsui Lap-Chee, the vice-
chancellor of the University of Hong Kong (HKU) and a leading authority in genetics, wrote:
I wish to make clear that HKU is a research-led institution, committed to the
public cause of higher education and benefiting society. Versitech is a
technology transfer company, established in accordance with good practices
of international universities to handle HKU's intellectual properties. Neither
HKU nor Versitech are profit-seeking organisations, and they both hold the
same view as CDC and BCCA-namely, to serve the public.
HKU is committed to sharing its research results with society;
locally, regionally, and internationally. We will continue to build up our
research strength, but we cannot hope to share the benefits of our newly
found knowledge if we do not properly manage our intellectual property
rights.
Tsui Lap-Chee, SARS Genome Patent: To Manage and to Share, 362 LANCET 405, 405 (2003).
In the interest of full disclosure, the Author has repeatedly served as a visiting professor in the
Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong.
147. See HOW A GLOBAL EPIDEMIC WAS STOPPED, supra note 27, at 49 (providing the
WHO's official figure at "8,098 cases, with 774 deaths,... in 29 countries and areas").
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law court. ... [For firms considering whether to develop a SARS
vaccine], uncertainty over patent rights makes this decision even
more difficult, because it is neither possible to determine the
future cost of licensing the patent rights, nor whether all necessary
patents will be available for licensing. . . . The incentive for
vaccine manufacturers is therefore to delay the decision to
invest.148
To prevent the SARS-related patents from creating a patent thicket, the
patent applicants eventually agreed to collaborate with each other through
the establishment of a patent pool.'4 9 The setting up of this pool is not new.
Such an arrangement has been used as early as the mid-nineteenth century;
it has since covered technologies ranging from sewing machines to aircrafts
to information and communication technology.' Nevertheless, the SARS
patent pool is somewhat different from many existing patent pools. As
Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen noted:
148. Simon et al., supra note 132, at 708, quoted in HELLER, supra note 130, at 54; see also
Rimmer, Race to Patent the SARS Virus, supra note 119, at 374 (noting the concerns in 2004
that "patent rights are impeding efforts to prevent an outbreak of bird flu-avian influenza");
Birgit Verbeure, Patent Polling for Gene-based Diagnostic Testing, in GENE PATENTS AND
COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT POOLS, CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE
MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES 3, 18 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009) ("The WHO set up a
SARS consultation group which proposed 'that a strategy be developed, in consultation with
stakeholders, to address potential SARS corona virus related [intellectual property] issues and
thus enhance development of intervention approaches."').
149. "A patent pool has been commonly defined as an agreement between two or more
patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or as a package to third
parties who are willing to pay the royalties associated, either directly by patentees to licensees
or, indirectly, through a new entity specifically set up for the pool administration." Geertrui Van
Overwalle, Of Thickets, Blocks and Gaps: Designing Tools to Resolve Obstacles in the Gene
Patents Landscape, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS, supra note
148, at 383, 405.
150. As one commentator observed:
One of the first patent pools was formed in 1856, by sewing machine
manufacturers Grover, Baker, Singer, Wheeler and Wilson, all accusing the
others of patent infringement. They met in Albany, New York to pursue their
suits. Orlando B. Potter, a lawyer and president of the Grover and Baker
Company, proposed that, rather than sue their profits out of existence, they
pool their patents. In 1917, an aircraft pool was privately formed
encompassing almost all aircraft manufacturers, which was crucial to the US
government entering World War I. In the late 1990s several patent pools
were formed in the ICT branch starting with the MPEG-2 pool in 1997 for
inventions relating to the MPEG-2 standard with others to follow.
Verbeure, supra note 148, at 3-4; see also Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First
American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARiz. L. REV. 165, 166-70
(2011) (discussing the patent pool involving sewing machines).
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First, the patent owners are mostly non-profit organizations. Other
patent pools tend to be creatures of the commercial sector, or
include at least some commercial partners. Second, the technology
is very much at the early discovery phase of the innovation cycle
rather than the downstream delivery phase. Third, the patents have
not yet been issued and so the scope of their claims is not yet
known. Finally, once issued, the patents may be competing rather
than complementary, given that each of the participants was
involved in sequencing the virus. 5
The SARS patent pool can be beneficial for several reasons.152 First,
patent pools provide an efficient and effective solution when patent rights
are highly fragmented.' As far as the SARS-related patents are
concerned,154 the uncertainty over who owns what "may remain for years,
151. Dianne Nicol & Jane Nielsen, Opening the Dam: Patent Pools, Innovation and Access
to Essential Medicines, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 63, at 235, 250.
152. Nevertheless, patent pools can have some major drawbacks, such as "the shielding of
invalid patents" and "the risk of inequitable remunerations." Van Overwalle, supra note 149, at
407. Indeed, these pools "could be both anti-competitive, particularly if they encourage
collusion and shield weak patents, and anti-innovative (or innovation-neutral), particularly if
they don't include all necessary patents or are poorly managed and inadequately resourced."
Nicol & Nielsen, supra note 151, at 237. In addition, patent pools could "lead to increased
complexity and transaction costs," as "[t]hey are expensive to establish and administer, and this
tends to lessen the incentive to voluntarily enter into pooling arrangements." Id. at 253 (footnote
omitted). They "may also disadvantage licensees by requiring them to license all the patents in a
package, even those that are not required by a particular licensee." Id. at 257. Finally, patent
pools do not work well for diverse parties. As Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen explained: "[T]he
interests of pool members are frequently non-aligned. This non-alignment issue is likely to be
most pronounced for pools that attempt to span the whole innovation cycle. Holders of upstream
research tool patents have very different motivations from holders of downstream formulation
patents, for example." Id. at 253-54.
153. As researchers from the Erasmus Medical Center observed:
Given that groups from several institutions, including the Bernhardt-Nocht
Institut (BNI), the [BCCA, the CDC], Erasmus Medical Centre (EMC) and
Hong Kong University (HKU), were simultaneously involved in the
sequencing of [the SARS coronavirus], it is likely that patent rights
incorporating the SARS genomic sequence will be fragmented across several
different groups. Sorting out these rights will be complex and may require
the intervention of law courts.
Simon et al., supra note 132, at 707-08; see also 'T HOEN, supra note 63, at 90 ("Potential
benefits of pooling include: a) reduced licensing transaction costs through 'one stop' licensing
rather than multiple agreements; b) elimination of blocking patents; c) management of multiple
owners and stacking of royalties. . .").
154. See, e.g., Coronavirus Isolated from Humans, U.S. Patent No. 7,220,852 (filed Apr.
12, 2004) (issued May 22, 2007); Human Virus Causing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) and Uses Thereof, U.S. Patent No. 7,375,202 (filed Mar. 24, 2004) (issued May 20,
2008); SARS Virus Nucleotide and Amino Acid Sequences and Uses Thereof, U.S. Patent
Application No. 20,070,258,999 (filed Apr. 28, 2004). These patents were cited in Ed Levy et
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delaying development that could help us to be prepared efficiently for any
next outbreak."' Second, "[p]atent pools may . . . offer an interesting
instrument for government policy, in the sense that it is better to encourage
companies to establish patent pools rather than for example to force them
into a compulsory licensing scheme."' 5 6 Third, as Frederick Abbott and
Graham Dukes observed: "Patent pools are sufficiently common as to have
become subject to a fairly sophisticated level of regulation, for example, in
the European Commission guidelines on technology transfer. Many of the
issues surrounding the negotiation and implementation of patent pools
already are anticipated by competition authorities."' Fourth, as the WHO
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health
declared: "Patent pools of upstream technologies may be useful in some
circumstances to promote innovation relevant to developing countries."'
Likewise, the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property, issued jointly by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission, suggested that patent pools "may provide
procompetitive benefits by integrating complementary technologies,
reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly
infringement litigation."' 59 Finally, patent pools provide additional benefits
al., Patent Pools and Genomics: Navigating a Course to Open Science?, 16 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 75, 89 n.75 (2010).
155. Carmen E. Correa, Case 2. The SARS Case: IP Fragmentation and Patent Pools, in
GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS, supra note 148, at 42, 45. As one
commentator explained:
The uncertainty over patent rights represents a challenge to product
development because companies willing to develop any SARS-related
product need to deal with several [intellectual property] applicants holding
primary patents, but they do not know from which they will get a license, or
if they will require to license from all such patent holders. This uncertainty
adds to the complexity to assemble a license, which translates in additional
costs and time to the product development. Together with the challenge to
decide whether to invest at such a high cost when they are not even sure
whether a market will develop for their products-no significant outbreaks
since 2003-setting up a patent pool is a real challenge.
Id.; see also Jorge A. Goldstein, Critical Analysis of Patent Pools, in GENE PATENTS AND
COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS, supra note 148, at 50, 51 ("[T]he SARS example shows
that the uncertainty of who would own what patent rights at the end of the day provided an
additional impetus to think about and attempt to create a patent pool.").
156. Verbeure, supra note 148, at 9.
157. ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 108, at 39.
158. WHO, COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH,
PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 53 (2006) [hereinafter
CIPRIPH REPORT].
159. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.5 (1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf; see also Nicol & Nielsen, supra note 151,
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that could be especially attractive to less developed countries. For example,
Ellen 't Hoen pointed out that these pools have the potential to both
"encompass non-patent technology and know-how" and "facilitate
technology transfer and a sustainable scaling-up of capacity and access in
the developing world." 60
Given the benefits of patent pools, it is no surprise that such an
arrangement has also been recently used to address access-to-medicines
problems in the context of HIV/AIDS treatments, the focus of the first
virostory. Established in 2010 as a spinoff from UNITAID, a global health
initiative financed by levies on plane tickets, the Medicines Patent Pool
aims to "increase access to quality, appropriate, affordable medicines for
people living with HIV in developing countries."' 6 1 In July 2011, the Pool
entered into a license agreement with Gilead Sciences to "allow for the
production of key HIV medicines at lower cost and in an easier-to-use
formulation, making them more accessible to developing countries." 62
To a large extent, the establishment of the Medicines Patent Pool
reminds us of the need for greater cooperation to address international
disputes that could jeopardize valuable scientific and medical research. One
might still recall the dispute between France and the United States over who
discovered the AIDS virus and who owned the commercial rights in a blood
test that emerged from research leading to the discovery.163 Fortunately, a
at 237 ("Provided that a patent pool includes all relevant patents, it can create a platform for
freedom to operate . .. within the patent landscape.").
160. 'T HOEN, supra note 63, at 90.
161. About the MPP, MEDICINES PATENT POOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/about/
(last visited Nov. 9, 2013). This pool aims to "facilitate[] the production of low-cost versions of
existing medicines as well as the development of needed new formulations, such as 'fixed-dose
combinations'---one pill comprised of several medicines that increase treatment adherence-
and formulations suitable for children." Id.
162. William New, Medicines Patent Pool Boosts HIV Drug Prospects with First Licence,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 12, 2011, 9:04 AM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2011/07/12/medicines-patent-pool-boosts-hiv-drug-prospects-with-first-licence/.
163. As Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer, and Kim Rubenstein recounted:
In May 1983, Luc Montagnier, Frangoise Barr6-Sinoussi and other French
scientists from the Institut Pasteur in Paris published a paper in Science,
detailing the discovery of a virus called lymphadenopathy ('LAV'). A
scientific rival, Robert Gallo of the National Cancer Institute, identified the
AIDS virus and published his findings in the May 1984 issue of Science. In
May 1985, the United States Patent and Trademark Office awarded the
American patent of the AIDS blood test to Gallo and the Department of
Health and Services. In December 1985, the Institut Pasteur sued the
Department of Health and Human Services, contending that the French were
the first to identify the AIDS virus and to invest the antibody test, and that
the American test was dependent upon the French research.
1602
1987 agreement between President Ronald Reagan and French Prime
Minister Jacques Chirac split the patent rights and donated the royalties to
AIDS research.'" Were it not for this ground-breaking agreement,
companies that produce diagnostic products might still remain confused
about the commercial rights relating to the products, not to mention that
they would be reluctant to invest in developing tests that help diagnose
HIV/AIiDS in the first place.
In sum, the race to patent the isolated gene sequences of the SARS
coronavirus has raised important questions in both the intellectual property
and public health arenas. As of this writing, SARS no longer poses a
recurring threat to the international community, thus undermining the
market value of SARS vaccines and SARS-related patents.165 Nevertheless,
this story is different from the earlier one concerning HIV/AIiDS. Instead of
calling for adjustments to the existing international patent system, countries
in this story took proactive efforts toward solving the problems within the
system. From engaging in a patenting race to the deployment of defensive
patenting to the development of a patent pool, the SARS story has shown
Thomas Pogge et al., Access to Essential Medicines: Public Health and International Law, in
INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 63, at 1-2.
164. As Pogge, Rimmer, and Rubenstein continued:
In March 1987, an agreement was brokered by President Ronald Reagan and
French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, which resulted in the Department of
Health and Human Services and the Institut Pasteur sharing the patent rights
to the blood test for AIDS. In 1992, the Federal Office of Research Integrity
found that Gallo had committed scientific misconduct, by falsely reporting
facts in his 1984 scientific paper. A subsequent investigation by the National
Institutes of Health, the US Congress and the US Attorney-General cleared
Gallo of any wrongdoing.
In 1994, the US Government and the French Government
renegotiated their agreement regarding the AIDS blood test patent, in order
to make the distribution of royalties more equitable. Under the agreement,
the US and French research institutions would keep 20 per cent of royalties
made from testing kits that each team has developed from its own
laboratories. The remaining 80 percent would be pooled. A quarter of the
pool was allocated to the World AIDS Foundation. Under the agreement, the
French received two thirds of the remainder and the Americans one third.
Id. at 2. For discussions of this agreement, see also Deborah M. Barnes, AIDS Patent Dispute
Settled, 236 Sci. 17, 17 (1987); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 226-29 (1987); Howard L. Singer,
Institut Pasteur v. United States: The AIDS Patent Dispute, the Contract Disputes Act and the
International Exchange ofScientific Data, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 439, 439-41 (1989).
165. See Nicol & Nielsen, supra note 151, at 250 ("While the SARS proposal might have
provided a useful model for more broadly based discovery phase patent pooling, further
development of the pool has been stalled given that there is no pressing need to develop a SARS
vaccine at the present time.").
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how countries can take advantage of the international patent system to
promote self-interests.
III. VIROPIRACY AND VIRAL SOVEREIGNTY
The third virostory concerns a lesser known virus: the H5N1 strain of the
avian influenza A. Avian influenza, or what is generally known as the "bird
flu," is dangerous because it "is more contagious and virulent than SARS
and can be spread by asymptomatic carriers.""' Nonetheless, avian
influenza is not commonly found in developed countries, as increased
urbanization, a growing emphasis on service industries, and the practice of
commercial farming have greatly reduced human contact with poultry and
farm animals. In fact, many policymakers and the mainstream media in the
United States did not pay much attention to the virus until the arrival of the
HINI strain of Influenza A, the so-called "swine flu virus."' 67 Before the
arrival of that strain, many expected H5N1, not H1N1, to be responsible for
the next pandemic.'68
When HINI crossed over from pigs to humans and began to spread,'69
the WHO, national and state governments, and public institutions (including
schools and universities) went into high alert, fearing that H IN1 would
wreak havoc the same way SARS did.'" Compared with the response to
SARS, the response to HIN1 was much quicker and more effective.
166. John J. Kirton & Andrew F. Cooper, Innovation in Global Health Governance, in
INNOVATION IN GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, supra note 112, at 309, 311.
167. See David Brown, New Strain of Swine Flu Investigated, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2009,
at A6.
168. As Ian Scoones observed:
Since the outbreak of avian influenza in Hong Kong, and the subsequent
death of six people, the world has been expecting the next pandemic to be the
H5Nl virus, coming from birds and with an origin in Asia. Instead, a
different virus struck-HINI. It was originally derived from pigs, but also
mixed with human and avian genetic material; it came from the Americas
and quickly spread across the world.
Ian Scoones, Preface to AVIAN INFLUENZA, supra note 28, at xi, xi.
169. As David Quammen explained:
Pigs offer conditions intermediate between what a flu virus finds in people
and what it finds in birds; therefore pigs get infected with both human
subtypes and bird subtypes. When an individual pig is infected
simultaneously with two viruses-one adapted to humans, one adapted to
birds-the opportunity exists for reassortment between those two.
QUAMMEN, supra note 140, at 507.
170. See David Brown, U.S. Steps up Alert as More Swine Flu Is Found, WASH. PosT, Apr.
27, 2009, at Al (reporting that the U.S. government declared HINI as a "public health
emergency").
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Although we will never know whether HINI could produce as much
devastation as SARS had these responses not been taken, it is worth noting
that the threats created by SARS and HINI remain far from over. Only
recently, reports have emerged about the outbreak of a new SARS-like
coronavirus in the Middle East and the United Kingdom, which was
responsible for a disease now termed the Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome ("MERS").17 ' The outbreak of the H7N9 strain of the avian
influenza virus in China has also caught the attention of both the WHO and
the media.172 Recent scientific evidence suggested that this strain has the
capacity to transmit among humans."'
This Part focuses primarily on H5N1, the bird flu virus, for two reasons.
First, the virus is found more frequently in less developed countries than
developed countries. Birds and poultry stricken with the virus, for example,
have been found in Hong Kong, Indonesia, mainland China, South Korea,
and Thailand. 174 Second, the H5N1 story helps bring out an issue that has
not yet arisen in the first two virostories. Although less developed countries
have expressed grave concern about the lack of protection for traditional
knowledge, traditional cultural expressions, and genetic resources since the
formation of the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore in
September 2000,175 these issues did not come up in either the first or second
story. This concern, however, has become a major part of the H5N1 story.
On February 16, 2007, Siti Fadilah Supari, the Minister of Health of
Indonesia at the time, informed senior WHO officials that Indonesia would
no longer send virological materials to the WHO Global Influenza
Surveillance Network ("GISN") unless a new global mechanism for virus
sharing with better terms for less developed countries was to be
developed.617 As Supari declared:
171. See, e.g., Maria Cheng, SARS-like Virus Detected in the Middle East, WASH. POST,
Sept. 26, 2012, at A2.
172. See Lena H. Sun, Bird Flu Death Toll Rises to Six in China, WASH. POST, Apr. 4,
2013, at A3; Press Release, WHO, Human Infection with Influenza A(H7N9) Virus in China
(Apr. 1, 2013), available at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2013_04_01/en/index.html.
173. Evidence New Bird Flu Spread Between Humans, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 8,
2013, at 3.
174. See Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, SARS and Avian Influenza in China and Canada: The
Politics of Controlling Infectious Disease, in INNOVATION IN GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE,
supra note 112, at 83, 83.
175. For the Author's earlier discussion of these issues, see generally Peter K. Yu, Cultural
Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 433 (2008) [hereinafter
Yu, Cultural Relics].
176. See RI "Will Not Share" Flu Samples, JAKARTA POST, Feb, 17, 2007,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/02/17/ri-039will-not-shareO39-flu-samples.html.
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Indonesia will insist on a material transfer agreement before
sending the Indonesian strain of bird flu virus to foreign
laboratories to prevent them from being used for commercial
purposes .... We agree to send the virus to the WHO with new
conditions or mechanisms approved by both parties as well as by
other developing countries. Until then, we won't share the
samples.177
The predecessor of the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response
System ("GISRS"), GISN is a network comprising WHO collaborating
centers, national influenza centers, and regulatory and reference
laboratories.' 7 8 In the past, countries submitted virus samples to the WHO
voluntarily and free-of-charge for the purposes of surveillance, risk
assessment, warning, and vaccine development.179 This time, however,
Indonesia withheld the samples and struck a deal with "Baxter Healthcare
SA to develop human vaccines with the Indonesian strain."'
Indonesia's decision to protect "viral sovereignty"'"' was highly
problematic from a public health standpoint. It "sent a shock wave through
the international health, diplomatic and academic communities."' 82 As the
late Richard Holbrooke and Laurie Garrett recounted, "The vast majority of
repeated avian flu outbreaks the past four years, in both humans and
177. Id.
178. Information about the GISRS is available at http://www.who.int/
influenza/gisrs laboratory/en/. GISRS was established in November 2011, following the
adoption of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework at the 64th World Health
Assembly in May 2011. The network now comprises six WHO collaborating centers in Atlanta,
Beijing, London, Melbourne, Memphis, and Tokyo, more than a hundred national influenza
centers, and additional essential regulatory and reference laboratories.
179. As David Fidler and Lawrence Gostin explained:
Analyzing pathogen samples allows public health officials to understand
what disease-causing organisms are circulating within populations. Such
samples are very important for conducting surveillance on changes in
pathogen strains, such as the development of drug-resistant strains.
Surveillance information allows public health to update diagnostic reagents
and to develop interventions (e.g., vaccines, antibiotics) to address the
characteristics of the viral or bacterial strain in question.
DAVID FIDLER & LAWRENCE GosTiN, BIOSECURITY IN THE GLOBAL AGE: BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE RULE OF LAW 170-71 (2007).
180. RI "Will Not Share" Flu Samples, supra note 176.
181. Supari herself did not use the term "viral sovereignty." Policymakers and
commentators, however, have picked up that term. See, e.g., Kenan Mullis, Note, Playing
Chicken with Bird Flu: "Viral Sovereignty, " the Right to Exploit Natural Genetic Resources,
and the Potential Human Rights Ramitications, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 943 (2009); Richard
Holbrooke & Laurie Garrett, 'Sovereignty' that Risks Global Health, WASH. POST, Aug. 10,
2008, at B7.
182. Paul Forster, On a Wing and a Prayer: Avian Influenza in Indonesia, in AVIAN
INFLUENZA, supra note 28, at 131, 158.
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poultry, have occurred in Indonesia. At least 53 types of H5N1 bird flu
viruses have appeared in chickens and people there . . . ."'" Nevertheless,
Indonesia's controversial effort earned the sympathy of the editor of Lancet,
one of the world's oldest and most respected medical journals. Describing
Indonesia's attempt to secure an affordable vaccine supply for its
population as "understandable," a journal editorial lamented:
To protect the global population, 6.2 billion doses of pandemic
vaccine will be needed, but under current manufacturing capacity
the world can only produce 500 million doses. And, in a
pandemic, it is industrialised countries that will have access to
available vaccines, whereas developing countries-where a
pandemic is likely to emerge-will be left wanting. In November,
2004, a WHO consultation reached the depressing conclusion that
most developing countries would have no access to vaccine during
the first wave of a pandemic and possibly throughout its
duration. 184
Indonesia's position can be attributed to five factors. First, and most
importantly, Indonesia was concerned that the WHO would share the
viruses with brand name pharmaceutical companies without their
authorization. As People's Health Movement, Medact, and Global Equity
Gauge Alliance recounted in their Alternative World Health Report:
The Indonesian government discovered that avian flu viral
material that it had voluntarily submitted to the GISN ended up in
the hands of pharmaceuticals companies for vaccine development,
without its permission. This was contrary to WHO guidelines,
which state that any further distribution of viruses beyond the
WHO reference laboratories must require the permission of the
originating country."'
183. Holbrooke & Garrett, supra note 181.
184. Editorial, Global Solidarity Needed in Preparing for Pandemic Influenza, 369 LANCET
532, 532 (2007) [hereinafter Global Solidarity Needed].
185. PEOPLE'S HEALTH MOVEMENT ET AL., GLOBAL HEALTH WATCH 2: AN ALTERNATIVE
WORLD HEALTH REPORT 232-33 (2008) [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE WORLD HEALTH REPORT]
(citation and footnote omitted); accord Charles Lawson & Barbara Ann Hocking, Accessing and
Benefit Sharing Avian Influenza Viruses Through the World Health Organization: A CBD and
TRIPS Compromise Thanks to Indonesia's Sovereignty Claim?, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL
PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 63, at 284, 298 (noting "Indonesia's concern that an Indonesian
provided H5N1 virus sample provided to the WHO's Global Influenza Surveillance Network
... was given to an Australian vaccine manufacturer that intended to patent (in some respect)
the vaccine that Indonesia would then need to purchase"); see also id. at 309 (viewing
"Indonesia's recourse to [the benefit-sharing and informed consent obligations] ... as a direct
result of the GISN apparent breach of trust").
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Indeed, it is not irrational for Indonesia-or, for that matter, other less
developed countries-to fear that brand name pharmaceutical companies
would exploit the genetic sequence data from the submitted viral samples,
to the point that the supplied samples would return to haunt the country in
the form of high prices and inaccessible vaccines and antivirals."' Because
both developed and less developed countries have an equally strong demand
for vaccines, those vaccines are likely to be priced according to the
economic ability of developed countries, not their less developed
counterparts.
Second, even if less developed countries could afford the vaccines-
which is very unlikely-they might be unable to successfully compete with
developed countries for the limited supply of vaccines. The Lancet editorial
already stated that the world could only produce 500 million doses of
pandemic vaccine even though 6.2 billion doses would be needed.187
Because "drug companies can produce only a limited amount of vaccines in
a given year, many developed countries have [already] made advance
purchase orders for vaccines, limiting even further the prospects of
countries like Indonesia benefiting from vaccine development." 8 8
186. See David P. Fidler, Negotiating Equitable Access to Influenza Vaccines: Global
Health Diplomacy and the Controversies Surrounding Avian Influenza H5NI and Pandemic
Influenza HIN1, 7 PLoS MED. e1000247 (2010) [hereinafter Fidler, Negotiating Equitable
Access] (noting "developing-country concerns that their populations would not have access to
H5N1 vaccines"); Indonesia Stops Announcing Bird Flu Deaths on Case-by-Case Basis,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 5 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/05/indonesia-
stops-announcing-bird-flu-deaths-casebycase-basis.html [hereinafter Indonesia Stops
Announcing Bird Flu Deaths] ("[Indonesia Minister of Heath Siti Fadilah Supari] worried that
pharmaceutical companies would use her country's viruses to make vaccines that [a]re
ultimately unaffordable for developing countries.").
187. See Global Solidarity Needed, supra note 184, at 532.
188. ALTERNATIVE WORLD HEALTH REPORT, supra note 185, at 233. As Professor Fidler
noted in relation to the shortage of vaccines for the HIN 1 virus:
Developed countries placed large advance orders for 2009-HINI vaccine and
bought virtually all the vaccine companies could manufacture. Developing
countries and WHO identified the lack of equity in how developed countries
were securing access to the vaccine. WHO entered talks with manufacturers
and developed-country governments to secure some vaccine for developing
countries, and WHO and the United Nations (UN) appealed for monetary
donations to purchase vaccines and other supplies to help developing
countries address the 2009-HINI virus. These efforts yielded donation
pledges from manufacturers and developed countries, but the donations still
left the developing world with limited supplies compared to developed
countries, which would retain, even after donations, sufficient vaccine to
cover their populations.
Fidler, Negotiating Equitable Access, supra note 186.
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To make matters worse, for the reasons stated in the first virostory, many
less developed countries have neither the capacity nor the resources to
manufacture vaccines and antivirals themselves.18 9 Because many vaccine
manufacturers are located in developed countries, less developed countries
are naturally and severely handicapped in a race to compete for vaccines.
After all, "in a 'global scramble for vaccine', governments might block
foreign access to their supplies, ban exports, nationalise the domestic
production facilities, or refuse to share their vaccine."' 90 As David Fidler
recounted in the HINI context, which did not break out until two years
after Indonesia's refusal to submit H5N1 samples to the WHO:
Canada awarded its vaccine contract to a Canadian company
because it feared that foreign governments might restrict exports
to Canada because of vaccine shortages within their territories.
The Australian government made it clear to the Australian
manufacturer CSL that it must fulfill the government's domestic
needs before exporting vaccine to the United States. The United
States pledged on September 17, 2009, to donate 10% of its
vaccine purchases to WHO, but on October 28, US Secretary of
Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius stated that the
United States would not donate HiNi vaccine as promised until
all at-risk Americans had access, because production problems had
created shortages in the United States.191
Third, after Indonesia turned over their virus samples, there was no
guarantee that the pharmaceutical companies would develop drugs that
respond to the needs of the Indonesian population, as opposed to the more
wealthy population in the developed world. Because viruses mutate all the
time, drugs that target diseases found in developed countries do not always
respond effectively to diseases found in their much poorer neighbors. In the
HIV/AIDS context, for example, commentators lamented how the drugs
189. As the Committee on Emerging Microbial Threats to Health of the Institute of
Medicine noted in its widely-cited report, co-edited by Nobel Laureate Joshua Lederberg:
[F]ew vaccines are highly profitable and strict federal safety and efficacy
requirements make the risk of failure a very real possibility. Vaccine
developers must also take into account the extra costs that may arise from
liability claims for injuries or deaths blamed on vaccines. This concern has
forced a number of vaccine manufacturers out of the marketplace.
COMMITTEE ON EMERGING MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
EMERGING INFECTIONS: MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (1992)
[hereinafter EMERGING INFECTIONS].
190. Kathryn White & Maria Banda, The Role of Civil Society in Pandemic Preparedness,
in INNOVATION IN GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, supra note 112, at 105, 117.
191. Fidler, Negotiating Equitable Access, supra note 186 (footnotes omitted).
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available for the strand in developed countries do not always work well for
patients in the less developed world.192
Fourth, Indonesia was understandably alarmed when the media reported
that "Indonesian H5N1 viral sequences submitted earlier to WHO had been
submitted to the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the US."'9 3
Considering the laboratory's involvement in national security-related
research,1 94 Indonesia expressed concern that the collected samples could be
used to develop biological warfare. The Indonesian government also
threatened to close down the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit Two
("NAMRU-2"), a public health laboratory in Jakarta staffed by Indonesians
and U.S. military scientists, accusing it of "profiteering off its 'sovereign'
viruses to manufacturing the H5Nl bird flu in an alleged biological warfare
scheme."' 95
On its face, Indonesia's charge seemed "outlandish,"' 96 considering that
the United States has been at the forefront of the combat against
192. As Kelley Lee and Anthony Zwi recalled:
In the report of a meeting on HIV vaccines held by the Rockefeller
Foundation at Bellagio, Italy in 1994, concerns were expressed that
companies are "catering to the needs of the developed world" by focusing on
"a small number of potential vaccine approaches". This had included an
emphasis on the HIV strain subtype B, which predominates in Europe and
the US but not in low-income countries. One notable example has been trials
in China and Thailand beginning in June 1993 of a potential HIV-B vaccine.
In China the trials have been carried out by the US company United
Biomedical with agreement of the Chinese government, while in Thailand it
has been a joint project between the US and Thai armies. . . . [B]oth projects
have been criticized on the grounds that the HIV-B virus generally does not
occur in Asia.
Kelley Lee & Anthony Zwi, A Global Political Economy Approach to AIDS: Ideology, Interests
and Implications, in HEALTH IMPACTS OF GLOBALIZATION: TOWARDS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 13,
29 (Kelley Lee ed., 2003) [hereinafter HEALTH IMPACTS OF GLOBALIZATION] (citation omitted);
see also EMERGING INFECTIONS, supra note 189, at 55 (discussing the HIV-1 and HIV-2
variants); Hammer, supra note 50, at 893 ("[C]linical needs in the third world may dictate a
range of differences in terms of appropriate drug combinations, composition and dosages. These
clinical differences can be consciously exploited to promote product differentiation between
first- and third-world treatments.").
193. William Aldis, Health Security as a Public Health Concept: A Critical Analysis, 23
HEALTH POL'Y & PLANNING 369, 374 n. 1 (2008); accord Indonesia Stops Announcing Bird Flu
Deaths, supra note 186 ("Indonesia stopped sharing bird flu samples with WHO in January
2007 after learning that some coveted data about the virus was being kept in a private database
at a U.S. government laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico, and made accessible to only a
handful of researchers.").
194. See Aldis, supra note 193, at 374 n.l ("This was distressing because this is understood
to be a national security, not a public health, facility.").
195. Holbrooke & Garrett, supra note 181.
196. Id.
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bioterrorism and biological warfare. In reality, however, the United States
did not have a clean record as far as medical experimentation on human
subjects is concerned. In October 2010, the U.S. government revealed,
shockingly, that "the government conducted medical experiments in the
1940s in which doctors infected soldiers, prisoners and mental patients in
Guatemala with syphilis and other sexually transmitted diseases." 9 7 The
doctor who led these shameful experiments was also involved in the now-
infamous medical experiment in Tuskegee, Alabama, in which "hundreds of
African American men with late-stage syphilis were left untreated to study
the disease between 1932 and 1972."l98
Finally, and quite importantly, Indonesia had international treaties on its
side. Although the WHO Constitution and the 2005 International Health
Regulations "do not contain specific, binding provisions on equitable access
to vaccines and drugs for developing countries,"1 99 Article 15.1 of the
Convention on Biological Diversity (the "CBD") "[r]ecogniz[es] the
sovereign rights of States over their natural resources" and states that "the
authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the national
governments and is subject to national legislation."20 0 Article 10.1 of the
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
("ITPGRFA"), which was developed under the auspices of the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, also "recognize[s] the
sovereign rights of States over their own plant genetic resources for food
and agriculture, including . . . the authority to determine access to those
resources."20 1 Given the fact that the viruses constitute genetic resources, as
stated explicitly in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the CBD,20 2 these
two treaties clearly support the strong sovereignty-based position taken by
Indonesia.
From the standpoint of international law, Indonesia's sovereignty claims
are very interesting. As Professor Fidler observed, the country's
"willingness to leverage control over virus samples to provoke more
197. Rob Stein, U.S. Infected Guatemalans for STD Tests, WASH. PosT, Oct. 2, 2010, at
Al. "The goal [of the studies] was to assess whether taking penicillin right after sex would
prevent sexually transmitted infections." Id.
198. Id.
199. Fidler, Negotiating Equitable Access, supra note 186.
200. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 15.1, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143
[hereinafter CBD].
201. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture art. 10.1,
Nov. 3, 2001, available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i05lOe/i051Oe.pdf.
202. See, e.g., Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
art. 3(h), Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 ("'Living organism' means any biological entity capable
of transferring or replicating genetic material, including sterile organisms, viruses and viroids."
(emphasis added)).
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multilateral responses to the access problem changed the political dynamics
of this issue."203 Its effort in "fram[ing] their positions by using international
law ... [also] illustrated the importance and limitations of international law
in global health diplomacy." 20
Notwithstanding Indonesia's legal claims, both the CBD and the
ITPGRFA include limitations and exceptions. Consider the CBD for
example. Article 15.2 states that "[e]ach Contracting Party shall endeavour
to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources for
environmentally sound uses by other Contracting Parties and not to impose
restrictions that run counter to the objectives of this Convention.",2 05 In this
case, not only did Indonesia fail to "create conditions to facilitate access to
genetic resources for environmentally sound uses by other Contracting
Parties," but it also arguably had "impose[d] restrictions that run counter to
the objectives of this Convention." 20 6 These objectives, as Article 1 states
explicitly, "are the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use
of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising
out of the utilization of genetic resources."207
Using the CBD language to question the appropriateness of Indonesia's
actions, Professor Fidler wrote:
States parties to CBD have addressed avian influenza, not as a
biological resource subject to CBD but as a threat to biological
diversity. CBD discussions of avian influenza have considered its
potential impact on wildlife, and the CBD process emphasized that
surveillance is critical for combating avian influenza's threat to
biological diversity. Surveillance suffers without sharing
information and samples of avian influenza viruses. Rather than
protecting biological diversity, as mandated by CBD, Indonesia's
withholding virus samples from global surveillance efforts
jeopardizes biological diversity in addition to population health.208
Because the spread of communicable diseases could undermine the CBD's
first two objectives, one could question whether Indonesia's policy is in fact
consistent with the Convention. One could also question whether
Indonesia's action would be in violation of Article 3, which prohibits States
203. David P. Fidler, Influenza Virus Samples, International Law, and Global Health
Diplomacy, 14 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 88, 89 (2008) [hereinafter Fidler, Influenza
Virus Samples].
204. Id. at 89-90.
205. CBD, supra note 200, art. 15.2.
206. Id.
207. Id. art. 1.
208. Fidler, Influenza Virus Samples, supra note 203, at 91 (footnote omitted).
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from "caus[ing] damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."2 09
To complicate matters even further, Article 15.3 stipulates that, "[fjor the
purpose of this Convention, the genetic resources being provided by a
Contracting Party . . . are only those that are provided by Contracting
Parties that are countries of origin of such resources or by the Parties that
have acquired the genetic resources in accordance with this Convention." 2 10
It therefore matters whether the claimed "sovereign" viruses actually
originated in Indonesia or whether they originated elsewhere and merely
entered the country to infect birds and chickens. While the former will
result in protection under the CBD, the latter likely will not.
In retrospect, the debate about viral sovereignty is not new. For more
than a decade, commentators have expressed concerns about the "biopiracy"
of plant species and genetic resources, which occurs when patents are
granted for naturally occurring products and indigenous practices that have
existed for many centuries.21 ' In theory, these products and practices are
exempt from patent protection, for they are neither novel nor inventive. In
practice, however, patents may be granted because many of these products
and practices remain largely unknown to the general public.2 12 As countries
begin to focus on their obligations under the CBD, biosovereignty issues
have quickly spilled over into the public health arena. Much of the rhetoric
Indonesia deployed in the viral sovereignty debate actually originated from
the biopiracy debate.
Even without the spillover from that debate, sovereignty issues come up
all the time in the public health arena, especially when international
obligations are implicated 2 1 3-regardless of whether they relate to the early
209. CBD, supra note 200, art. 3; see also Mullis, supra note 181, at 957-58 (suggesting
that Indonesia's decision to withhold avian influenza samples could cause other countries
sufficient harm to invoke Article 3 of the CBD).
210. CBD, supra note 200, art. 15.3.
211. "Biopiracy is seen as a new form of Western imperialism in which global seed and
pharmaceutical corporations plunder the biodiversity and traditional knowledge of the
developing world. Biopiracy is the unauthorized and uncompensated expropriation of genetic
resources and traditional knowledge." SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 140 (2003) (footnotes omitted). For
discussions of biopiracy, see sources cited in Yu, Cultural Relics, supra note 175, at 481 n.266.
212. See IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 81-82 (discussing the needs for and
problems of traditional knowledge databases and digital libraries).
213. See, e.g., Andrew F. Cooper et al., Critical Cases in Global Health Innovation, in
INNOVATION IN GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, supra note 112, at 3, 9 ("[N]ew sovereignty ...
arises as actors beyond nation-states and their intergovernmental institutions emerge as
appropriate and effective centres of innovation and thus become legitimately embedded as
authoritative institutions of global health governance."); Arthur Kleinman & James L. Watson,
Introduction: SARS in Social and Historical Context, in SARS IN CHINA: PRELUDE TO
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international standards concerning hygiene and sanitation, to the right to
health under international human rights treaties, or to newly created
obligations under the 2005 International Health Regulations. Nevertheless,
the claims of sovereignty in this case could pose serious health hazards to
the nationals of other equally sovereign countries. As Holbrooke and
Garrett rightly observed:
It is dangerous folly . to extend [the sovereignty notion] to
viruses. If the concept of "viral sovereignty" had been applied to
AIDS 25 years ago, we would not have central repositories of
thousands of varieties of HIV today; these allow scientists to test
drugs and vaccines against all the different strains of the AIDS
virus. It is even more ludicrous to extend the sovereignty notion to
viruses that, like flu, can be carried across international borders by
migratory birds.214
In March 2007, health ministers of thirty countries gathered in Indonesia
to draft the Jakarta Declaration on Responsible Practices for Sharing Avian
Influenza Viruses and Resulting Benefits. 215 This declaration called upon
the WHO "to convene the necessary meetings, initiate the critical processes
and obtain the essential commitment of all stakeholders to establish the
mechanisms for more open virus and information sharing and accessibility
to avian influenza and other potential pandemic influenza vaccines for
developing countries."216 Eight months later, at the Intergovernmental
Meeting on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, tensions resurfaced when
"Indonesia reiterated the need for developing countries to have trust in a
multilateral system that did not undermine their sovereign rights over
biological resources (based on the CBD), nor disadvantage the health of
people living in poor countries. 2 17 In response, developed countries
charged that "the stance taken by Indonesia was jeopardising global health
PANDEMIC? 1, 1 (Arthur Kleinman & James Watson eds., 2005) [hereinafter SARS IN CHINA]
(noting that the SARS epidemic "raised important questions about the role of national
sovereignty in an increasingly interconnected world").
214. Holbrooke & Garrett, supra note 181.
215. Jakarta Declaration on Virus Sharing: A Strategic Step to More Equitable and
Affordable Avian Flu Vaccines Distribution, EUROBALI (Apr. 12, 2007),
http://eurobali.org/index.php?action=news&newsid=190.
216. Chan Chee Khoon & Gilles de Wildt, Developing Countries, Donor Leverage, and
Access to Bird Flu Vaccines 2 (U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Working Paper No. 41,
2007), available at http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp4l_2007.pdf.
217. ALTERNATIVE WORLD HEALTH REPORT, supra note 185, at 234.
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security and violated the WHO's International Health Regulations."2 18
Neither side was able to resolve the disagreement.
To make matters worse, other less developed countries have expressed
similar concerns or have begun to follow Indonesia's lead in asserting
claims of viral sovereignty. For instance, at the meeting of the WHO
Executive Board in January 2007, a representative of Thailand noted:
We are sending our virus [samples] to the rich countries to
produce antivirals and vaccines. And when the pandemic occurs,
they survive and we die.. . . We are not opposed to the sharing of
information and virus [samples], but on the condition that every
country will have equal opportunity to get access to vaccines and
antivirals if such a pandemic occurs.219
In May 2008, "Indian Health Minister A. Ramadoss [also] endorsed the
concept [of viral sovereignty] in a dispute with Bangladesh."2 2 0 Members of
the Non-Aligned Movement ("NAM") further "agreed to consider formally
endorsing the concept of 'viral sovereignty' at [a later] meeting." 2 2 1 A
legacy of the Cold War, this Movement includes more than 100 less
developed countries that seek not to align with the positions adopted by the
major powers. On June 27, 2008, "[t]he NAM Ambassadors adopted the
Declaration presented by Indonesia on avian flu, virus exchange and other
benefits."222
Although the positions taken by Indonesia, India, and other NAM
members were highly controversial, the wide support Indonesia received
among less developed countries eventually led to the May 2007 adoption of
Resolution WHA60.28, which recognizes both "the sovereign right of
218. Id Article 46 of the 2005 International Health Regulations, which covers "transport
and handling of biological substances, reagents and materials for diagnostic purposes,"
provides: "States Parties shall, subject to national law and taking into account relevant
international guidelines, facilitate the transport, entry, exit, processing and disposal of biological
substances and diagnostic specimens, reagents and other diagnostic materials for verification
and public health response purposes under these Regulations." Revision of the International
Health Regulations, World Health Assembly Res. WHA58.3 (May 23, 2005); see also Lawson
& Hocking, supra note 185, at 301 ("In implementing the International Health Regulations
(2005) . . . members were 'urged' to 'disseminate to WHO collaborating centres information
and relevant biological materials related to highly pathogenic avian influenza and other novel
influenza strains in a timely and constituent manner."' (quoting Application of the International
Health Regulations (2005), World Health Assembly Res. WHA59.2 (May 26, 2006))).
219. FIDLER& GoSTIN, supra note 179, at 171.
220. Holbrooke & Garrett, supra note 181.
221. Id.
222. The Non-Aligned Movement, 15th Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned
Movement-Report of the Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement: September 17, 2006-July 5,
2008, NAM 2008/Doc.6, available at http://nam.gov.ir/Portal/File/
ShowFile.aspx?ID=679ba392-78cd-43be-8b4a-08a07ff0154a.
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States over their biological resources, and the importance of collective
action to mitigate public health risks." 2 3 That resolution further recognizes
that "intellectual property rights do not and should not prevent Member
States from taking measures to protect public health." 2 4
Three years later, the World Health Assembly adopted Resolution
WHA64.5 outlining the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness ("PIP")
Framework.2 25 Paragraph 5.1.2 of the PIP Framework specifically states
that, by supplying biological materials to WHO collaborating centers and
H5 reference laboratories, "Member States provide their consent for the
onward transfer and use of PIP biological materials to institutions,
organizations and entities, subject to provisions in the Standard Material
Transfer Agreements ["SMTA"]."22 6 Paragraph 5.4 introduces two types of
these agreements: SMTA 1 "will be used to cover all transfers of PIP
biological materials within the WHO GISRS for the duration of its
applicability," 2 27 while SMTA 2 "will cover all transfers of PIP biological
materials to recipients" outside the WHO GISRS.228
In addition, Paragraph 6.9.1 states that the WHO Director-General "will
establish and maintain a stockpile of vaccines for H5N1 and other influenza
viruses with human pandemic potential and associated equipment, including
223. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to
Vaccines and Other Benefits, pmbl., recital 4, World Health Assembly Res. WHA60.28 (May
23, 2007), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA60/A60_R28-en.pdf.
224. Id pmbl., recital 5; see also Global Strategy and Plan of Action, supra note 107, T 25
("Intellectual property rights are an important incentive in the development of new health care
products. However, this incentive alone does not meet the need for the development of new
products to fight diseases where the potential paying market is small or uncertain.").
225. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework for the Sharing of Influenza Viruses and
Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits, World Health Assembly Res. WHA64.5 (May 24,
2011) [hereinafter PIP Framework].
226. Id. 5.1.2. When the PIP Framework was proposed, the working group advancing the
proposal "strongly recommend[ed] that the ... Assembly consider the options regarding the
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of
Benefits Arising from their Utilization." Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of
Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits: Report by the Open-Ended
Working Group of Member States on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of Influenza
Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits, Sixty-Fourth World Health Assembly, May
16-24, 2011, A64/8, provisional agenda item 13.1, at 3 (May 5, 2011). Adopted on October 29,
2010, the Nagoya Protocol aims to promote fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from
the utilization of genetic resources, thereby contributing to the conservation and the sustainable
use of biological diversity. Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization art. 1, Oct. 29, 2010, available at
http://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf.
227. PIP Framework, supra note 225, T 5.4.1. Article 6.1 of this SMTA explicitly states
that "[n]either the Provider nor the Recipient should seek to obtain any intellectual property
rights (IPRs) on the Materials." Id. annex 1, art. 6.1.
228. Id. 5.4.2.
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syringes, needles and applicators, consistent with expert guidance."2 29 As
the Director-General reported in her 2013 biennial report: "During May
2011-May 2012, [she] initiated discussions with four large influenza
vaccine manufacturers to commence the process to sign SMTA 2s. The PIP
Secretariat has also provided information on the SMTA 2 and the process to
conclude it to over 30 prospective recipients of PIP biological materials."2 30
Finally, Paragraph 6.13.1, which covers technology transfer, states that
the Director-General "will continue to work closely with Member States
and influenza vaccine manufacturers to implement the WHO Global
Pandemic Influenza Action Plan to Increase Vaccine Supply, including its
strategies to build new production facilities in developing and/or
industrialized countries and through transfer of technology, skills and
know-how." 2 3 1 Paragraph 6.13.2 further states that "Member States should
urge influenza vaccine, diagnostic and pharmaceutical manufacturers to
make specific efforts to transfer these technologies to other countries,
particularly developing countries, as appropriate."232
In sum, compared with the first two virostories, the third story shows
more radical developments. Instead of relying on adjustments to the patent
system or taking full advantage of that system, countries advance new
concepts to challenge the whole system. Building on efforts developed over
the biopiracy debate, Indonesia, India, and other NAM members
successfully underscored the importance of maintaining sovereignty over
their virological materials. Luckily, the PIP Framework and its two SMTAs
229. Id. T 6.9.1.
230. WHO Executive Board, Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of Influenza
Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits: Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Framework 2013 Biennial Report-Report by the Director-General, at 20, WHO Doc.
EB132/16 (Nov. 16, 2012). As elaborated in a "Questions and Answers" document:
The process to negotiate and sign SMTA 2 with individual manufacturers
and entities will start in 2012 and is anticipated to be a multi-year process
taking place in several phases. WHO will start by developing template
agreements for the different types of benefit sharing foreseen under the PIP
Framework (donations; pre-purchase of vaccine or antiviral medicines;
licenses for intellectual property rights). Following this, WHO will contact
influenza vaccine manufacturers first, in order to begin negotiation of
individual agreements. Later, WHO will work with other recipients so that in
time, all non-GISRS recipients of PIP biological materials have signed an
SMTA2 with WHO.
WHO, Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework for the Sharing of Influenza Viruses and
Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits (PIP Framework): Questions and Answers 9, (Sept.
2011), available at http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/PIPFQANov_201 1.pdf.
231. PIP Framework, supra note 225, 6.13.1.
232. Id. 6.13.2.
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were established in time to prevent the global health system from being
seriously undermined.
IV. TOWARD A NEW INTEGRATED APPROACH
The three stories discussed earlier in this Article cover viruses that have
serious impacts on global public health. They not only provide important
lessons about the changing intellectual property system, but also raise
important questions about how to analyze issues lying at the intersection of
intellectual property, public health, human rights, and economic
development.2 33 For example, should our analysis be different if the
patented medicines were introduced to treat communicable diseases, which
could quickly spread from one country to another? Should the international
intellectual property norm-setting process be modified in light of the
growing participation of health NGOs and pro-consumer activists, which
are usually unrepresented or underrepresented in state-based fora? Are there
alternative innovation models or policy options that go beyond incremental
adjustments to existing intellectual property standards?
To help analyze these issues and develop new legal standards and policy
recommendations, Part IV.A underscores the need for a new integrated
approach to setting international intellectual property norms. Specifically, it
calls for analysis that is holistic, multidisciplinary, globally-oriented, and
empirically based. Part IV.B then draws seven important lessons from the
three virostories discussed in the Article. With a focus on global
governance, this Part discusses these lessons in the context of three areas in
which the international intellectual property norm-setting process can be
reformed: (1) negotiation gains; (2) the negotiation process; and (3)
negotiated outcomes. Among the concrete examples that will be further
explored are the recent and ongoing efforts to reform the international
patent system (including the effort to ratify Article 31bis of the TRIPS
Agreement), the introduction of higher international enforcement standards
in ACTA234 and the TPP,235 and the continued negotiation of intellectual
property chapters in bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agreements.23 6
233. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Training and Education for Development, 28
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 311, 328 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Intellectual Property Training]
("[I]ntellectual property training and educational programs should feature inter- and multi-
disciplinary perspectives."); Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 14, at 855
("[I]f we are to effectively address the public health crises in less developed countries, it is very
important to take a holistic perspective and target each aspect of the problem, because efforts
that succeed in addressing one aspect may alleviate the impact of the others.").
234. For the Author's earlier discussions of ACTA, see generally Peter K. Yu, ACTA and
Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (2011); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What
1618 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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Although the scope and length of this Article do not allow for a full
discussion of the application of the proposed integrated approach to other
developments in the area intersecting intellectual property and public
health, it is worth noting that a deeper analysis using this approach could
provide new and important insights. Some of the recent developments on
which the proposed approach could shed light include India and Brazil's
WTO dispute with the European Union and the Netherlands over the seizure
of in-transit generic drugs,23 7 Novartis' unsuccessful challenge to section
3(d) of the Indian Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005 before the Indian
Supreme Court,238 the tobacco industry's ongoing efforts to use the WTO
and bilateral investment agreements to challenge plain packaging
Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 239 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement]; Peter K. Yu,
Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of A CTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six
Secret Fears].
235. For discussions of the TPP, see generally No ORDINARY DEAL: UNMASKING THE
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Jane Kelsey ed., 2011); THE TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENT (C.L. Lim
et al. eds., 2012); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or
Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (2011); Peter K. Yu, The
Alphabet Soup of Transborder Intellectual Property Enforcement, 60 DRAKE L. REV.
DISCOURSE 16, 24-28 (2012).
236. See AUSFTA, supra note 32, ch. 17; Free Trade Agreement Between the Republic of
Korea and the United States of America, S. Korea-U.S., ch. 18, June 30, 2007, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset upload file273 1271
7.pdf; see also Peter K. Yu, Trade Agreement Cats and the Digital Technology Mouse, in
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: BALANCING COMPETING
INTERESTS 185, 193-97 (Bryan Mercurio & Ni Kuei-Jung eds., 2014) (discussing these
chapters).
237. See sources cited supra note 104.
238. See Patralekha Chatterjee, Novartis Loses Patent Bid: Lessons from India's 3(d)
Experience, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 1, 2013, 11:41 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2013/04/01/novartis-loses-patent-bid-lessons-from-indias-3d-experience/; see also
Rachel Marusak Hermann, Novartis Before India's Supreme Court: What's Really at Stake?,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 2, 2012, 12:05 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/03/02/novartis-
before-india%E2%80%99s-supreme-court-what%E2%80%99s-really-at-stake. Novartis made
that challenge following the rejection of its application concerning the anti-cancer drug
Gleevec/Glivec (imatinib mesilate). Section 3(d) of that law specifically prevents patent
protection from being granted to
the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in
increased efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new
use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or
apparatus unless such process results in a new product or employs at least one new
reactant.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 3(d), India Code (2005); see also Amy
Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in
India's Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1590-98 (2009) (discussing section
3(d) of the Indian Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005).
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legislation,23 9 and Eli Lily's recent $500 million complaint against Canada
under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
following the Canadian courts' invalidation of its drug patents.240
To some extent, many of these developments remind us of the disastrous
lawsuit the South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and
thirty-nine mostly multinational pharmaceutical companies brought against
Nelson Mandela's government in February 1998.241 Signed into law by the
late President Mandela, the Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act 1997 "introduce[d] a legal framework to increase the
availability of affordable medicines in South Africa . . . [by providing for]
generic substitution of off-patent medicines, transparent pricing for all
medicines, and the parallel importation of patented medicines." 2 42 The brand
name pharmaceutical industry's challenge, and the subsequent backing of
the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") and the European
Commission, 24 not only created a public relations disaster for the industry,
but eventually led to the adoption of the Doha Declaration.2"
239. See Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Australia-Certain Measures Concerning
Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging, WT/DS434/1 (Mar. 15, 2012); Request for Consultations by Honduras, Australia-
Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS435/1 (Apr. 10, 2012). For discussions
of these challenges, see generally PUBLIC HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES:
LEGAL ISSUES (Tania Voon et al. eds., 2012); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Conflict-of-Laws
Approach to Competing Rationalities in International Law: The Case of Plain. Packaging
Between IP, Trade, Investment and Health (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop. &
Competition Law, Research Paper No. 13-05, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-2204980.
240. See Kazi Stastna, Eli Lilly Files $500M NAFTA Suit Against Canada over Drug
Patents, CBC NEWS (Sept. 13, 2013, 8:44 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/eli-lilly-files-
500m-nafta-suit-against-canada-over-drug-patents-1.1829854; see also Henning Grosse Ruse-
Khan, Investor-State Arbitration to Challenge Host State Compliance with International IP
Treaties?, INT'L ECON. L. & POL'Y BLOG (Dec. 11, 2012, 11:07 AM),
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2012/12/investor-state-arbitration-to-challenge-host-
state-compliance-with-international-ip-treaties.html (discussing this notice).
241. See 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 64, at 30-31 (discussing the
lawsuit).
242. Id. at 30.
243. The United States government backed the industry by putting South Africa on the
Section 301 Watch List and announcing the suspension of its Generalized System of
Preferences benefits. See SELL, supra note 211, at 151; see also 't Hoen, TRIPS,
Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 64, at 30-31 (discussing the support the brand name
pharmaceutical industry received from both the USTR and the European Commission).
244. The ill-advised lawsuit also led to the Clinton administration's adoption of Executive
Order 13,155, which enables countries in sub-Saharan Africa to enhance access to HIV/AIDS
medicines and related medical technologies without fear of trade retaliation. Exec. Order No.
13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521 (May 12, 2000).
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Paragraph 6 of this Declaration, in turn, precipitated the efforts to amend
the TRIPS Agreement by adding Article 31 bis.245 Paragraph 7 also extended
the transition period for the protection of pharmaceutical patents and
undisclosed clinical trial data,246 paving the way for two later extensions for
least developed countries in all other areas.2 47 If these changes are not far-
reaching enough, the industry's ill-advised lawsuit has changed the tone of
the entire global intellectual property debate. 248 Given the seemingly repeat
efforts of rights holders in restricting access to patented medicines and the
less developed countries' continued difficulty in obtaining this much-
needed access, the development of a new approach is not only in order, but
urgently needed.
A. The Need for Holistic, Multidisciplinary, Socio-legal Analysis
When intellectual property laws and policies come into existence, they
tend to be established in clinical isolation from developments in other
disciplines and issue areas. However, as the three stories discussed earlier in
this Article have shown, what happens in the intellectual property area
could easily spill over into other areas-in this case, global health
governance. As the scope of intellectual property rights continues to
expand, the intellectual property debate no longer concerns only technical
details about intellectual property laws and policies. As a result, an
integrated approach is needed to help us better understand the global health
implications of these laws and policies.
The proposed approach is also important in light of the continued forum-
manipulative activities conducted by both developed and less developed
countries.2 49 Because such activities have moved international intellectual
property discussions to fora that traditionally do not cover the subject
245. See Doha Declaration, supra note 73, 6.
246. See id.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
248. See, e.g., SELL, supra note 211, at 181 (observing that "[t]he HIV/AIDS pandemic was
a contingency that sped up the revelation of the negative consequences of TRIPS"); Ruth
Mayne, The Global Campaign on Patents and Access to Medicines: An Oxfam Perspective, in
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 244, 249
(Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002) (noting that "[t]he South African government's
decision to fight the case was a critical factor in generating global media interest"); Yu, Access
to Medicines, supra note 67, at 355 (arguing that "the campaign on access to drugs, to which
South Africa made an important contribution, provides a major turning point in the TRIPs
debate").
249. For discussions of these activities, see sources cited in Yu, Intellectual Property
Training, supra note 233, at 325 n.59.
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matter,250 new issues, ideas, textual language, values, and arguments have
begun to emerge in the debate on intellectual property laws and policies.
Drawing on these new developments, commentators have called for
policymakers to undertake a more holistic assessment of the need for legal
and policy reforms.25 1
Consider the HIV/AIDS pandemic for example. The adjustment of
intellectual property laws and policies alone is insufficient to address
problems created by this pandemic. Other contributing factors include
"inadequate healthcare and drug delivery; lack of medical infrastructure and
research capabilities; insufficient sex education and drug control; ill-advised
trade, investment and financial policies; political unrests and civil wars;
bribery and corruption; abject poverty and colonization-induced
underdevelopment." 25 2 The more comprehensive the analysis is, the better
the understanding of the interplay among these factors will be, and the more
successful adjustments policymakers will make to their priorities.
The push for a more holistic approach, indeed, has opened up the
possibility for experts from different disciplines to interact with each other,
at both the policy and discursive levels. As the discussion of global health
governance becomes more inter- and multi-disciplinary, experts have begun
to pay greater attention to the multifaceted interfaces between and among
the different international regimes.253 These interfaces are not only present
in places where the regimes intersect, but they can also be created through
legal linkages, technical cooperation, institutional interplay, and political
alliances. The emphasis on these interfaces makes good sense. After all,
"[tihe process by which an infectious disease emerges and is recognized and
responded to can be complex."2 5 4
250. See Yu, Two Development Agendas, supra note 92, at 522-40 (discussing how less
developed countries have actively pushed for intellectual property reforms in not only WIPO
and the WTO, but also other fora governing public health, human rights, biological diversity,
food and agriculture, and information and communications).
251. See Jonathan Mann, AIDS, in ONE WORLD: THE HEALTH AND SURVIVAL OF THE
HUMAN SPECIES IN THE 21sT CENTURY 75, 79 (Robert Lanza ed., 2003) ("It is now clear that
HIV/AIDS is as much about society as about a virus.").
252. Yu, Rugged Road Ahead, supra note 102, at 227; accord Richard Dogson & Kelly
Lee, Global Health Governance: A Conceptual Review, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 92, 92 (Rorden Wilkinson & Steve Hughes eds., 2002) [hereinafter GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE] ("Part of the increasing health risk and the lack of an adequate local, national
and global response is caused by factors outside the health sector-trade and investment
policies; debt burden and international development assistance.").
253. See Sonja Bartsch et al., Interfaces: A Concept for the Analysis of Global Health
Governance, in FIGHT AGAINST HIV/AIDS, supra note 17, at 18 (advancing the concept and
logic of "interfaces" for analyzing global governance).
254. EMERGING INFECTIONS, supra note 189, at 113.
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Because this integrated approach can be realized through a large number
of practices, this Section provides three examples. The first concerns the use
of the approach to reframe the international patent debate. Such refraining is
likely to have significant implications for intellectual property laws and
policies. As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite reminded us, "Had TRIPS
been framed as a public health issue, the anxiety of mass publics in the US
and other Western states might have become a factor in destabilising the
consensus that US business elites had built around TRIPS." 25 5 Likewise, a
growing number of commentators are now paying attention to the framing
of the domestic and international intellectual property debates.2 56
Indeed, had this Article been written from the intellectual property
perspective, as opposed to one lying at the intersection of intellectual
property and public health, it likely would have read very differently.
Instead of highlighting the less developed countries' increased frustration
with the international patent system in the public health arena, an article
written from the intellectual property perspective alone would focus on the
widespread problem of piracy and counterfeiting, the low enforcement
standards of the TRIPS Agreement,2 57 the lack of compliance with these
standards in many less developed countries, and the need for efforts such as
the WHO International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce
(IMPACT).25 8
The second example concerns efforts to bring together expertise from
multiple disciplines. As commentators repeatedly noted, there is a strong
and ever-growing need for collaboration between government officials
involved in various policy areas 2 5 9-in this case, public health personnel
and intellectual property policymakers.2 60 Consider, for example, the
Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency ("ANVISA"), which Peter
255. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 576 (2000).
256. For discussions of the importance of framing and refraining issues in the international
intellectual property debate, see sources cited in Yu, Objectives and Principles, supra note 134,
at 1038 n.270.
257. See Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, supra note 57, at 483-504 (discussing the low
TRIPS enforcement standards).
258. See Kaitlin Mara, Hope for Consensus on WHO and Counterfeits Moves to May
Assembly, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jan. 27, 2009, 10:33 AM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2009/01/27/hope-for-consensus-on-who-and-counterfeits-moves-to-may-assembly/
(discussing the controversy surrounding IMPACT of the WHO).
259. See generally CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 211-14 (2009) (discussing government coordination in making intellectual property
decisions).
260. See, e.g., Peter Drahos, "Trust Me": Patent Offices in Developing Countries, 34 AM.
J.L. & MED. 151, 169-70 (2008) [hereinafter Drahos, "Trust Me"]; Yu, Access to Medicines,
supra note 67, at 378.
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Drahos used to illustrate the many benefits provided by greater coordination
between patent offices and health and medical experts in assessing an
invention's contribution to innovation and health welfare.2 6' As he
explained, health and medical experts are likely to be in a much better
position than patent examiners to make such an assessment.262
Drawing on Professor Drahos's example, I went further to suggest that
the ANIVSA model could be used to facilitate greater cooperation between
intellectual property offices in the South and health and medical experts and
related NGOs in the North.263 Sadly, despite the immense potential of the
ANVISA model, the Brazilian government recently greatly curtailed the
agency's efforts, 264 due in part to the continued conflict between ANVISA
and the Brazilian industrial property agency (INPI). 265 As of this writing, it
is unclear how effective ANVISA will continue to be in the patent area,266
261. See Drahos, "Trust Me, "supra note 260, at 169-70.
262. As he elaborated:
The Brazilian model is worth close study by other developing countries. It is
a preventive strategy that avoids the high costs of attempting to remove
patents that have been granted. It is also an integrative regulatory strategy. It
links patentability criteria in the area of pharmaceuticals to the goal of
welfare-enhancing innovation in the health sector. One of the real concerns
with pharmaceutical patenting has been that patent offices are granting
patents over essentially trivial steps in the innovation process. The reasons
for this are complex, having to do with the incentives facing patent offices,
the narrow training of patent examiners, the fact that patent examiners are not
researchers, and that they are not integrated into communities of public
health experts that know about what constitutes real innovation in a given
field. From the perspective of the patent social contract, the grant of patents
over trivial or obvious steps in the pharmaceutical innovation process
constitutes a welfare loss to society. Involving public health experts in the
process of patent administration is one way of helping to ensure that the
patent social contract functions as it should in the health sector.
Id. at 169-70 (footnotes omitted).
263. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 67, at 378.
264. See Felipe Carvalho, Brazil and the Defence of Public Health: Do as I Say, Not as I
Do, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 17, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2011/02/17/brazil-and-the-defence-of-public-health-do-as-i-say-not-as-i-do/
(reporting the October 2010 decision of the Advocacia Geral da Uniao that undermined
ANVISA's prior consent mechanism (anugnciaprevia)).
265. For discussions of this conflict, see generally Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Political
Contradictions of Incremental Innovation: Lessons from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination in
Brazil, 39 POL. & Soc'Y 143 (2011); Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Rise and Fall of "Prior
Consent" in Brazil, 3 WIPO J. 103 (2011) [hereinafter Shadlen, Rise and Fall].
266. See Shadlen, Rise and Fall, supra note 265, at 108 ("In fact, as of late 2011 prior
consent appears, for all practical purposes, to be dead.").
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although Brazil is currently reviewing ANVISA's role in the patent
examination process.267
To some extent, the need for collaboration across disciplines reminds us
of a key lesson from the SARS outbreak. As anthropology professors
Arthur Kleinman and James Watson rightly pointed out:
Seen in the context of avian flu and the major outbreaks of flu in
the twentieth century-most of which appear to have originated in
south China-the SARS crisis suggests that a new approach to
understanding human epidemics must be found. Virologists need
to work in teams consisting of ecologists, biologists, soil scientists,
economists, political scientists, demographers, epidemiologists,
anthropologists, and ethicists. This is the only way we can hope to
understand the intersection of ecological, social, and biological
processes that underline emergent infectious diseases. At issue
here are the migration of waterfowl, the intensive cultivation of
ducks, chickens, and pigs in settings of dense human habitation,
trade in and sale of wild animals, the migration of workers and the
complexities of local cultural practices.268
Within governments, "more departments are [now] becoming involved,
including the powerful departments for agriculture, finance, development,
trade, foreign policy, national security, and national intelligence, as well as
the traditionally low-ranking and isolated ones responsible for environment
and for health."26 9
The third example concerns the development of empirical studies that
can help holistically assess the strengths and weaknesses of intellectual
property laws and policies. An empirically based approach would not only
allow policymakers to better assess the full costs and benefits of newly
introduced measures, but would also prevent the assessment from being
captured by those who would directly benefit from heightened standards of
intellectual property protection and enforcement.
In recent years, impact assessments have been widely endorsed in the
areas of human rights, public health, and biological diversity.27 0
267. See Open Letter from Global Academics in Support of Proposal to Amend Brazil's
Patent Law to Take Advantage of TRIPS-Compliant Flexibilities, INFOJUSTICE.ORG,
http://infojustice.org/support-brazil (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (calling for ANVISA's
involvement in Brazil's patent examination process).
268. Kleinman & Watson, supra note 213, at 14.
269. Kirton & Cooper, Innovation in Global Health Governance, supra note 166, at 314.
270. See, e.g., CBD, supra note 200, art. 14(1)(a) (requiring contracting parties to
"[i]ntroduce appropriate procedures requiring environmental impact assessment of its proposed
projects that are likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity with a view to
avoiding or minimizing such effects and, where appropriate, allow for public participation in
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Assessment, evaluation, and impact studies also constitute one of the six
clusters of recommendations adopted as part of the WIPO Development
Agenda in October 2007.271 To ensure more accurate assessments, countries
should deploy holistic impact assessments that involve institutional
cooperation across sectors and agencies. Preferably, these assessments will
be conducted before the introduction of new forms of protection.2 72 If such
assessments cannot be undertaken at that time-for example, as a result of
heavy external pressure from developed country governments-assessments
should still be conducted following the introduction of new standards or
measures, perhaps after a specified period of time.273
In sum, there are many different ways to develop a new integrated
approach for international norm-setting that is holistic, multidisciplinary,
globally oriented, and empirically based. To provide further illustrations,
the next three sections draw seven different lessons from the three
virostories discussed in this Article. The first two lessons concern the need
for developed countries to rethink their negotiation gains and for less
such procedures"); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The
Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting
from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author (Article
15, Paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), 35, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 17] ("States parties should ... consider undertaking human
rights impact assessments prior to the adoption and after a period of implementation of
legislation for the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one's scientific,
literary or artistic productions."); CIPRIPH REPORT, supra note 158, at 10 (stating that "[h]ealth
policies, as well as inter alia those addressing trade, the environment and commerce, should be
equally subject to assessments as to their impact on the right to health"); JAMES HARRISON, THE
HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 228 (2007) ("Systematic
environmental assessments of trade agreements are relatively common. Norway, the US and
Canada all carry out reviews of the environmental impact of trade policies which include some
international impact assessment, as do the United Nations Environment Programme and World
Wildlife Fund.").
271. See The 45 Adopted Recommendations Under the WIPO Development Agenda,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/
recommendations.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (outlining recommendations concerning
assessment, evaluation, and impact studies in cluster D).
272. Ex ante reviews tend to be more effective than ex post reviews. See Peter K. Yu, The
Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 777, 799-801 (2010) [hereinafter
Yu, Political Economy] (criticizing the EU ex post evaluation of its Database Directive and
distributing recommendations based on such an evaluation); see also James Boyle, Two
Database Cheers for the EU, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2006, 5:31 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/99610a50-7bb2-1 1da-ab8e-0000779e2340.html (discussing the
European Commission's first report on the Directive).
273. Cf HARRISON, supra note 270, at 229 ("The EU methodology ... contains provisions
requiring 'ex post monitoring, evaluation and follow up of trade agreements' so that ongoing
impacts of trade agreements can be evaluated once the agreement in question is actually in
force.").
1626 [Ariz. St. L.J.
developed countries to better articulate their bargain offers. The next three
focus on the changing nature of the international norm-setting process. The
final two lessons cover the possibility for a wide and diverse array of
negotiated outcomes.
B. Negotiation Gains
1. Lesson #1: Communicable Diseases
Intellectual property agreements are established through international
negotiations. When countries negotiate these agreements, they often are
reluctant to provide concessions to other parties unless they gain something
in return. Although there are many different narratives about the origin of
the TRIPS Agreement,27 4 the bargain narrative remains the most widely
accepted.27 5 Under this narrative, developed countries received stronger
intellectual property protection and greater market access. In return, less
developed countries obtained lower tariffs on textiles and agriculture and
protection via the mandatory WTO dispute settlement process against
unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States and other developed
countries. Viewed through the bargain narrative, the TRIPS Agreement was
a well-negotiated compromise between developed and less developed
countries.
While a "quid pro quo" approach is understandable, bargaining has not
always been easy within the WTO. Consider the current Doha Round
negotiations. Although developed country governments continue to demand
liberalization in trade areas that are not yet covered by existing WTO
agreements, there are very few remaining areas in which less developed
countries could offer concessions. Even worse, because the high TRIPS
standards often ignore the needs, interests, conditions, and priorities of the
latter group of countries, the legitimacy of the TRIPS Agreement, and by
extension the WTO, have now been called into question.2 76
Sadly, despite this deepening legitimacy crisis, developed country
negotiators continue to demand concessions in exchange for proposals that
274. See Peter K. Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 369,
371-79 (2006) (discussing four dominant narratives concerning the origins of the TRIPS
Agreement). The three other narratives are the coercion narrative, the ignorance narrative, and
the self-interest narrative. Id. at 373-79.
275. See id. at 371-73 (discussing the bargain narrative of the TRIPS Agreement).
276. See Yu, Objectives and Principles, supra note 134, at 1024; see also SELL, supra note
211, at 173 ("The shaky foundations of [the TRIPS] regime raise important concerns about
accountability and legitimacy.").
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strengthen the development dimension of the TRIPS Agreement. This point
is not hard to understand from the standpoint of domestic politics. As
Robert Putnam pointed out in a path-breaking article, international treaty
negotiations involved two different political games: one domestic and one
international.2 77 If negotiators are to be successful, they need to get buy-in at
both levels. What these negotiators fail to realize, however, is that
rebuilding the legitimacy of the TRIPS Agreement is just as important a
gain as obtaining new concessions in trade and trade-related areas.
Fortunately for the protection of public health, two additional sets of
negotiation gains exist to accelerate the negotiations between developed and
less developed countries. This section will explore the first set of
negotiation gains, and the next section will address the second set. Although
developed country negotiators have hitherto not appreciated any of these
gains, an integrated approach would show that the gains are not to be
ignored.
The first set of negotiation gains is unique to communicable diseases. It
focuses on the immense health benefits provided by addressing the access-
to-medicines problems in less developed countries. As commentators have
widely noted, the provision of public health is a public good that is often
undersupplied. In fact, many less developed countries lack the incentive to
provide extra control when they know full well that the costs of
underprotection-and by extension the costs of interruptions to global flows
of trade and commerce-would be externalized to developed countries and
other parts of the world. As Eric Posner remarked in relation to the SARS
outbreak:
Quick detection and quarantine in a state of origin would benefit
victim states-but an originating state has few incentives to be
vigilant on behalf of other states, since it does not bear the full cost
of the pandemic. States of origin may in fact have an incentive to
hide the outbreak, so as not to scare off foreign investment and
tourism, until the pandemic becomes uncontrollable and can no
longer be hidden in any event. China covered up the SARS
outbreak at first. Sharing of early evidence of an outbreak would
clearly be collectively beneficial, but individual state interests are
in conflict.278
277. See generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-
Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988) (discussing the two-level game involved in
international treaty negotiations). For a collection of essays inspired by this highly influential
article, see DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
(Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam eds., 1993).
278. ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALIsM 5 (2009).
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Increasingly, countries need to view the protection of public health as a
security issue.27 9 To some extent, what happens in the less developed world
could easily spill over into the developed world. Although AIDS could be
traced back to contact with primates in Africa decades ago,280 it now has
affected both developed and less developed countries. In fact, because the
WHO mischaracterized HIV/AIDS as a developed country health problem
in the early days of the disease, it "missed the initial opportunity to act
against the rapid spread of the epidemic in Africa and also in the Caribbean
and to contain its explosion into a global problem."2 8 '
Likewise, even though SARS has been traced to wild animals in
China,282 it has affected a large number of countries in both the developed
and less developed worlds. In the wake of the SARS outbreak, it is no
surprise that the WHO, national governments, and health professionals have
been exceedingly cautious in handling H5N1 and HlNl. We may never
know whether these two viruses would have spread as quickly as SARS if
these precautions had not been taken, but it is hard to ignore the increasing
global nature of health hazards caused by communicable diseases. As the
2007 World Health Report reminded us, "an outbreak or epidemic in any
one part of the world is only a few hours away from becoming an imminent
threat somewhere else."283
In sum, in cases involving this type of disease, the intellectual property
debate can be easily linked to the ongoing debate about global health as a
security issue. In doing so, it could help elevate the political status of the
279. See S.C. Res. 1308, recital 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1308 (July 17, 2000) ("Stressing that
the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security. . . ."); LISK,
supra note 17, at 59-68 (discussing HIV/AIDS as a security threat); Dennis Altman,
Understanding HIV/AIDS as a Global Security Issue, in HEALTH IMPACTS OF GLOBALIZATION,
supra note 192, at 33 (noting the need to understand HIV/AIDS as a global security issue); Ilona
Kickbusch, Foreword: Governing Interdependence, in FIGHT AGAINST HIV/AIDS, supra note
17, at x, xi ("[T]he rapid spread of HIV/AIDS was no longer considered just a health risk, it was
defined as a security concern of global dimensions."); Kelley Lee, Understandings of Global
Health Governance: The Contested Landscape, in GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, supra note
17, at 27, 38 (noting "security" as one of the four competing perspectives-in addition to bio-
medicine, economism, and human rights). See generally McInnes, supra note 17 (discussing the
relationship between global health governance and national security).
280. See generally QUAMMEN, supra note 140, at 385-489 (tracing the origin of HIV to
zoonotic spillover from primates in Africa).
281. LISK, supra note 17, at 12.
282. See HOW A GLOBAL EPIDEMIC WAS STOPPED, supra note 27, at 226 (noting the
"compelling evidence to suggest that the virus originated in animals [such as Himalayan palm
civets, raccoon dogs, and Chinese ferret badgers] and then possibly mutated, becoming more
readily transmissible between humans").
283. WHO, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2007: A SAFER FUTURE: GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH
SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY x (2007).
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issue, thereby enabling it to attract attention it otherwise would not
receive.284 It would also help intellectual property negotiators realign their
focus-not only with trade benefits, but also with greater security benefits
within the global health system. Such a focus, in turn, would change their
cost-benefit analyses. After all, "[i]nfectious disease accounts for around 26
per cent of all deaths worldwide and is one of the prime examples of a
globalised issue requiring global response."28 With the many economic,
demographic, and technological changes globalization has wrought, some
experts also estimated that "a new influenza pandemic could kill up to 150
million people."286
In recent years, rights holders, industry groups, and policymakers have
actively sought to link intellectual property protection and enforcement to
the security debate.287 By linking piracy and counterfeiting to terrorism and
organized crime,288 they were able to obtain rhetorical advantage to push for
new and higher standards of intellectual property protection and
enforcement. Such framing efforts, however, deserve close scrutiny. As this
section has shown, the security gains from strengthening intellectual
property protection and enforcement standards do not always offset the
security risks posed by overprotection of intellectual property rights in the
less developed world to the global health arena. If a new integrated
approach were adopted, it would question the largely one-sided analysis of
security gains provided by high intellectual property standards.
284. Cf KELLEY LEE, GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH: AN INTRODUCTION 18 (2003)
[hereinafter LEE, GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH] ("Th[e] wedding of the emerging global health
agenda with realist-based notions of national security has resulted in the elevation of some
health issues to 'high' politics. Since the late 1980s global health issues have received
increasing attention within high-level policy circles, particularly in the United States." (footnote
omitted)).
285. Simon Rushton, Global Governance Capacities in Health: WHO and Infectious
Diseases, in GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, supra note 17, at 60, 60 (citation omitted).
286. Id
287. See Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play 3 (Program on Information Justice and Intellectual
Property, American University Washington College of Law, Research Paper No. 15, 2010),
available at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context-research
("Introducing a security frame for [intellectual property] has allowed these [intellectual
property] maximalists to enlist new actors, law enforcement agencies, in their cause. Law
enforcement agencies have become eager recruits to the [intellectual property] maximalists'
network."); see also Yu, Two Development Agendas, supra note 92, at 569 ("The use of this
new rhetorical frame plays unfortunately to the widespread sentiments developed in the wake of
the September 11 tragedies. Government officials, for example, have repeatedly described how
terrorists have used piracy and counterfeiting to fund their operations.").
288. For discussions linking piracy and counterfeiting to terrorism and organized crimes,
see sources cited in Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, supra note 234, at 246 n.26.
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2. Lesson #2: The Radical Turn in Intellectual Property
The second set of gains developed countries could obtain is the
prevention of a radical turn in intellectual property law and policy. The
three virostories discussed in this Article not only demonstrate the less
developed countries' ability to come up with different policy responses to
address concerns and challenges in the public health arena, but also reveal
an increasingly radical turn in intellectual property law and policy. Out of
all three stories, the last story reflects the most radical approach to
addressing deficiencies in the international patent system. While brand
name pharmaceutical companies and their supportive developed country
governments detest the less developed countries' use of compulsory
licenses to provide downward adjustment of international patent standards,
the radical approach taken by Indonesia, India, and other NAM members
based on claims of "viral sovereignty" could inflict significant harm to
intellectual property rights holders and their supportive governments.
To some extent, the push for recognition of viral sovereignty reminds us
of the other radical turns in the history of the international patent system.
For example, during the eighteenth century, many European countries,
including Bismarck Germany, subscribed to the anti-patent movement. 289
Had Germany not changed course to support the international patent
system,2 90 the development of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property ("Paris Convention") 291 would have been quite different.
Even with the establishment of the Convention, countries such as the
Netherlands and Switzerland continued to decline to offer patent
protection.2 92 It was indeed intriguing that these countries were allowed to
289. See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property
Regime, 38 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 323, 349 (2004). For discussions of the anti-patent movement,
see generally Heinrich Kronstein & Irene Till, A Reevaluation of the International Patent
Convention, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 765 (1947); Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The
Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1950).
290. "The development of German patent legislation, jurisprudence and practice in the late
nineteenth century was very much driven by newly-organised stakeholder groups and an
emergent wider patent community." DUTFIELD, supra note 128, at 67. Nevertheless, "[w]ithin
German industry as a whole there were a number of conflicting views. While the Society of
German Engineers lobbied in favour of a patent law, there were still differences about the kind
of patent law needed... .The chemical industry was also divided." Id. at 68.
291. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 828
U.N.T.S. 305.
292. Although the Netherlands enacted patent law in 1817, it repealed the law in 1869.
Machlup & Penrose, supra note 289, at 3, 5. For a discussion of the Netherlands and
Switzerland during the time when they did not have a patent system while nearly all other
industrialized countries had such a system in place, see generally ERIC SCHIFF,
INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS: THE NETHERLANDS, 1869-1912,
SWITZERLAND, 1850-1907 (1971).
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join the Paris Convention despite not offering any protection in the patent
area. 293
When many newly independent countries joined the international family
of countries shortly after the Second World War, they quickly became
dissatisfied with the international patent system, which was virtually
imposed upon them by their former colonial masters.2 94 Such dissatisfaction,
in turn, led to major adjustments within both the domestic and international
patent systems.
Consider India, for example. Shortly after gaining independence in 1947,
the country established the Patents Enquiry Committee (Tek Chand
Committee) to review the adequacy of the Indian patent system in
promoting industrialization. 29 ' Finding that the extant system "enabled
multinational companies to gain patent rights beyond the scope of their
inventions," the Committee "recommended incorporating compulsory
licensing provisions to minimize the potential for abuse of monopolies."2 96
Its recommendations were subsequently incorporated into the patent law in
1950.
A decade later, the Indian government appointed Justice Rajagopala
Ayyangar to head a committee that sought "to promote law reforms to
improve local industrialization in critical areas like food and drugs." 29 7
Taking into account the limited economic development within the country,
the Ayyangar Committee unsurprisingly articulated the need for differential
treatment for foodstuffs, medicines, chemical inventions, and educational
materials; the prohibition of product patents (as opposed to process patents)
in pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals; the provision of compulsory
293. Eventually, Switzerland introduced patent protection in 1888, and the Netherlands
followed suit in 1910. Before these countries introduced patent protection, both countries did
have trademark laws in place. Such protection might have justified their Paris Convention
memberships. SCHIFF, supra note 292, at 22. It is worth noting that the United States was able to
join the Paris Union without offering any protection to utility models and with only limited
protection to industrial designs. Pamela Samuelson, Challenges for the World Intellectual
Property Organisation and the Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights Council in
Regulating Intellectual Property Rights in the Information Age, 21 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
578, 579 (1999).
294. See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives
ofDeveloping Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 315, 325-34 (2003) (providing an excellent discussion of how the former colonies
conducted their international intellectual property relations following their declarations of
independence).
295. See Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round, 10 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 273, 279 (2006).
296. Id,
297. Id. at 281.
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licensing; and the local working requirement.298 This report eventually
paved the way for the establishment of the 1970 Patent Act, under which
India did not provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products.29 9 To a
large extent, the very different regime India had until the expiry of the
TRIPS transition period for pharmaceutical protections in 2005 has paved
the way for the development of the Indian generic pharmaceutical
industry.3 00
Like India, Brazil's developments have been rather important for the less
developed world. In November 1961, "Brazil and many other developing
nations demanded for the first time-within the UN system-rules on the
protection of intellectual property . . . favourable to their economic
development, including proper controls against abuse, thereby putting
'development' issues and 'public interest concerns' on the international
[intellectual property] agenda." 301' Titled The Role ofPatents in the Transfer
of Technology to Under-developed Countries, this proposal was advanced
against a background of dissatisfaction of the international patent system in
Brazil.302
A few months earlier, the Brazilian Parliament established the Comissio
Parlamentar de Inquerito (a special inquiry commission) "to analyze the
domestic abuses of patent monopolies by multinational pharmaceutical
corporations. The Commission made reference to the abuses regarding the
non-working of patents by foreigners, the restrictive practices in licensing
agreements, the payment of high royalties, including royalties for expired
patents, and the high cost of medicines."303 Although many developed
countries considered Brazil's proposal "a threat to existing international
conventions on patents and also to the hitherto unchallenged position of the
Paris Union,"3 04 the U.N. General Assembly eventually "passed a resolution
298. See id. at 281-89 (discussing the Ayyangar Committee Report).
299. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 14, at 863.
300. See generally CHAUDHURi, supra note 14, at 180-221 (discussing the Indian generic
pharmaceutical industry).
301. Andrda Koury Menescal, Changing WIPO's Ways? The 2004 Development Agenda in
Historical Perspective, 8 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 761, 761-62 (2005).
302. See id. at 765.
303. Id. at 764.
304. As Ulf Anderfelt explained:
The criticism of [Brazil's proposal], as voiced by several delegations,
emphasized three things: that abuses to which the patent system might give
rise ought to be remedied through national legislation; that the existing
machinery of the Paris Union was highly sufficient to deal with any
questions concerning its field of activity and that countries not yet members
ought to accede to it; and that particularly for developing countries
unpatented or unpatentable technology was of greater importance than
patented inventions.
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requesting that the Secretary General prepare a report on the effects of
patents on the economies of underdeveloped countries."305
Even in the United States, major backlashes against the patent system
existed in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As Graham Dutfield recounted:
From 1959 to 1962, the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly, under the chairmanship of Senator Estes Kefauver,
carried out an inquiry into the pharmaceutical industry. After three
years of hearings, the Subcommittee concluded that the drug
companies were charging too much for their drugs and making
excessive profits. Through patenting and branding, Kefauver and
the subcommittee believed, they were free to charge as much as
they liked, and were using this freedom to excess.306
The timing of Senator Kefauver's hearings was interesting because it
coincided with extensive media reports about child birth defects caused by
the use of thalidomide, a drug that had been heavily marketed to pregnant
women at the time .30  Following these hearings, Congress enacted the
Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments to introduce efficacy as a requirement
for drug approval before the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.30 8
Understanding all these rather radical historical developments is
important because such developments could easily reappear in the
international patent system had developed countries not paid attention to the
frustrations and concerns of less developed counties. Even worse,
dissatisfaction with the current international intellectual property system
can spread the same way and at the same speed as a contagious virus.
Indeed, one may fear that, if developed countries continue to fail to meet the
needs, interests, goals, and priorities of less developed countries, such
failure could lead to a radical turn in the international patent system. It is
also worth noting that the potential for such a turn would provide an
ULF ANDERFELT, INTERNATIONAL PATENT-LEGISLATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 173
(1971).
305. Pedro Roffe & Gina Vea, The WIPO Development Agenda in an Historical and
Political Context, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPING COuNTRIEs 79, 95 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2008) [hereinafter THE
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA]. The resolution was reprinted in Principal Decisions by the
International Community Regarding the Patent System, WORLD DEV., Sept. 1974, at 37, 37.
306. DUTFIELD, supra note 128, at 148; see also 'T HOEN, supra note 63, at 15 ("[Senator
Kefauver's] Subcommittee examined the price differences between US companies and foreign
companies for a number of medicines widely-used at the time, including: tranquillisers, diabetes
drugs, arthritis drugs and antibiotics. It also looked into marketing and advertising practices and
the safety of medicines.").
307. See Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of US. Drug Regulation and Labeling,
36 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 420, 437-41 (1981) (discussing "the lesson of thalidomide").
308. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
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important international context against which we analyze the growing
number of patent decisions from the United States Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, for those less developed countries that seek to use radical
approaches to increase their bargaining leverage, they should also be aware
that radical approaches could backfire sometimes. While commentators,
NGOs, and the public at large have sympathized with the positions on
biopiracy taken by less developed countries, they have less sympathy for
positions involving claims of viral sovereignty in the public health arena. If
countries seek to deploy measures that are as radical as, or even more
radical than, claims of viral sovereignty, such approaches could eventually
undercut the considerable momentum less developed countries have built so
far in their painstaking effort to recalibrate the balance in the international
intellectual property system. If this scenario occurs, the push for a radical
turn in intellectual property law and policy could hurt those countries that
are in most need of such recalibration.
C. The Negotiation Process
1. Lesson #3: Growing Complexity and Fragmentation
The global governance system is currently encountering two sets of
major changes. In the past couple of decades, this system has become
increasingly complex and fragmentary. As a result, the state-driven policy
discussions have often implicated quite a number of disparate international
regimes. In addition, the system has seen the increasing assertiveness of
non-state actors. It is also confronted with the arrival of more powerful
players, such as the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa) and members of the African Group. This section will focus on
the change in relation to the growing complexity and fragmentation within
the international regulatory system, while the next two sections will focus
on changes in relation to changing global governance.
Consider global HIV/AIDS governance for example. Although
intellectual property issues concerning HIV/AIDS treatments are
traditionally governed by conventions developed by WIPO and its
predecessors, the establishment of the WTO and its TRIPS Agreement has
steered the discussions toward the international trade arena. Intellectual
property and trade, however, are not the only two fora in which intellectual
property issues are being discussed. For instance, issues lying at the
intersection of HIV/AIDS governance and intellectual property protection
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have now been explored in the human rights forum.3 09 Since the TRIPS
Agreement entered into force, a number of U.N. human rights bodies-
including the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and two Special
Rapporteurs on the Right to Health-have issued reports and documents
emphasizing the primacy of human rights over the TRIPS Agreement and
other international trade, intellectual property, and investment
instruments.31 0
In addition, intellectual property issues concerning HIV/AIDS treatments
have been closely scrutinized in the public health arena. In February 2004,
the World Health Assembly established the Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health."' The Commission's final
report reminded us of the many adverse spillover effects of strong
protection for pharmaceutical patents and undisclosed clinical trial data. The
report eventually led to the May 2008 adoption of the Global Strategy and
312Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property,
which sought to facilitate the development of funding and incentive
mechanisms for the creation of new medicines.1
In light of the growing complexity and proliferation of fora that can be
used to discuss global health governance issues, policymakers should think
more about the discussion of intellectual property issues outside WIPO and
the WTO. They should be more conscious of the potential conflict created
by other international obligations, such as in the human rights or public
health arena. In fact, commentators have increasingly embraced the
protection of human rights as part of the needed rhetorical and normative
bases for enhancing access to affordable HIV/AIDS treatments.3 14 Although
309. See Yu, Two Development Agendas, supra note 92, at 522-27.
310. See Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Human Rights
Res. 2000/7, 2-3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/c462b62cf8a07b 13c 1 2569700046704e
(reminding governments "of the primacy of human rights obligations over economic policies
and agreements" and the importance of other human rights, such as the right to food and the
right to health); Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human
Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1039, 1092-93 (2007) [hereinafter Yu,
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests] (discussing the principle of human rights
primacy).
311. See Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, World Health
Assembly Res. WHA56.27, 1 2(2) (May 28, 2003), available at
http://apps.who.int/gb/archive/pdf files/WHA56/ea56r27.pdf.
312. Global Strategy and Plan of Action, supra note 107.
313. See 'T HOEN,supra note 63, at 92-9 3 .
314. See, e.g., Obijiofor Aginam, Communitarian Globalism and Disease: A Normative
Orientation for Global Health Governance, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS, supra note
16, at 14, 19-21 (discussing the "human rights versus intellectual property rights" debate);
[Ariz. St. L.J.1636
existing international human rights agreements protect both the right to life
and the right to health on the one hand and the human rights interests in
intellectual creations on the other,3 15 there is no denying that the right to life
has now become part of customary international law.3 16 The right to health
has also been incorporated into strategies for reshaping the global health
governance debate.1
In addition to thinking about strategies, policymakers should also be
cognizant of the growing fragmentation of the international regulatory
system. They need to think about how such fragmentation could have
different impacts on countries based on their economic and technological
conditions.
On the one hand, fragmentation will allow less developed countries to
better protect their interests by mobilizing in favorable fora, laying down
the needed political and diplomatic groundwork, and establishing new
"counter-regime norms" that help restore the balance of the international
intellectual property system.3 18 The existence of multiple fora will also help
promote "norm competition across different fora as well as . . . inter-agency
James Harrison, Trade Agreements, Intellectual Property and Access to Essential Medicines:
What Future Role for the Right to Health?, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS, supra note
16, at 87 (discussing the role of right to health in HIV/AIDS governance); Carlos Correa &
Duncan Matthews, The Doha Declaration Ten Years on and Its Impact on Access to Medicines
and the Right to Health (U.N. Dev. Programme, Discussion Paper, 2011), available at
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hiv-aids/dohal Oyearson.html
(discussing the impact of the Doha Declaration on access to medicines and the right to health).
315. For the Author's earlier discussions of the human rights interests in intellectual
creations, see generally Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the
Nonmultilateral Era, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1045 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Intellectual Property and
Human Rights]; Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 310; Peter K.
Yu, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 709 (2007).
316. For discussions of customary international law status of protections under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the right to life and right to health, see
sources cited in Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, supra note 315, at 1065 n.93.
317. See generally HESTERMEYER, supra note 14 (discussing the right to health in relation
to the intellectual property debate).
318. See Donald J. Puchala & Raymond F. Hopkins, International Regimes: Lessons from
Inductive Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 66 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (defining
"counterregime norms" as norms that "either circulate in the realm of rhetoric or lie dormant as
long as those who dominate the existing regime preserve their power and their consequent
ability to reward compliance and punish deviance"); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The
TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (2004) (defining "counter-regime norms" as "binding treaty rules and
nonbinding soft law standards that seek to alter the prevailing legal landscape").
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competition and collaboration."' As Kelly Lee reminded us, "[i]t was
within th[e] context of institutional rivalry that the goal of polio eradication
was agreed and pursued by the WHO, UNICEF and partner organizations
(such as Rotary International and the CDC) at the World Summit for
Children in 1990.",320
On the other hand, fragmentation could benefit developed countries by
raising the transaction costs of policy negotiation and coordination, thereby
helping these powerful countries to retain the status quo. 32 ' These higher
costs, coupled with the increased incoherence and complexities in the
international intellectual property system, are particularly damaging to less
developed countries, which often lack resources, expertise, leadership,
negotiation sophistication, and bargaining power. By forcing countries to
prioritize, fragmentation also makes them vulnerable to the ever-increasing
forum-manipulative activities undertaken by powerful developed
countries,322 including the development of bilateral, plurilateral, and
regional TRIPS-plus trade and investment agreements.
2. Lesson #4: Changing Governance
From the Paris Convention to the TRIPS Agreement, the international
intellectual property system was built upon a state-centric international legal
system. This system "historically deferred to states as the guardians of
domestic welfare, with the assumption that the appropriate exercise of
sovereign power for domestic public interest would inure inevitably to the
benefit of the global community.",3 23 To the extent non-state actors are
involved, their interests are usually reflected through those state actors
representing them.3 24 Before the establishment of the TRIPS Agreement,
corporations and industry groups made up most of the nongovernmental
participants in the international intellectual property norm-setting process.32 5
319. P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT: FINAL REPORT 41 (2008),
available at http://www.ivir.nlpublicaties/hugenholtz/finalreport2008.pdf.
320. KELLEY LEE, THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO) 68 (2009).
321. See generally Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes:
Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REv. 595 (2007)
(discussing how the growing proliferation of international regulatory institutions with
overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries has helped powerful states to preserve their
dominance in the international arena).
322. See supra text accompanying notes 249-50.
323. Okediji, International Copyright System, supra note 94, at ix.
324. See Yu, Two Development Agendas, supra note 92, at 547.
325. See id. at 548; see also Noah Benjamin Novogrodsky, Beyond TRIPS: The Role of
Non-state Actors and Access to Essential Medicines, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC
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Since the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, however, civil society
organizations have become much more active in the intellectual property
arena. Indeed, many NGOs found themselves "woken up" by the harsh
realities the unbalanced TRIPS Agreement brought and the public health
crises the Agreement precipitated in the less developed world.32 6 In
retrospect, Sisule Musungu and Graham Dutfield considered "[c]ivil society
groups .. . the single most important factor in raising the issue of the impact
of the international intellectual property standards, especially TRIPS
standards, on development issues such as health, food and agriculture."3 27
Andrea Menescal also observed that "[t]he most welcome news to emerge
from the 2004 [WIPO Development Agenda] debate is that developing
countries' governments are no longer alone in opposing an even further
HEALTH, supra note 63, at 343, 345 ("In the beginning, most NGOs were conspicuously absent
from the debates surrounding the creation of global intellectual property mechanisms.").
326. See SELL, supra note 211, at 181 ("When I asked some public-regarding copyright
activists 'where they had been' during TRIPS, they told me they had been 'sleeping' but that
because of TRIPS they had 'woken up."'); Ellen 't Hoen, The Revised Drug Strategy: Access to
Essential Medicines, Intellectual Property, and the World Health Organization, in ACCESS TO
KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 127, 131 (Gadlle Krikorian & Amy
Kapczynski eds., 2010) [hereinafter ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE] (stating that it was at the
International Conference on National Medicinal Drug Policies in Sydney in 1995 that "for the
first time public-health advocates raised the concern that the globalization of new international
trade rules and the harmonization of regulatory requirements would restrict countries' ability to
implement drug policies that would ensure access to medicine for all"); Keith E. Maskus, The
WIPO Development Agenda: A Cautionary Note, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note
305, at 163, 164 ("Policymakers, non-governmental organizations, the media, and even many
legal scholars have awakened to the fact that [intellectual property] regulations have rather
fundamental implications for the processes of economic development."); see also Novogrodsky,
supra note 325, at 356 ("NGOs operating in this space are part of a broad movement that has
served to politicize the previously arcane field of intellectual property law. . . . NGOs at the
forefront of the struggle for affordable and accessible medicines stand poised to force a
reconception of allegiances, values and state-citizen relationships.").
327. Sisule F. Musungu & Graham Dutfield, Multilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-plus
World: The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 22 (Quaker United Nations
Office, TRIPS Issues Paper No. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.quno.org/sites/default/files/resources/Multilateral-Agreements-in-TRIPS-plus-
English.pdf (footnote omitted); see also DEERE, supra note 259, at 114 ("A key result of post-
TRIPS tensions was the deepening complexity of the global [intellectual property] system. The
range of non-state actors involved in global [intellectual property] debates became broader and
many NGOs, industry groups, international organizations . . . and academic experts deepened
their degree of engagement."); SELL, supra note 211, at 140 ("[W]hat is new is the mobilization
of [grassroots activists, farmers' groups, environmental groups, development groups, human
rights groups, and consumer groups] to oppose an increasingly aggressive approach to
intellectual property by US corporations."). For an excellent discussion of the role played by
NGOs in the international intellectual property debate, see generally DUNCAN MATTHEWS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF NGOS AND
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2011).
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strengthening of the [intellectual property] holders' rights and the
prevalence of private interests in the [intellectual property] field."3 28
In the public health arena, Noah Benjamin Novogrodsky further noted
that "[s]ome NGOs, particularly MSF [M6decins Sans Frontibres], the
Consumer Project on Technology (now Knowledge Ecology International)
and Health Action International played a significant role in the processes
leading up to the adoption by WTO members of a declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health at the Doha Conference on 14 November 2001.",329 In his
view, these organizations "have revolutionized advocacy on the national
and international stage, most dramatically with respect to antiretroviral
drugs used to combat HIV/AIDS."3 30
In fact, the growing assertiveness of civil society organizations and the
changing nature of the global governance model are not limited to the
intellectual property field alone. They happen across the board in the
international regulatory system. In the past few decades, that system has
slowly transformed from a simple Westphalian nation-state model to a more
pluralistic order featuring complex, transnational interactions among state
governments, intergovernmental bodies, international donor organizations,
sub-state and non-state actors, and the private sector.3 1 As John Kirton and
Andrew Cooper observed:
328. Menescal, supra note 301, at 794.
329. Novogrodsky, supra note 325, at 350; see also MATTHEWS, supra note 327, at 15-51
(discussing the role played by health NGOs in the run-up to the adoption of the Doha
Declaration and its aftermath).
330. Novogrodsky, supra note 325, at 343.
331. As Ilona Kickbusch observed:
[T]he traditional state-centric system of international politics both runs in
parallel to and interfaces with a system of global governance which tries to
bundle and coordinate lobbies, interest groups, policy networks, advocacy
groups, alliances, partnerships, foundations, international organizations and
states-all of which in turn come together in a different hybrid forms of
organization. Additionally, the familiar processes of state-based multilateral
governance are increasingly challenged both by market multilateralism, for
example the World Economic Forum, and by 'charitainment' as personified
by Bono. No longer do diplomats just talk to other diplomats-everyone
talks to everyone else. Access to and legitimacy within this system are no
longer gained through status as a nation-state but through a range of other
mechanisms: expertise, moral standing and increasingly the demonstrated
ability to achieve results.
Kickbusch, supra note 279, at xiv (citations omitted); see FDLER, supra note 27, at 187-88
("Although strategies for infectious disease control had already begun to move away from the
Westphalian model, the handling of the SARS outbreak has taken this transition to a new level
of importance and potential effectiveness that makes any return to Westphalian modes of
surveillance unthinkable."); Bartsch et al., supra note 253, at 18-19 ("[Global health
governance] must be seen as an ongoing process of institutional change. It is part of the
[S]tates are no longer always the dominant actors, as they are now
joined as important innovators in key cases by sub-national actors
below, transnational actors across their borders, and international
actors above. In all cases a multiplicity of actors has become
involved in shaping responses. Many arose as innovators or
catalysts for innovation by others. Within states, civil society and
often the media stand out as driving change and providing disease
surveillance, delivery, implementation and overall legitimacy.332
Consider global HIV/AIDS governance again. From programs the WHO
developed to the ongoing negotiations in the Doha Round, governments
have worked closely to confront the HIV/AIDS crisis head-on. NGOs have
also entered the fold to provide non-state based assistance, especially in
areas where national governments alone could not achieve satisfactory
outcomes. These NGOs include ACT UP!, Health Action International, the
Health Global Access Project (Health GAP), the International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Knowledge Ecology
International, MSF, Oxfam, Public Citizen, the Third World Network, the
Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac), and the Treatment Action
Campaign.3
Apart from traditional NGOs, new private foundations, such as the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation and the William J. Clinton Foundation, have
also emerged from the non-state sector.334 The substantial resources of the
Gates Foundation have ushered in exciting initiatives in vaccine
development and global health research. Although some commentators have
transitional process from a Westphalian structure of international relations between sovereign
nation-states to a post-Westphalian global political system."); Peter K. Yu, The Global
Intellectual Property Order and Its Undetermined Future, 1 WIPO J. 1, 2 (2009) [hereinafter
Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order] ("[T]he traditional international legal order, which was
built upon the Westphalian nation-state model, has now morphed into a more pluralistic order
that includes a wide range of state, sub-state, and non-state actors.").
332. Kirton & Cooper, Innovation in Global Health Governance, supra note 166, at 328;
see also LEE, GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH, supra note 284, at 202 ("Global health governance
(GHG) . . . concerns cooperation among state and non-state actors to address issues of a
transborder nature. While GHG is a nascent form of governance, important examples include
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control . . . and Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria." (citation omitted)); Craig N. Murphy, Foreword: Why Pay Attention
to Global Governance?, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 252, at xi-xii ("[A]s a
consequence of neoliberal marketisation, the services once provided by public
intergovernmental organisations are now contracted to private, non-governmental, often 'social
movement'-style, organisations. Today it is . . . NGOs who run the refugee camps, provide
disaster relief, design and carry-out development projects, monitor and attempt to contain the
international spread of disease, and try to clean up an ever more polluted environment.").
333. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 67, at 377.
334. See SOPHIE HARMAN, THE WORLD BANK AND HIV/AIDS: SETrING A GLOBAL AGENDA
112-15 (2010) (discussing philanthropy and new forms of HIV/AIDS financing).
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expressed reservation about the Foundation's focus on biomedical science,
emphasis on intellectual property rights, and limited interest in
infrastructural development,3  most are thankful for the many opportunities
created by this new player. The Foundation's war chest alone exceeds the
public health budgets of many less developed countries.
To some extent, the participation of NGOs in providing expertise to the
intellectual property debate has changed the dynamics of the discussions.
Coined by Pat Mooney, the co-founder of Rural Advancement Foundation
International (RAFI),"3 the term "biopiracy" has provided the needed
rhetorical groundwork for later claims of "viropiracy" and "viral
sovereignty." Turning the word "piracy" on its head,3 the term biopiracy
(and now viropiracy) brings with it the massive energy that industry groups
and rights holders have built over the years-ironically, for stronger
intellectual property rights. In sum, HIV/AIDS governance is global in
every sense of the word.3
Given the increasing fragmentation within the international regulatory
system and growing importance of non-state actors in this system, one has
to think more about how international intellectual property negotiations
should be conducted. ACTA provides a good but disturbing example. It
illustrates both the complexity within the international intellectual property
regime as well as the need for greater input from non-state actors. Thus far,
ACTA has been one of the most heavily criticized international intellectual
property negotiations conducted by the United States, Japan, members of
the European Union, Switzerland, and other developed and like-minded
countries. Among some of the major public interest concerns of ACTA
were "(1) lack of transparency; (2) very limited public, non-industry
335. For criticisms of the Gates Foundation, see id. at 114; Lee, supra note 279, at 27, 32;
Matthew Rimmer, The Lazarus Effect: The (RED) Campaign and Creative Capitalism, in
INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH 329-32 (Thomas Pogge et al. eds., 2010).
336. DUTFIELD, supra note 128, at 265. RAFI has now become the ETC Group.
337. See Yu, Two Development Agendas, supra note 92, at 571-72.
338. As Sonja Bartsch, Wolfgang Hein, and Lars Kohimorgen observed:
The constellation of actors in the fight against HIV/AIDS-as in the field of
global health governance in general-is very heterogeneous, with actors
differing not only with regard to their character (public, non-public), their
institutional structure (formalized, informal), or their level of activity (global,
national, local), but also with regard to their interests, their logic of action
and their power resources.
Bartsch et al., supra note 253, at 36. For collections of articles discussing how the global health
governance has grown beyond the state-based model, see generally GOVERNANCE OF
HIV/A[DS: MAKING PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY COUNT (Sophie Harman & Franklyn
Lisk eds., 2009); FIGHT AGAINST HIV/AIDS, supra note 17.
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participation; (3) a huge democratic deficit; and (4) virtually no domestic or
global accountability." 3 39
As Robert Weissman of Essential Action noted in the comments on
ACTA his organization submitted to the USTR: "There is no conceivable
rationale for the cloak-and-dagger aura around the talks, and the refusal to
disclose draft texts and relevant background documents." 3 40 Likewise,
Robin Gross of IP Justice lamented:
The lack of transparency and public participation in the process to
negotiate ACTA is deeply troubling to anyone who cares about
democracy and the public interest. Outside of a scant press release
or two, the USTR has provided the general public with virtually no
public information about the proposed substance of ACTA. 341
Given the lack of transparency in the ACTA negotiations, it is indeed
ironic-if not hypocritical-that the Agreement includes transparency
provisions even when their negotiations were not transparent at all. 3 42 Also
troubling are the negative impacts these negotiations will have on the
developed countries' ongoing effort to promote democracy and the rule of
law in other parts of the world. 343
To be certain, the negotiations would contain some classified or highly
sensitive information from negotiating governments.34 It is also not hard to
see how the disclosure of all draft treaty texts could have complicated the
dynamics of the negotiations. As I noted in a previous article:
[The United States'] concern was mainly due to the fear that such
disclosure would result in parties walking away from the
negotiation table (in addition to further complications in the
ongoing negotiations of other trade and investment agreements).
As far as the agreement's impact on domestic politics is
concerned, however, the US negotiators are likely to have much
339. Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 234, at 998-99.
340. Letter from Robert Weissman, Dir., Essential Action, to Susan Schwab, U.S. Trade
Representative (Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/uploads/factsheets/2008/asset upload file989_15121 .pdf.
341. Robin Gross, ACTA's Misguided Effort to Increase Govt Spying and Ratchet-Up IPR
Enforcement at Public Expense, IP JUST. (Mar. 21, 2008, 9:35 AM), http://ipjustice.org/wp/
2008/03/21/acta-ipj-comments-ustr-2008march/.
342. See ACTA, supra note 30, art. 30.
343. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 234, at 1050-59 (discussing how ACTA may
undermine the United States' longstanding interests in promoting human rights, civil liberties,
and the rule of law throughout the world).
344. See id. at 1002-08 (discussing the protection against classified or highly sensitive
information during the ACTA negotiations).
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less to worry about than their counterparts in emerging
countries.345
Nevertheless, if the leakage of sensitive information from foreign
governments and the changing dynamics of the negotiations are the main
concerns, at the very least policymakers should frequently and adequately
communicate to the public the contents of those agreements. They should
also include ample opportunities for the public to provide feedback on these
agreements, as opposed to only limited opportunities after the conclusion of
the agreements.
To some extent, the need for transparency in intellectual property
negotiations resonates well with the need for transparency in the global
health arena-or, for that matter, the international regulatory system. As
Holbrooke and Garrett emphatically noted in an opinion piece highly
critical of Indonesia's viral sovereignty claims: "As the world learned with
the emergence of .. .. SARS ... -which first appeared in China in 2002 but
was not reported by Chinese officials until it spread to four other nations-
globally shared health risk demands absolute global transparency." 3 4 6
In sum, given the growing fragmentation in the international intellectual
property system and the rapid emergence of non-state actors, the
international intellectual property debate is likely to become more
interesting and pluralistic. Because non-state actors bring to the table highly
diverging interests, focuses, and mindsets, the ability to reach for
compromise in patent reforms will also become more difficult. Nonetheless,
if compromises are successfully struck, the inclusiveness of the norm-
setting process could make these compromises more legitimate and long-
lasting.34 7
345. Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, supra note 234, at 13; see also James Love,
Ambassador Kirk: People Would Be "Walking away from the Table" If the ACTA Text Is Made
Public, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Dec. 3, 2009, 5:31 PM), http://keionline.org/node/706
(noting the USTR's concern).
346. Holbrooke & Garrett, supra note 181.
347. See Wolfgang Hein et al., Conclusion: Global Health Governance and the Fight
Against HIV/AIDS in a Post- Westphalian World, in FIGHT AGAINST HIV/AIDS, supra note 17,
at 226, 240 [hereinafter Hein et al., Conclusion] ("The rise of new institutional forms and many
new actors in global politics creates a structure of global governance that is more inclusive than
the one based only on state regulation."). A point of comparison is the ACTA negotiations,
where the exact reverse happened. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 234, at 1015 ("[I]f
ACTA ultimately is to be accepted by the public as fair and legitimate, completing the
agreement through a shady backdoor deal is unlikely to lead to wide public acceptance of the
new norms embodied in the agreement."); Kimberlee Weatherall, The Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement: What's It All About? (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context-kimweatherall (last visited
Oct. 30, 2013) ("The secrecy is ... operating, once again, to bring intellectual property law into
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3. Lesson #5: Emerging Players
Whether the debate is about access to essential medicines or the
protection of genetic materials in viruses, less developed countries have
played a very important role. Of particular importance are the policy
positions taken by leaders of this group: Brazil, China, and India. It is no
coincidence that these countries are frequently mentioned in all three
virostories. Indeed, commentators have paid increasing attention to the
development of the so-called BRICS countries, which originally included
only Brazil, Russia, India, and China but has since been slowly extended to
cover South Africa and other large developing countries.3 48
The importance of Brazil, China, and India in the global health debate
does not need much explanation. Featuring companies such as Cipla, Dr.
Reddy's Laboratories, and Ranbaxy, the Indian generic pharmaceutical
industry is considered one of the most important and sophisticated in the
world.34 9 Because India "makes more than a fifth of the world's generic
drugs"35 o and eighty-five percent of generic HIV/AIDS antiretrovirals in
Sub-Saharan Africa,15 1 commentators have noted the significant impact a
reduced supply of Indian generic drugs would have on the global access to
essential medicines in the less developed world.3 52
Like India, Brazil plays a very important role in the public health debate.
Brazil is the poster child of the use of-or, more precisely, the threat to
use-compulsory licenses to promote access to essential medicines. 53
Although the country has repeatedly obtained concessions from brand name
pharmaceutical companies through these threats, it finally granted
disrepute. To the extent that at some later point governments and [intellectual property] owners
will ask people to accept the outcomes as 'fair' and ones that should be adopted, it will be more
difficult to convince them when the agreement has the appearance of a secret deal done with
minimal public input.").
348. See, e.g., CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A
DEVELOPMENT QUESTION 221-22 (2012) (expanding BRICS to cover other emerging middle-
income economies); Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 67, at 346 (expanding the BRICS
acronym to cover South Africa); Sdbastien Hervieu, South Africa Gains Entry to BRIC Club,
GUARDIAN WKLY. (Apr. 19, 2011, 9:04 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/19/
south-africa-joins-bric-club (reporting that the South African president joined his counterparts
from Brazil, Russia, India, and China for the third summit of the informal group in China).
349. See generally CHAUDHURI, supra note 14, at 180-221 (discussing the growth and
prospects of generic drug exports from India).
350. KAMALNATH, INDIA'S CENTURY 110 (2008).
351. See Colleen Chien, HIV/AIDS Drugs for Sub-Saharan Africa: How Do Brand and
Generic Supply Compare?, 2 PLOS ONE e278 (2007); see also Shadlen, Is AIDS Treatment
Sustainable?, supra note 102, at 36 ("It is estimated that more than half of those receiving AIDS
treatment in the developing world are treated with generic [antiretrovirals] produced in India.").
352. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 64-70.
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compulsory licenses for the noncommercial public use of the patented
AIDS drug efavirenz in April 2007.354 It remains to be seen how active
Brazil will be in using compulsory licenses to promote public health.
In the mid-1980s, Brazil launched its now very successful National
STD/AIDS Programme, which provides free, universal access to HIV/AIDS
treatments. This program has been widely recognized as a model for the less
developed world."' As the IPR Commission documented in its final report,
the National STD/AIDS Programme "has reduced AIDS-related mortality
by more than 50 percent between 1996 and 1999. In two years, Brazil saved
$472 million in hospital costs and treatment costs for AIDS-related
infections."356
China is the late comer in this trio, but it has since moved up very
quickly. As I noted in an earlier article, "[a]lthough China has yet to be as
aggressive as India in exporting drugs or as successful as Brazil in
promoting public health within the country, it already is the world's largest
producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients and is likely to be a very
important player in the generic market.""' In addition, "China has
advantages in producing 'me too' drugs because its capacity to conduct
organic synthesis is very strong after many years of China's being the target
for outsourced [multinational pharmaceutical companies'] business."35 8
It is also worth noting that Margaret Chan, a Chinese national, is now
serving her second term as the WHO Director-General.3 59 As one
commentator observed:
The election of Margaret Chan as the director general of the WHO
in 2006 has shown that China is not complacent about merely
acting as a passive follower of liberal international order and is
354. Press Release, Brazilian Ministry of Health, Brasil decreta licenciamento compulsorio
do Efavirenz (May 4, 2007), available at http://www.aids.gov.br/noticia/brasil-decreta-
licenciamento-compulsorio-do-efavirenz.
355. See IPR COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 29, at 43 (noting that the National
STD/AIDS Programme in Brazil "has been widely acclaimed as a possible model for other
countries"); John S. Odell & Susan K. Sell, Reframing the Issue: The WTO Coalition on
Intellectual Property and Public Health, 2001, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 85, 96 (John S. Odell ed., 2006) ("Developing countries
looked to Brazil as a beacon of hope in strategies to combat the HIV/AIDS crisis."); 't Hoen,
TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 64, at 32 (noting that "[t]he Brazil AIDS program
serves as a model for some developing countries that are able to produce medicines locally").
356. 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 64, at 32.
357. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 67, at 363.
358. LI YAHONG, IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES 54(2010).
359. Press Release, WHO, Dr Margaret Chan Appointed to a Second Term as Director-
General, (May 23, 2012), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/
2012/dgappointment_20120523/en/.
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striving for a greater say in global health governance. . . . It has
been widely believed that China's success was largely due to
Beijing's blessing and her appointment was seen as a diplomatic
triumph for her and for China.360
To illustrate the growing importance of the BRICS countries in the
global health debate, consider their increasingly assertive roles in the WHO:
During the World Health Assembly of May 2004, Brazil, South
Africa, China, India, Nigeria, Russia, Thailand and Ukraine
committed themselves to establishing a network of technological
cooperation on AIDS, with the financial support of the Ford
Foundation, to reduce the technological dependency of developing
countries compared to developed countries, to promote new drug
producers on the world market and to catalyse antiretroviral price
reductions. And during the fifteenth International Conference on
AIDS held in Bangkok in July 2004, these countries (except for
India and South Africa) signed a joint declaration of commitment.
The technological network of cooperation on AIDS was officially
created between Argentina, Brazil, China, Cuba, Nigeria, Russia,
Thailand and Ukraine during the fifty-eighth World Health
Assembly of 17 May 2005. The aim is to allow countries located
in the most affected areas to increase their local output of generic
drugs and various tests by exchanging their technologies: condoms
for Thailand, generic drugs and diagnostic tests for Brazil,
production of raw materials for China, diagnostic tests for Russia
and so on. The network also aims to develop joint research to
partially copy new antiretroviral drugs.36'
The BRICS countries have also become more assertive in the WTO. At
the June 2010 TRIPS Council meeting, both China and India made
important interventions expressing concerns about the inappropriate push
for TRIPS-plus enforcement norms through the highly controversial ACTA
and other bilateral and regional trade agreements.3 6 2 A month earlier, India
and Brazil filed complaints with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body against
the European Union and the Netherlands over the seizure of in-transit
generic drugs.3 63
360. CHAN LAl-HA, CHINA ENGAGES GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: RESPONSIBLE
STAKEHOLDER OR SYSTEM-TRANSFORMER? 213-14 (2011).
361. Amlie Robine, Technology Transfer Agreements and Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs: The
Brazilian Case, in POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HIV/AIDS, supra note 16.
362. See TRIPS Council, Minutes of Meeting 248-73, IP/C/M/63 (Oct. 4, 2010); see
also Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, supra note 57, at 518-21 (discussing these
interventions).
363. See sources cited supra note 105.
45: 1563] VIROTECH PATENTS 1647
ARIZONA STATE LA WJOURNAL
Another group that has been actively emerging in the public health arena
is the African Group.3" In the debate leading up to the adoption of Article
31 bis of the TRIPS Agreement, members of this Group advanced proposals
with clearly defined positions.16' Their active participation eventually led to
compromises that took serious consideration of its needs, interests,
conditions, and priorities. The successful adoption of the Doha Declaration
can also be attributed to the active engagement of Zimbabwe,' whose
delegate served as the chair of the TRIPS Council at that time.36
Outside the public health arena, the African Group has also joined the
major developing countries in advancing proposals to reform the
international intellectual property system. For instance, in July 2006,
Tanzania cosponsored the proposal for the introduction of a new Article
29bis into the TRIPS Agreement.' That provision would create an
obligation to disclose in patent applications the source of origin of the
biological resources and traditional knowledge used in patent-seeking
inventions."9
Disturbingly, despite the growing importance of both the BRICS
countries and the African Group in the global health debate, members of
neither groups had been invited to negotiate new and higher intellectual
property protection and enforcement standards in ACTA or the TPP. To
some extent, these two plurilateral agreements were set up as "country club"
364. See DEERE, supra note 259, at 123.
365. See African Group Proposal, supra note 42 (providing the proposal for the African
Group); Communication from Kenya, Elements of a Paragraph 6 Solution, IP/C/W/389 (Nov.
14, 2002) (advancing the position on behalf of the African Group); see also Yu, The
International Enclosure Movement, supra note 14, at 879-81 (discussing the position of the
African Group in relation to the Paragraph 6 solution).
366. See Sangeeta Shashikant, The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health: An
Impetus for Access to Medicines, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE, supra note 326, at 141, 146
("Zimbabwe, on behalf of the Africa Group, proposed that the Doha Ministerial Conference to
be convened later in the same year issue a special declaration to affirm a common understanding
that the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent members from taking measures to protect public
health....").
367. Zimbabwean Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku chaired the TRIPS Council in its
formal meeting on June 18-22, 2001. WTO, ANNUAL REPORT (2001) OF THE COUNCIL FOR
TRIPS (2001). He also "requested a special TRIPS Council session on access to medicines."
Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 481, 512
(2002).
368. See Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Peru,
Thailand and Tanzania, Doha Work Programme-The Outstanding Implementation Issue on the
Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity,
WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2 (July 5, 2006).
369. See id. 2 (requiring patent applicants to "disclose the country providing the resources
and/or associated traditional knowledge, from whom in the providing country they were
obtained, and, as known after reasonable inquiry, the country of origin").
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agreements,370 whose key strategy was to isolate the emerging players to
ensure more effective negotiated outcomes.' Nevertheless, if these
countries are important to global health governance and have gained
economic and geopolitical importance in recent years, it is worth thinking
about whether such an exclusion strategy would eventually make the new
initiatives ineffective.
After all, considering the growing importance of global health problems,
country club-based solutions that are developed out of key developed and
like-minded countries are unlikely to be successful. This would be true
regardless of whether the issues concern patented pharmaceuticals or
counterfeit drugs. As of this writing, China and other BRICS countries
remain the major sources of counterfeiting in the world.3 72 Greater
collaboration between these countries and their counterparts in the
developed world are therefore unavoidable.
Moreover, as Fareed Zakaria rightly reminded us in his discussion of the
Western leaders chosen for the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, "customs of an old segregated country club .. . may be charming and
amusing to insiders, but to outsiders it is bigoted and outrageous."3 73 At a
time when international cooperation is greatly needed in the public health
arena, the resentment created by the country club-approach to international
norm-setting is likely to be highly counter-productive.
Even worse, as noted in Part IV.A, communicable diseases have
presented a much more complicated picture. Whatever happens in the
BRICS countries could easily affect those in the developed world. As
Obijiofor Aginam rightly observed:
370. As Daniel Gervais explained, "I refer to this approach as 'Country Club' because, like
a country club, the membership rules are negotiated by a number of like-minded founders.
Others are then invited to join, but changes to the membership rules are difficult to achieve."
Daniel Gervais, Country Clubs, Empiricism, Blogs and Innovation: The Future ofInternational
Intellectual Property Norm Making in the Wake of ACTA, in TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 323, 324 (Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier eds., 2012).
371. For criticisms of the ill-advised "country club" approach to international norm-setting,
see generally Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, supra note 234, at 5-9; Yu, Six Secret Fears,
supra note 234, at 1074-83.
372. For the Author's earlier discussions of the Chinese intellectual property system, see
generally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in
the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners
(Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901
(2006); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007); Peter K. Yu, The Middle
Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR. REV. INT'L L. 209 (2011).
373. FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD 38 (2008).
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Microbes carry no national passports, neither do they recognize
geo-political boundaries or state sovereignty. Propelled by travel,
trade, tourism, the phenomenon of globalization, and a host of
other factors, public health threats occasioned by an outbreak of a
disease in one remote part of the world can easily transcend
national boundaries to threaten populations in distant places.374
In fact, "[g]lobalization, with its increased trade and travel, meant that
outbreaks even in a small prefectural city can quickly become international
in scope and threat.", 7 1 In all three virostories discussed in this Article, the
virus began in one place but ended with a large number of victims in
another place. SARS was the quickest, the most severe, and the most
unexpected. It spread from a village in Foshan, China to a few
superspreaders to multiple victims in Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Vietnam, and other parts of the world.3 76 "By the time [SARS] came under
374. OBUIOFOR AGINAM, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PUBLIC HEALTH IN A DIVIDED WORLD 6 (2005); accord MARK S. SMOLINSKI ET AL., MICROBIAL
THREATS TO HEALTH: EMERGENCE, DETECTION, AND RESPONSE xvii (2003) ("Whether naturally
occurring or intentionally inflicted, microbial agents can cause illness, disability, and death in
individuals while disrupting entire populations, economies, and governments. In the highly
interconnected and readily traversed 'global village' of our time, one nation's problem soon
becomes every nation's problem as geographical and political boundaries offer trivial
impediments to such threats.").
375. Alan Schnur, The Role of the World Health Organization in Combating SARS,
Focusing on Efforts in China, in SARS IN CHINA, supra note 213, at 31, 50. Similarly, the late
John Mann observed:
The world has rapidly become much more vulnerable to the eruption and,
most critically, to the widespread and even global spread of both new and old
infectious diseases. This new and heightened vulnerability is not mysterious.
The dramatic increases in worldwide movement of people, goods, and ideas
is the driving force behind the globalization of disease.... The lesson is that
a health problem in any part of the world can rapidly become a health threat
to many or all.
Jonathan M. Mann, Preface to LAURIE GARRETT, THE COMING PLAGUE xv, xv (1994); see also
LEE, GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH, supra note 284, at 61-103 (discussing the spatial dimension
of global health); Mclnnes, supra note 17, at 46 ("The increased speed of movement of goods
and people, and their rapid interaction over wider geographical areas, means that infectious
diseases can spread more quickly and over a greater area than ever before . . .
376. As an epidemiology professor recounted:
[SARS] remained a fairly local problem until February 21, 2003, the day on
which a 65-year-old physician from Guangdong checked into a room on the
ninth floor of the Metropole Hotel in Hong Kong, already symptomatic with
the infection for which he had been treating people back at home. Although
the doctor had little contact with others in the hotel, twelve guests staying on
the same floor were eventually diagnosed with SARS. Among them were a
Chinese businessman who traveled on to Hanoi to become the index case of
the outbreak there, a Singaporean woman who was hospitalized soon after
her return to her native city, an elderly woman from Toronto who went home
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control in August 2003, 8422 cases had been identified in 29 countries with
908 fatalities."3 77 The disease showed vividly "what could happen in a
globally interconnected world where infectious diseases have the capacity
to spread rapidly along international air travel routes."
Finally, if developed countries continue to ignore the needs, interests,
conditions, and priorities of the BRICS countries and the African Group,
there is a good chance that these countries would be willing to team up with
each other to establish a unified position 3 79-- or worse, a radical unified
position. Such development would resonate with the earlier discussion
about the increasingly radical turn in intellectual property law and policy.38o
As I noted in the past, if Brazil, China, and India are willing to team up with
each other, they could form a formidable alliance rivaling the traditional
trilateral alliance among the European Union, Japan, and the United
States.38 1 This BRICS-African Group alliance likely will have a major
impact on the future development of the international intellectual property
system.
In sum, it is important to facilitate greater cooperation within both the
international intellectual property system and the global health regime. Such
cooperation is particularly needed in the area of communicable diseases. As
Wolfgang Hein, Sonja Bartsch, and Lars Kohlmorgen observed, "[i]n
modern times, the fight against infectious diseases has always depended on
international cooperation, requiring nations to coordinate their health and
trade strategies with each other."38 2 Likewise, Andrew Price-Smith and
Huang Yanzhong also noted:
to expose her large family in Canada, and a group of others who were
admitted to Hong Kong hospitals, where they spread the disease to many of
the hospital staff to whom they were exposed.
Megan Murray, The Epidemiology of SARS, in SARS IN CHINA, supra note 213, at 17, 19.
377. McInnes, supra note 17, at 44.
378. Christine Loh, Preface to AT THE EPICENTRE, supra note 113, at vii, vii.
379. For discussions of the benefits of setting up an alliance among these countries, see
generally Peter K. Yu, Building IPC4D to Promote Access to Essential Medicines, in GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE OF HIV/A[DS, supra note 16, at 200; see also Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property
and Asian Values, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 329, 371 (2012) (arguing that teaming up
China, India, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the form
of a "Chindiasean" alliance will create a formidable force in future international intellectual
property negotiations).
380. See supra Part IV.B.1.
381. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 67, at 358-62 (arguing that, if the BRICS
countries are willing to join together to form a coalition, it is very likely that the resulting
coalition will possess immense power to stop the push by the European Union and the United
States to ratchet up global intellectual property standards while threatening to grind the
intellectual property harmonization process to a halt).
382. Hein et al., Conclusion, supra note 347, at 226.
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The health of developed countries is increasingly affected by
microbes emerging in the poorer reaches of the developing world
(e.g., avian influenza, West Nile virus, SARS). Therefore, global
public health can be understood as a public good, and the costs of
epidemiological surveillance and containment should be borne by
the international community, although continued diplomatic
leadership by the hegemon (the U.S.) will doubtless be central.383
Indeed, poverty and a lack of infrastructure-whether in Asia, Africa, or
other parts of the world-could create "weak links" in the global response
to pandemics. 38 4 Because of the climate, crowdedness, and huge population,
China and countries in Southeast Asia have also been the breeding places
for outbreaks of influenza and other infectious diseases. 385 It is therefore no
surprise that the third story about viral sovereignty took place in Indonesia.
As Kathryn White and Maria Banda observed in the HIN1 context:
[N]ational pandemic preparedness, by its nature, is an international
issue: in a world lacking equitable access to the cure, even the
vaccinated would face devastation if the global economy were to
stop in its tracks. Instead of hoarding the vaccine, the West ought
to release it to the most vulnerable, because the regions the first to
be hit would also be the first line of defence.386
383. Price-Smith & Huang, supra note 112, at 44.
384. See FIDLER & GoSTIN, supra note 179, at 219 (noting the need for development of new
governance approaches that "must be global in scope to avoid gaps or 'weak links' in the chain
of efforts created to prevent, protect against, and respond to pathogenic threats"); see also David
Heymann, Foreword to FIDLER, supra note 27, at xi, xi ("A high proportion of new and
emerging infectious diseases come from developing countries, often those least equipped to
detect and respond to them early, and to contain them before they spread internationally.");
Adrian Kay & Owain David Williams, Introduction: The International Political Economy of
Global Health Governance, in GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, supra note 17, at 1, 10 ("[One]
mode of disease transmission is linked to poverty, underdevelopment, the underlying structure
and particular spatial characteristics of the global economy, and particularly poor levels of
public health infrastructure in many countries.").
385. See CHAN, supra note 360, at 8 ("The three large-scale outbreaks of pandemic viruses
in the twentieth century-the 1918 Spanish influenza, the 1956 Asian influenza, and the 1968
Hong Kong influenza-were widely believed to have originated in Asia."); FIDLER, supra note
27, at 72 ("The southeast Asian region had also been the location of two previous scary but
ultimately limited viral outbreaks-the H5N1 avian influenza outbreak in Hong Kong in 1997
and the Nipah virus outbreak in 1998-99 in Malaysia. . . . Public health experts have kept an
eye on southern China and southeast Asia as a possible, if not the probable, source of the long-
anticipated, killer pandemic influenza virus."); NINA HACMGIAN & MONA SUTPHEN, THE NEXT
AMERICAN CENTURY: How THE U.S. CAN THRIVE AS OTHER POWERS RISE 41 (2010) ("When it
comes to influenza, China is both the problem and the solution. Asia, especially southern China,
is ground zero for flu outbreaks.").
386. White & Banda, supra note 190, at 118.
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Given the importance of both the BRICS countries and the African
Group, policymakers should think more about how to use the current trade
and intellectual property provisions to induce more collaboration between
the two groups. Article 31bis(3) of the TRIPS Agreement, for example,
creates a special arrangement that allows less developed countries to
aggregate their markets to generate the purchasing power needed to sustain
the development of an indigenous region-based pharmaceutical industry.38 7
The provision therefore "paves the way for the development of regional
supply centers, procurement systems, and patent pools and institutions,
while facilitating technical cooperation within the region."3" Additional
collaboration can also come from the private sector. As UNAIDS
documented in its technical brief:
In 2007, Quality Chemicals Limited, in cooperation with Cipla, set
up a US$38 million pharmaceutical plant in Kampala, Uganda to
produce antiretrovirals drugs for the domestic market and
eventually for export to the East African region and beyond. In
February 2009, the plant started producing the triple-therapy
combination Triomune (lamivudine, stavudine and nevirapine) and
the antimalarial therapy Lumartem (artemisinin and lumefantrin).
This plant has been approved for procurement of antiretroviral and
malaria medicines drugs by the International Committee of the
Red Cross as well as by the WHO Pre-qualification of Medicines
program.389
From the standpoint of less developed country governments and NGOs,
the arrival of these new players could present new opportunities for
reshaping the international intellectual property and health systems. Indeed,
given the diverse backgrounds, technological capabilities, and innovation
paths the BRICS countries and members of the African Group have, the
positions they take are likely to be quite different from those of developed
countries. As I noted in the inaugural issue of The WIPO Journal, "[I]t is
premature to assume that less-developed countries, once developed, will
always want the existing international intellectual property system. There is
a good chance that they may want or need something rather different!"390
Moreover, as Rorden Wilkinson reminded us:
387. See TRIPS Agreement art. 31 bis(3); Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 67, at 346
(discussing the strengths and weaknesses of Article 31 bis(3)).
388. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 67, at 346 (footnotes omitted).
389. UNAIDS Technical Brief, supra note 90, at 6.
390. Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order, supra note 331, at 15. Indeed, because these
countries "generate substantial trade surpluses with OECD countries, arguments in favour of
price concessions on pharmaceuticals may become less compelling in a wider political arena,"
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[T]he evolving character of global governance brings with it
moments of opportunity-moments in which pressure can be
brought to bear on the emerging patterns of governance. In such
moments, alternative possibilities have the potential to emerge,
thus altering the way in which global governance is constituted. In
this way, identifying the potential for alternative possibilities
becomes an intrinsic part of any interrogation of global
governance.
D. Negotiated Outcomes
1. Lesson #6: A Multiplicity of Options
When the three virostories are taken into account, one could not help but
notice the significantly different openings, plot twists, and endings in each
story. Although all three stories touch on deficiencies and challenges within
the international patent system, the approaches taken by the characters in
each story and the compromises they struck have been rather different.
While compulsory licensing dominated the first story, viral sovereignty
claims were asserted in the last story.
Taken together, these three virostories reveal a wide array of approaches
that countries can deploy to address the deficiencies in the existing
international patent system. To some extent, the stories warn against the
rather narrow focus many policymakers have had when considering options
to revamp the existing patent system. Although changes in the intellectual
property arena are often made based on addition (through new, broader, and
stronger rights) and subtraction (through limitations and exceptions),3 92
commentators have widely questioned whether the system should be based
solely on the property rights model enshrined in the Paris Convention, the
TRIPS Agreement, and other international intellectual property treaties.
even though the poor in these countries continue to suffer from high prices and the resulting
inaccessibility of drugs. Abbott, Cycle ofAction, supra note 52, at 29.
391. Rorden Wilkinson, Global Governance: A Preliminary Interrogation, in GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE, supra note 252, at 1, 3.
392. See Daniel J. Gervais, TRIPS 3.0: Policy Calibration and Innovation Displacement, in
THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 305, at 51, 52-54 (advancing the addition and
subtraction narratives).
393. See Yu, Political Economy, supra note 272, at 792 ("As far as policy options are
concerned, there is a misguided tendency for policymakers in both developed and less
developed countries to assume that the property rights model is the only model, or the best one,
that is compliant with the TRIPs Agreement or other commitments under the international
intellectual property regime.").
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Proposals abound to suggest the use of other options, including grants,
subsidies, prizes, advance market commitments, reputation gains, patent
buy-outs, open source drug discovery, patent pools, public-private
partnerships, and equity-based systems built upon liability rules.39 4
There have also been growing discussions at both the domestic and
international levels about the need for greater limitations and exceptions in
the intellectual property system, including the adoption of compulsory
licenses, parallel importation, and government use provisions and the
introduction of exceptions for early working, research, and development of
diagnostics.39 5 Beyond patents, commentators have advanced the use of
limitations and exceptions in other or broader intellectual property contexts.
For example, in a project commissioned by the Open Society Institute,
Bernt Hugenholtz and Ruth Okediji discussed the need to develop an
international instrument on limitations and exceptions to copyright.396 A few
years earlier, Rochelle Dreyfuss also articulated the need to develop
affirmative user rights to facilitate public access to protected materials.39 7
The development of limitations and exceptions is particularly important
in the context of global health governance. Such development becomes
even more important when communicable diseases are involved. Consider,
for example, a special exception for the provision of diagnostic kits for
testing patients. Regardless of whether it is HIV, SARS, H5N1, HINI,
MERS, or H7N9, a person infected with the virus may not quickly show
distinct symptoms before the virus is spread to other members of the
community.39 Testing and screening therefore will be highly critical to the
prevention, control, and treatment of the disease. If a patent holder can
prevent others from testing and screening the disease, the results from the
public health standpoint could be disastrous, especially when the disease
can easily spread from one region to another. The need for testing was,
394. See generally GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS, supra note
148 (collecting articles discussing patent pools, clearinghouses, open source models, and
liability regimes); Ho, supra note 14, at 355-72 (advancing new approaches to alleviate the
impact patents have on short-term access to medicine); INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC
HEALTH, supra note 63, at 133-283 (collecting articles discussing prizes, patent pools, and open
source drug discovery).
395. See, e.g., 'T HOEN, supra note 63, at 39-59; IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29,
at 49-51; RODRIGUES, supra note 12, at 159-236.
396. See HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDI.I, supra note 319.
397. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 21, 21 (2004); see also Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, supra note 274, at 396-401
(outlining the various proposals advanced by scholars).
398. See, e.g., Robert Goldberg, Disease Control, WASH. TIMES, May 15, 2003, at A19
("SARS and HIV are the same in one respect: You can test positive but not show symptoms.
That means the only way to control it is through testing, screening and education.").
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indeed, one of the primary reasons why the patents surrounding BRCAl
and BRCA2-genes associated with a predisposition to breast and ovarian
cancers-were challenged in Association for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc."'
While the three virostories show that a wide and diverse array of policy
options exists, they also indicate that these options can be developed in
many different ways. In fact, the debate concerning access to essential
medicines in less developed countries does not always end with these
countries on the defensive end, demanding special and differential
treatment. With collective insights and the assistance of outside experts,
such as academics and NGOs from the developed world,4 00 these countries
have now been slowly moving toward the offensive end, demanding
compromises from both within the system and without. In the future, the
development of the international patent system is likely to be highly
intriguing as the larger developing countries, such as Brazil, China, and
India, become more economically powerful, more technologically
proficient, and more assertive on the negotiating front.40 1
Moreover, as the three virostories have shown, the discontent with the
existing international patent system is not limited to only less developed
countries. In fact, a heterogeneous group of countries has been dissatisfied
with the system. Because of their different economic strengths and
technological capacities, the policy choices and responses they made are
also quite varied. For example, the more technologically proficient
countries402 have chosen to compete with developed countries-either under
399. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2107 (2013). "Genetic tests are an important component of health
care services, as they provide a way to establish difficult diagnoses and to detect persons at risk,
before expressing the disease. Testing is also useful in planning clinical interventions that may
benefit the concerned individuals, by attenuating or even efficiently treating their disease." Van
Overwalle, supra note 149, at 387-88.
400. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 67, at 377 (noting the important role NGOs,
academics, and media from developed countries can play in promoting access to essential
medicines in the less developed world).
401. On the emergence of these countries, in particular China, as innovative powers, see
generally Peter K. Yu, Five Oft-repeated Questions About China's Recent Rise as a Patent
Power, 2013 CARDOzO L. REV. DE Novo 78; Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian
Values, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 329 (2012); Peter K. Yu, The Middle Intellectual
Property Powers, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE
MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 84 (Randall Peerenboom & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014); Peter K. Yu, The
Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 525 (2012).
402. See Shamnad Basheer & Annalisa Primi, The WIPO Development Agenda: Factoring
in the "Technologically Proficient" Developing Countries, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION'S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 100 (Jeremy de Beer ed.,
2009) (differentiating countries based on technological proficiency, rather than economic
development).
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the same rules (as in the case of Versitech in Hong Kong in the second
story) or through the adjustment or reinterpretation of these rules (as in the
case of the Indian generic pharmaceutical industry in the first story). By
contrast, the less technologically proficient countries have no choice but to
rely on special and differential treatment. Nevertheless, they now add to this
special treatment their demands for greater protection of genetic resources
(as in the case of the Indonesian government in the third story). Thus, the
positions they take have not always been TRIPS-minus; where beneficial,
they have also called for the creation of new TRIPS-plus rights.
Indeed, the need to protect genetic resources is one of the primary
reasons why less developed countries were very eager to link the TRIPS
Agreement to the CBD. Paragraph 19 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration
explicitly "instruct[ed] the [TRIPS] Council . . . to examine, inter alia, the
relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on
Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore,
and other relevant new developments raised by members pursuant to Article
71.1 .403 Taking advantage of this linkage, a group of less developed
countries advanced the proposal for Article 29bis of the TRIPS Agreement,
as discussed earlier.404
2. Lesson #7: Rights and Responsibilities
Although Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, which outlines the
Agreement's objectives, states that "[t]he protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights should contribute ... to a balance of rights and
obligations," the Agreement emphasizes rights more than responsibilities.40 5
As the High Commissioner for Human Rights declared in her report:
[W]hile the Agreement identifies the need to balance rights with
obligations, it gives no guidance on how to achieve this balance.
On the one hand, the Agreement sets out in considerable detail the
content of intellectual property rights-the requirements for the
grant of rights, the duration of protection, the modes of
enforcement. On the other hand, the Agreement only alludes to the
responsibilities of [intellectual property] holders that should
403. WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, $ 19, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41
I.L.M. 746 (2002).
404. See supra text accompanying notes 368-69.
405. High Commissioner's Report, supra note 46, 23; see also Yu, Objectives and
Principles, supra note 134, at 1035-37 (discussing the need to identify intellectual property
rights holders' obligations and to build obligations, responsibilities, maximum standards, and
affirmative rights into the intellectual property system).
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balance those rights in accordance with its own objectives. The
prevention of anti-competitive practices and the abuse of rights,
the promotion of technology transfer, special and differential
treatment for least developed countries are merely referred to-but
unlike the rights it sets out, the Agreement does not establish the
content of these responsibilities, or how they should be
implemented.406
While the TRIPS Agreement mentions the word "right" more than a
hundred times, it mentions "responsibilities" only once. 40 7 Even in that
occurrence, the word refers to the responsibilities of the TRIPS Council, not
the responsibilities of intellectual property rights holders.
The approach taken in the intellectual property arena stands in sharp
contrast to the approach taken in the human rights arena. For example, in its
authoritative interpretation of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,4 08 the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights states clearly that "intellectual property is a social product
... [with] a social function" and that "the private interests of authors should
not be unduly favoured and the public interest in enjoying broad access to
their productions should be given due consideration." 40 9 In an earlier
interpretative comment on the right to health, the Committee also declares:
"While only States are parties to the Covenant and thus ultimately
accountable for compliance with it, all members of society-. . . including
... the private business sector-have responsibilities regarding the
realization of the right to health." 4 10
Like these general interpretive comments, the preamble to the Human
Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to
Medicines states: "Pharmaceutical companies, including innovator, generic
and biotechnology companies, have human rights responsibilities in relation
to access to medicines."4 1' Guideline 26, in particular, stipulates that these
companies "should make and respect a public commitment not to lobby for
more demanding protection of intellectual property interests than those
406. High Commissioner's Report, supra note 46, T 23.
407. TRIPS Agreement art. 68.
408. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
409. General Comment No. 17, supra note 270, 35.
410. General Comment No. 14, supra note 139, 42.
411. Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest
Attainable Standard of Physical & Mental Health, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right
of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental
Health, at 15, transmitted by Note of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/63/263 (Aug. 11,
2008) (by Paul Hunt), available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/human rights/
A63_263.pdf.
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required by TRIPS, such as additional limitations on compulsory
licensing." 4 12
In recent years, commentators have widely discussed the need to build
obligations, responsibilities, maximum standards, and affirmative rights into
the intellectual property system. As Jacqueline Lipton pointed out, when
laws borrowed from traditional property theory are applied in the
information property context, there is a tendency to overlook the fact that
"traditional Property rights entail significant concurrent obligations or
responsibilities imposed on the proprietary owner as an incident of their
Property ownership." 413 Jerome Reichman, Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, and
I have also independently articulated the important roles Articles 7 and 8 of
the TRIPS Agreement can play in the international intellectual property
regime.4 14 To a large extent, the lack of focus on responsibilities in the
TRIPS Agreement has tilted the balance so far toward rights holders that the
Agreement no longer fulfills the Article 7 objective of achieving "a balance
of rights and obligations."4 1 5
Even worse, developed countries increasingly push less developed
countries to introduce heightened obligations to enforce intellectual
property rights, even though the preamble to the TRIPS Agreement
explicitly states that "intellectual property rights are private rights."4 16 Cases
in point are those provisions in ACTA, the TPP, and other nonmultilateral
trade agreements that call for greater criminal enforcement, ex officio
authority, and data exclusivity on the part of regulatory authorities. These
demands gradually shift the costs and responsibilities from private rights
holders to national governments.4 17
412. Id. at 21.
413. Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV.
135, 148 (2004).
414. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Proportionality and Balancing Within the Objectives
for Intellectual Property Protection, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 161,
169-91 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2008); J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes ofAge:
Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441, 461
(2000); Yu, Objectives and Principles, supra note 134, at 1018-46.
415. TRIPS Agreement art. 7.
416. Id. pmbl., recital 4; see also Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing
Countries, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 727, 747-54 (2011) (discussing the private nature of
intellectual property rights); UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND
DEVELOPMENT: AN AUTHORITATIVE AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 11 &
n.21 (2005) [hereinafter TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK] (stating that a senior member of the WTO
Secretariat recalling that "the reference to 'private rights' was included at the insistence of the
Hong Kong delegation, which wanted clarification that the enforcement of IPRs is the
responsibility of private rights holders, and not of governments").
417. See Li, supra note 51, at 28 ("Responsibility of enforcement has cost implications....
[B]y shifting responsibility, it would shift the cost of enforcement from private parties to the
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From the standpoint of global health governance, such a shift is highly
undesirable, as stronger enforcement often comes with a hefty price tag and
difficult trade-offs.4 18 Given the limited resources in many less developed
countries, an increased use of resources in the enforcement area will
inevitably lead to the withdrawal of resources from other competing, and at
times more important, public needs. An example of these competing needs
that easily comes to mind is the protection of public health.419 As the IPR
Commission noted in its influential final report:
[A]s state enforcement of IPRs is a resource-intensive activity,
there is a strong case for developing countries to adopt IPR
legislation that emphasises enforcement through a civil rather than
a criminal justice system . ... [W]e note that developing countries
have come under pressure from industry which advocates
enforcement regimes based on state initiatives for the prosecution
of infringements. Such pressures should be resisted, and right
owners assume the initiative and costs of enforcing their private
rights.420
In sum, policymakers should take account of both rights and
responsibilities when developing laws and policies. In doing so, they will be
in a better position to strive for balance between the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights on the one hand and the
fulfillment of international health and human rights obligations on the other.
As commentators rightly reminded us, the protection of intellectual property
rights should not be seen as an end in itself, but rather a means to an end.42'
government and ensure right-holders are beneficiaries without taking responsibility."); Henning
Grosse Ruse-Khan, Re-delineation of the Role of Stakeholders: IP Enforcement Beyond
Exclusive Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 51, at 43, 51-52
(noting the trend of "externalizing the risks and resources to enforce [intellectual property]
rights away from the originally responsible rights-holders towards state authorities").
418. See generally Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, supra note 51.
419. Other needs include purification of water, generation of power, reduction of child
mortality, provision of education, promotion of public security, building of basic infrastructure,
reduction of violent crimes, relief of poverty, elimination of hunger, promotion of gender
equality, protection of the environment, and responses to terrorism, illegal arms sales, human
and drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and corruption. See Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and
Developing Countries, supra note 416, at 751 & n.125.
420. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 147.
421. See id. at 6 (stating that intellectual property rights should be regarded "as instruments
of public policy which confer economic privileges on individuals or institutions solely for the
purposes of contributing to the greater public good" and that the conferred privileges should be
"a means to an end, not an end in itself"); TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 416, at 125-26
("Article 7 makes it clear that IPRs are not an end in themselves."); Marco Ricolfi, Is There an
Antitrust Antidote Against IP Overprotection Within TRIPs?, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
305, 326 (2006) ("A closer reading of TRIPs . . . shows that [intellectual property] protection
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In the global health context, such protection should be harnessed to
promote the protection of public health and greater access to essential
medicines in both developed and less developed countries. The introduction
of responsibilities into the international intellectual property system would
also resonate with the ongoing discussions of responsibilities in national
healthcare debates. As Adrian Kay and Owain David Williams observed:
[N]eoliberal healthcare states use the technique of
responsibilisation; citizens become "responsibilised" by making
them see health risks and outcomes such as illness or disease as
their own individual responsibility, with the corollary that the
policy problem of health governance is framed as one of
encouraging "self-care". . . . We [also] witness responsibilisation
in many of the current debates in advanced capitalism over
tobacco, obesity, and access to medicines; they reveal the
dominant neoliberal thrust in health, it is our responsibility to
remain free of illness so as to be able to work and to care for our
dependents such as children and elderly parents.422
CONCLUSION
The movie Contagion paints a grim picture where a mysterious disease
quickly travels from Macau, China to other parts of the world. In the first
few scenes of the movie, people die and suffer without knowing where the
disease came from, what the disease entails, and how doctors could prevent
or treat the disease. The quick and wide spread of this contagion eventually
leads to quarantines, deaths, emotional distress, crimes, and ultimately mass
panic. The movie also raises important questions about the readiness of our
public health system and our ability to trust governments to do the right
thing.
Although this movie features heavily dramatized events, its important
point that a failure to prevent and control a highly contagious disease can
take a heavy toll on society is not lost on the audience. The inclusion of
scenes from different parts of the world also drives home the point that
viruses can spread quickly from one country to another and often by
accident-something that has already been vividly demonstrated by the
spread of HIV/AIDS, SARS, and HIN1.
and enforcement are seen as means rather than ends in themselves both because the larger ends
encompass freedom of trade . . . and because the international community is committed to
taking into account other non-trade and non-[intellectual property] factors while shaping
[intellectual property] protection.").
422. Kay & Williams, supra note 384, at 6-7 (citations omitted).
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The three virostories discussed in this Article have shown that the
intellectual property system can play a very important role in addressing the
concerns caused by communicable diseases and the spread of viruses.
Whether that role is constructive or destructive will depend largely on
whether the system is tailored to the needs, interests, conditions, and
priorities of each individual member of the international community. While
we need the development of new pharmaceuticals to prevent, control, treat,
or cure these diseases, we also need to ensure that the needed medicines are
available and affordable in all corners of the world.
The discussion of issues at the intersection of intellectual property and
public health becomes even more important considering that diseases can
easily spread from rich developed countries to poor less developed
countries, or vice versa. Sub-Saharan Africa needs medicines to deal with
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis just as the United States had urgency
for ciprofloxacin in response to the anthrax scare shortly after the
September 11 terrorist attacks.4 23 The three virostories discussed in this
Article undoubtedly provide important reminders about the need for greater
global collaboration to harness the international patent system to provide
mutual benefits.
423. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 14, at 874 (noting the
United States' need for ciprofloxacin following the anthrax attacks in Boca Raton, New York,
and Washington in 2001).
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